Aristotle on Perception as Representation
Abstract
Aristotle speaks of perception as having a content that is assessable in terms of truth and falsity. Why might Aristotle have been drawn to a view of perception as representational (as opposed to presentational) in nature? That is the question I aim to address in this paper. I am inclined to think that Aristotle takes perception to be representational rather than presentational because perception sometimes involves having in mind things which are not, strictly speaking, present.
Repository Citation
Ganson, Todd. "Aristotle on Perception as Representation." In Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism, edited by David Bennett and Juhana Toivanen, 57-67. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020.
Publisher
Springer
Publication Date
12-16-2020
Department
Philosophy
Document Type
Book Chapter
Notes
Series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind
ISBN
9783030569457
Language
English
Format
test