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Friends, Barbarians, Future

Countrymen: *Clientela* and Caesar's *De*

Bello Gallico

J.T. Godfrey

Advised by: Professor Chris Trinacty

Classical Civilizations Honors

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Preface: A War of Words

Imagine a Roman citizen of the 50s BCE unrolling Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*. They might expect a dramatic tale of barbarians rushing naked against Roman shields with faces painted blue, blonde mustaches adorning their faces, their hair like horses' manes flowing in the wind. Our Roman would probably believe Gallic society to be even more mysterious than their battle tactics; after all, they counsel with druids, they count by nights, and they believe in a never-ending cycle of life and death. Although some Romans possibly read Posidonius' account of Gallic society (which dispels some of these prejudices), most would think of them as the barbaric enemy to the North. After all, these were the descendants of the Gauls that sacked Rome in 390 BCE.¹

At distinct points in the narrative, this is what Caesar wants you and I, or rather his Roman audience, to believe is the reality of Gaul. However, it is a purposeful exaggeration of the truth, an invented Gaul created by a man writing an account of his own achievements. As Shadee writes, concerning the ethnography of the *BG*,

Caesar's organizing hand is more readily recognized in his portrayal of the protagonists of *De Bello Gallico* and their actions, than in the geographical setting in which they operate. Moreover, Caesar's characterizations of northern Europe appear acceptable because they agree, to some extent, with our own conceptions of Europe. The reason for this correspondence is, of course, that Caesar's conquests and their presentation formed an inspiration for many classical, early modern and modern historians and statesmen, on whose visions our notions are in part dependent. Yet Caesar's ethnographies are not intended as straightforward observations of reality²

¹ Made famous by Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* 5.41, although the work comes after the *BG*, we can assume that this was the depiction of the sack of Rome common in the 1st Century BCE.

² Shadee (2008) 158-160.

Working off of Shadee's concept that Caesar's ethnography is unique due to how he represents the Gauls and Germans based on their actions, the aim of this thesis is to investigate particular ethnographic exaggerations such as *clientela* and to explore how they underscore the political purposes of the *BG*. I will also draw upon Shadee's ideas on Caesar's organizing hand, particularly the interplay between Caesar's textual aims within the work and political aspirations for the military conquest, as I find this defines Caesar's unique ethnographic stylings. For the majority of books, I-V, Caesar presents incidental ethnographic features of Gallic society such as patron/client relationships and their tendency to rely on rumor, which can be found in the military campaign. My own reading of Caesar's ethnography was inspired by this inter-play between the ethnographic "digression" in book VI and the scattered ethnographic details of the military narrative.

For instance, Caesar opens his account with the campaign against the Helvetii and it is told with quasi-journalistic clarity. Divicius the Aeduian druid tells Caesar of the Helvetian "problem" and asks for Roman aid. Caesar subsequently marches to Gaul in defense of an *amicus Romani*.³ As Caesar tells us, in 60 BCE, an ambitious young Gallic aristocrat named Orgetorix had made a move for power and attempted to become the king of one of the most powerful tribes in Gaul: the Helvetii.⁴ He gained prominence among the tribe, displaying qualities such as bravery, wealth, and a familial connection to former powerful Helvetian warlords.⁵ With a silver tongue, he convinced the Helvetians to fulfill his desires of expansion

³ *BG* 1.3.

⁴ *BG* 1.2. (trans. Raaflaub)

⁵ Such characteristics are certainly not foreign to Roman politicians on the make and certain *novi homines*.

and told them they must forsake their homes to make a campaign for the conquest of new lands. Orgetorix and his Helvetian supporters took two years to prepare for the expedition. In addition, Orgetorix conspired with Casticus of the Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui to take up the crowns of their own people and join the Helvetian cause.⁶

Orgetorix's plot to seize the crown is discovered and he stands trial for conspiring to assume ultimate power, a heinous crime that was punishable by a fiery death in the heart of the Wicker Man. To escape from his execution, he gathered his "clients and persons indebted to him" and flees to the Gallic countryside⁷. On the lam, he died by his own hand.⁸ Leaderless, the Helvetii nonetheless make their final preparations and go on the march, their ancestral homeland ablaze behind them. One might think without a leader that they would not take on such a grueling mission. The fact that they went on campaign in spite of Orgetorix's death indicates that it was not the policy, but rather the leader that was problematic.

