Are Color Experiences Representational?

Abstract

The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. I consider various ways of trying to avoid the objection, and find all of the responses wanting. My conclusion is that we have reason to be skeptical of the orthodox view that color experiences are constitutively representational.

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Publication Date

1-1-2013

Publication Title

Philosophical Studies

Department

Philosophy

Document Type

Article

DOI

https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0018-1

Keywords

Color, Experience, Perception, Color constancy, Lightness constancy, Color appearance, Representation

Language

English

Format

text

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