Event Title

Selfish Routing on the Deterministic Queuing Model

Presenter Information

Christine Antonsen, Oberlin College

Location

Science Center, A255

Start Date

4-24-2015 1:30 PM

End Date

4-24-2015 2:30 PM

Abstract

Dynamic flow networks can model traffic, optical networks, building evacuations, and more. In these situations, though, individual agents using a network want to maximize their own personal welfare, and thus act selfishly. In the field of algorithmic game theory, we study how bad a situation is when everyone acts selfishly compared to finding an optimal solution to the problem. In my research, I focus on selfish routing on the Deterministic Queuing Model. Specifically I study how minor changes in the model can affect the computability, optimality, and existence of selfish routings.

Notes

Session 1, Panel 4 - Tinkering with Models: Studies in Security, Equilibrium, and Intemperance
Moderator: Bob Geitz, Associate Professor of Computer Science

Link to full text thesis at OhioLINK ETD Center:
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1432304648

Major

Computer Science; Mathematics

Advisor(s)

Susan Colley, Mathematics
Alexa Sharp, Computer Science

Project Mentor(s)

Alexa Sharp, Computer Science

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Apr 24th, 1:30 PM Apr 24th, 2:30 PM

Selfish Routing on the Deterministic Queuing Model

Science Center, A255

Dynamic flow networks can model traffic, optical networks, building evacuations, and more. In these situations, though, individual agents using a network want to maximize their own personal welfare, and thus act selfishly. In the field of algorithmic game theory, we study how bad a situation is when everyone acts selfishly compared to finding an optimal solution to the problem. In my research, I focus on selfish routing on the Deterministic Queuing Model. Specifically I study how minor changes in the model can affect the computability, optimality, and existence of selfish routings.