Degree Year

2010

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Philosophy

Advisor(s)

Dorit Ganson

Keywords

Warrant, Belief, Pragmatism, Epistemology, Relativism, Justification

Abstract

Philosophical theories of warrant and justification are thought to answer the question of what makes some beliefs better to belief than others. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to find general qualities that beliefs share to get at the nature of warrant. Some of the most prominent theories based on these attempts are criticized. It is then suggested that what all of these theories miss is the fact that whenever the warrant of a belief is being evaluated, characteristics of the evaluator – not just the belief or the believer – affect the epistemic status of that belief. A pragmatist account of warrant is offered that takes into account the evaluator’s role in determining the epistemic status of a belief.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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