Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution
Abstract
This article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary-threat approach, which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance. In particular, we develop an "endogenous" voluntary-threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and eliminate zero-abatement equilibria. Experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the "exogenous" approach of Segerson and Wu (2006) suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes.
Repository Citation
Suter, Jordan F., Kathleen Segerson, Christian A. Vossler, and Gregory L. Poe. 2010. "Voluntary-threat Approaches To Reduce Ambient Water Pollution." American Journal Of Agricultural Economics 92(4): 1195-1213.
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Publication Date
7-1-2010
Publication Title
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Department
Environmental Studies
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aaq042
Keywords
Ambient tax, Laboratory experiments, Nonpoint source pollution control, Voluntary-threat approach
Language
English
Format
text