Visual Prominence and Representationalism

Abstract

A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Publication Date

1-1-2013

Publication Title

Philosophical Studies

Department

Philosophy

Document Type

Article

DOI

https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9853-3

Keywords

Attention, Representationalism, Determinacy of representation, Visual prominence

Language

English

Format

text

Link to Full Text

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