Degree Year
1983
Document Type
Thesis - Open Access
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Economics
Advisor(s)
David Cleeton
Keywords
Insurance, Medicare, United States, Health care
Abstract
The findings of this paper can briefly be summarized. Demand, as measured by hospital admissions rate, is inelastic. Demand, as measured by mean length of stay, is elastic. A given amount of public hospital insurance has a small, but significantly larger effect on demand, by either measure, than an equal amount of private hospital insurance. These estimates can then be applied to several topics. One such topic is the effect of the Reagan Administration's plan to alter the Medicare benefit payment system. A second application measures the welfare loss (Martin Feldstein's phrase) of "excess" hospital insurance coverage, and the gains which would occur if patients were forced to pay a larger share of total costs. Finally, suggestions are made regarding structural changes in private insurance contracts, and ways in which these proposed changes can alter incentives, and thus alleviate tile health care crisis which plagues America.
Chapter 2 is a brief history of private hospital insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. Chapter 3 is a review of pertinent literature. Chapter 4 describes the methodology used. Chapter 5 enumerates the results. Chapter 6 offers interpretation of the results. Chapter 7 analyzes the implications of the results obtained. Chapter 8 concludes the paper.
Repository Citation
Zelder, Martin, "Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and the Demand for Hospital Care: Implications for Medicare and Private Contracts" (1983). Honors Papers. 649.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/649