The Helvetii march through the lands of the Aedui and their neighbors. They plunder towns and cut down fields for supplies. Caesar, protector of Rome and, more importantly, patron of the Aedui, meets the Helvetii in a vulnerable position: three-fourths of their forces had already crossed the Arar River and one-fourth is left on the same bank as the Roman forces.⁹ He shows no remorse in his slaughter of the unprepared force, finally taking revenge on the Tigurini for

⁶ *BG* 1.3.1-1.3.8 (trans. Raaflaub).

⁷ *BG* 1.4.2 (trans. Raaflaub).

⁸ *BG* 1.4.4 (trans. Raaflaub); Caesar says likely by suicide, although he is not entirely certain.

⁹ *BG* 1.8.1 to 1.8.4 (trans. Raaflaub), Caesar and Divicius' patron/client relationship is paramount for Caesar justifying entering the Gallic political landscape.

their slaughter of Lucius Cassius' army in 107 BCE.¹⁰ Caesar's men then construct a massive bridge over the Arar in a single day to face the rest of the Helvetian forces.¹¹ The stunned Helvetians clash with the Roman war machine. Caesar unapologetically denies the Gauls at every turn. His literary goal is to show the full might of the Senate and People of Rome. He glorifies his men's tactical ability to defeat their enemy, erect massive structures such as bridges and walls strong enough to repel tens of thousands of Gallic combatants in hours, and travel at unbelievable speeds.¹²

Sensing an opportunity to take tactical advantage over the Helvetii, Caesar orders his troops to meet them in battle. Before reaching the town of Bibracte, the Helvetii march uphill to attack Caesar's forces.¹³ Caesar and his men, with the advantage of higher ground, hurl their spears and repel brutish force with Roman shields. The battered Helvetii march to a smaller hill southwest of the original battlefield. The Romans fight uphill to meet the Helvetian forces to deliver the final blow. Although they find themselves outflanked, Caesar commands his men to fight their way out to the Helvetian baggage fort and they lay waste to it. When the fog of war is

¹⁰ *BG* 1.12.3-7 (trans. Raaflaub); Caesar points to divine intervention as a reason why the Tigurini were the first of the Helvetii to be killed, according to Raaflaub, "Caesar rarely mentions the god's impact on war and prefers to consider that of chance and luck (Fortuna)." Perhaps this is Caesar showing the impact of the first battle being both so successful and vengeful.

¹¹ See Raaflaub's (2019) annotation at 1.13a-b concerning the construction aspect of the Roman military and the trope of superiority through technological advantage.

¹² Literally and figuratively, an interesting addition to the exaggerations of the *BG* could be to question the speed at which Caesar travels. Using *Orbis*, a geospatial network model of the Roman world created by Stanford University, the reality of Caesar's travel could easily be tested. This is also a trope that appears elsewhere in military accounts of Caesar such as his action towards the pirates that kidnapped him, see Osgood (2010) pg. 328-358.

¹³ *BG* 1.23.2 (trans. Raaflaub).

lifted, Caesar takes a census of the remaining Helvetii. Of the 368,000 who left their ancestral homeland, only 110,000 remain. 220,000 people did not survive the onslaught. The 6,000 Gauls who escape the ruins of the baggage fort all are sold into slavery.¹⁴

What follows in the narrative of *de Bello Gallico* is eerily reminiscent of this initial Helvetian campaign. Caesar outmaneuvers and outclasses his opponents from books I to VI with Roman coolness and tactical precision. However, the campaign against the Helvetii is by far the most brutal and unforgiving towards the Gallic inhabitants. Caesar paints a picture of a smaller force of “pacifying Romans” absolutely decimating a larger force of “vicious Barbarians.” In this trope, the latter is powerless against the tactics, technology, and leadership of Caesar and his army. Caesar does this almost sympathetically for his reader. His depictions of the battles are blunt and calculated, so rather than being bogged down by the morality of the killing, the reader is amazed by the number of “pacified” Helvetii and Caesar’s particular *bellum Romanum*.¹⁵ Caesar the author was able to control the entire narrative and he configures his narrative in order to please his reader’s sensibilities and gain their support.¹⁶

¹⁴ *BG* 1.30.3 (trans. Raaflaub).

