Modality and Free Will: an Incompatibilist Account of Frankfurt-style Cases
Location
PANEL: Philosophy Honors: Contemplating the Boundaries of Existence
CELA A019
Document Type
Presentation - Open Access
Start Date
4-28-2023 10:00 AM
End Date
4-28-2023 11:00 AM
Abstract
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which has enjoyed broad support until the 1960s, states that an agent is morally responsible for their decision only if they have an alternative possibility accessible to them. Frankfurt-style Cases (FSCs) present counterexamples to PAP; agents appear to be morally responsible, yet lack the ability to do otherwise. In my paper, I argue that the challenges presented by FSCs – specifically those with counterfactual intervention – necessitate a particular view on the compatibility of free will and determinism that I present. My view can be summarized as follows: a necessary condition of free will is that the decision must be made in a universe where at least one of the events that causally influences the decision does so indeterministically. I conclude that my view, which I present partly by way of modal semantics, allows one to dismiss the objection raised by FSCs and preserve PAP.
Keywords:
Modality, Determinism, Free will, Metaphysics
Recommended Citation
Lee-Sursin, Julian, "Modality and Free Will: an Incompatibilist Account of Frankfurt-style Cases" (2023). Research Symposium. 6.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/researchsymp/2023/presentations/6
Major
Philosophy; French
Project Mentor(s)
Amy Berg, Philosophy
Kate Thomson-Jones, Philosophy
2023
Modality and Free Will: an Incompatibilist Account of Frankfurt-style Cases
PANEL: Philosophy Honors: Contemplating the Boundaries of Existence
CELA A019
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which has enjoyed broad support until the 1960s, states that an agent is morally responsible for their decision only if they have an alternative possibility accessible to them. Frankfurt-style Cases (FSCs) present counterexamples to PAP; agents appear to be morally responsible, yet lack the ability to do otherwise. In my paper, I argue that the challenges presented by FSCs – specifically those with counterfactual intervention – necessitate a particular view on the compatibility of free will and determinism that I present. My view can be summarized as follows: a necessary condition of free will is that the decision must be made in a universe where at least one of the events that causally influences the decision does so indeterministically. I conclude that my view, which I present partly by way of modal semantics, allows one to dismiss the objection raised by FSCs and preserve PAP.
