On the Generality of Experience: A Reply to French and Gomes
Abstract
According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111:311–331, 2014) criticizes this view, and French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2):451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.
Repository Citation
Mehta, Neil, and Todd Ganson. 2016. "On the Generality of Experience: A Reply to French and Gomes." Philosophical Studies.
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Publication Date
3-14-2016
Publication Title
Philosophical Studies
Department
Philosophy
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0659-6
Keywords
Phenomenal particularism, Phenomenal generalism, Phenomenal character, Naive realism, Particularity of experience
Language
English
Format
text