¹⁵ As James J. O’Donnell points out, the Latin word for blood (*sanguis*) is only mentioned twice in the entire 8-year campaign. *BG* 7.20.12.2 & 7.50.6.3

¹⁶ This is particularly true of the *BG* as a military narrative. Caesar’s reader is spared the thought of Roman family members or friends or agents of the Republic committing a mass genocide, and can focus on Caesar’s day to day conquering. This is particularly interesting if we look at Korneel (2013), who discusses attitudes towards what we now understand to be Post-Traumatic Stress brought on by military service in Republican Rome. He shows that there is a distinction in interest between military violence and the spectacle of public violence such as executions and gladiatorial combat. I would suggest that Caesar engages with the actuality of violence in a sympathetic manner to appeal to an audience who understood such violence in their daily lives. His readers were possibly veterans who knew the violence of war or everyday Romans who would rather hear about battles won than hearing of their family members and friends brutally slaughtering Gallic men, women, and children. He was conscious of this and it reflects in his writing style and rhetorical technique.

Throughout the work, Caesar combines the day to day military movements of the war with glimpses of ethnography. Ethnographic details culminate in the long excursus of book VI, which is the primary subject of this thesis. Not only does this pause the account in a notable manner, but the narrative drastically changes after the excursus. In books I-VI, Caesar is outnumbered and fights on foreign soil, yet he defeats the Gauls with wit, technology, and maneuverability. By book VII, the Gauls under Vercingetorix fight with Roman discipline and show technological advancements that rival those of Rome. Societally, the people against whom he fights in books I-V are distinctly barbarian with some important exceptions, yet in books VI and VII Caesar emphasizes strong Roman features in their socio-political hierarchies.

There is a subtle, yet clear shift in how “Roman” the Gauls become during the eight-year campaign. This shift is most noticeable after the excursus. In books I-V, the Caesarian reader is made to believe Gaul is plunged deep into barbarity, but after book VI, the Gallic people are shown to have the ability to serve Rome and its people, as they are more akin to Romans than first thought. The ways in which Caesar crafted the Gallic socio-political landscape through his ethnography to both Romanize and Barbarianize the Gauls led me to explore the reasons Caesar created this particular landscape in *De Bello Gallico*.

Section I: Introduction and Methodologies

Recent scholarship, often employing a post-colonialism or historical revisionist lens, has challenged the veracity of Caesar's claims and explored his reasons for characterizing the Gauls in the manner he does. I enter this conversation at a point where we understand the purposefulness and literary artistry of Caesar's writing. Scholars today are very aware that the *BG* is not an unbiased account of his war in Gaul. I will explore the political purposes of Caesar's text and the ways the ethnographic material helps to justify his conquest of Gaul.

Concerning the distribution of the *BG*, there are two schools of thought within the scholastic zeitgeist. The first school of thought is that Caesar sent the chapters as annual reports. In this theory, Caesar would write the reports throughout the campaign, and send it back to Rome during the winter. The second school suggests that Caesar crafted the *BG* during the 7th year of the war in 51BCE and distributed the work before his return to Rome, famously crossing the Rubicon on January 10th, 49 BCE. The idea that Caesar wrote the *BG* during the hardship of the 7th year is made famous by Matthias Gelzer in his 1968 biography on Caesar. Gelzer argues that the *BG* was meant to turn the tide against Caesar's opposition in the Senate.¹⁷ However, recent scholars of the *BG* have argued that the work must have been published in annual reports. For this view, I turn to the scholarship of T.P. Wiseman and his article "The Publication of *De Bello Gallico*."

Concerning Gelzer's theories on the publication and distribution of the *BG*, Wiseman writes:

Two assumptions are being taken for granted here. First, that *De Bello Gallico* is a single narrative composed as a unit after the defeat of Vercingetorix; second, that it was aimed

¹⁷ Gelzer (1968) 171.

at an elite audience of senators and equites, and based on earlier reports to the senate...Both assumptions, it seems to me, are demonstrably false.

In his textual analysis, Wiseman first argues that the *BG* must have been released as annual reports, citing particularly the population of the Nervii in Books II and V.¹⁸ Having solidified his thoughts on the publication of the work, Wiseman then defines the Caesar's audience. It must be acknowledged that the literate population of Rome during the late Republic was minuscule, consisting of a small population of literati elite.¹⁹ However, Caesar's praise of the common man such as Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo and particularly the 10th Legion's bravery in the face of the Germans and Britains shows his praise of the common man.²⁰ As Wiseman points out, Caesar was a *popularis*. His political base was made up of the common man, and this is shown in his somewhat over use of the phrase *populus Romanus*.²¹ So, how did Caesar reach an illiterate audience with the *BG*? Wiseman suggests that the work would have been read aloud, following the tradition of historians such as Thucydides before him.²²

Knowing the manner of publication and Caesar's audience allows us to define the Caesarian reader. As I have discussed earlier, Caesar's work is unique due to how he crafted it sympathetically to his reader. The *BG* is an intentional work, and defining the Caesarian reader as such a diverse audience allows us to know how it was written and why. For example, it must be acknowledged that the Gallic resistance of Book VI, led by Vercingetorix was the most

¹⁸ Wiseman (1998) 2, *BG* 2.15-2.32 & *BG* 5.36-5.58.

¹⁹ Wiseman (1998) 2.

²⁰ Wiseman (1998) 3-4.

²¹ 41 times in Book I alone.

²² Wiseman (1998) pg. 3-7

difficult campaign for Caesar. Book VII is the only account in which the Romans lose a battle with Caesar at their helm, and the battle of Alesia represents the grueling challenge of defeating a calculated, well-led, and well-armed Gallic force. It is interesting how Caesar introduces this resistance in line 7.1, he writes:

Gaul was quiet. Caesar proceeded to Italy, as planned, to hear cases. There he learns of Clodius' murder and hears of the senate's decree that the youth of Italy should take the oath; he decides to hold a draft across the whole province. This news passes swiftly to Transalpine Gaul. Gauls add to it and make up stories as opportunity suggest, that Caesar is detained by unrest at Rome and cannot rejoin the Army while such disturbances last. Seizing this opportunity, people already unhappy to be subject to the Roman people's rule, begin openly, daringly to make plans for war. Gallic leaders summon meetings in woods and wild places, complaining about the death of Acco and observing that the same could happen to them. They bemoan the common lot of Gaul. With every promise and bribe, they challenge men to begin war and liberate Gaul, risking their necks.²³

This line suggests that not only do the Romans have access to the happenings of Gaul, but the Gauls have an ear to the political world of Rome, and decide to go to war with Caesar because of his apparent weakness. What happened in the political worlds of Rome and Gaul were intertwined through the *BG*, and with his work, Caesar was able to control the narrative to both his opposition and his allies. Throughout this essay, it is important to keep the Caesarian reader in mind, as their sensibilities and actions are behind Caesar's portrayal of the campaign's interworkings.

Scholars such as Andrew Riggsby and Andrew C. Johnston have analyzed how Caesar "others" the Gauls in his depiction of Gallic and Germanic societies.²⁴ A post-colonial viewpoint allows the Caesarian reader to further understand Roman ideals through descriptions of the lands

²³ *BG* 7.1 (trans Raaflaub).

²⁴ For example, Riggsby (2006) uses postcolonial theory to delve into the language and rhetoric of *de Bello Gallico* to understand the Roman identity that Caesar poses to his reader as well as Caesar's political motivations for creating a Caesarian-Roman mystique. Spurr (1993).

and people which they conquered.²⁵ Caesar's semi-Romanization of the Gauls delineates the contrasts between Roman, Gallic, and Germanic values and helps us understand how the *BG* sheds light on both other cultures and his own. Building off of the scholarship of Riggsby and Johnston, I am concerned with how Caesar's othering interacts with the deliberate writing of the work. Caesar's use of othering creates a virtual "scale of civilization" between the three groups (Romans, Gauls, and Germans) by which Caesar categorizes the social development of each society. In doing so, Caesar substantiates his own colonial rhetoric for his Roman audience; these motivations are used as justification for his campaign. Therefore, the ethnographic details of the work were meant to council his Roman audience on the importance of conquering the Gauls, crossing the Rhine to engage with Germanic forces, and subjugating the majority of Trans-Alpine Europe.

To define the scale of civilization, I turn to the scholarship of David Spurr and his work *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration*.²⁶ While discussing the categorization of "less superior societies" Spurr studied the appearance of two schools of thought, the Charles Darwin and the Joseph-Arthur Comte de Gobineau schools. Spurr asserts that Darwin in his *Journal of Researches* (1839) believed in a structure where the differences of society came from relative human evolution, in which societies

²⁵ Of course, in any colonial rhetoric of othering, the author represents their own society self-reflexively. As represented in Caesarian scholar Johnston (2018) 18-29. For more defining works on post-colonial theory and its practicality in Classical studies, see Saïd (1978) 1-92, Hall (1989) 1-55, and Ando (2016) 5-12.

²⁶ Although the book serves the purpose of delving into the colonial rhetoric of 21st century, particularly within the theaters of Africa and South America, he adds an interesting theory basis concerning the categorization of civilization that is useful to understanding the Roman rhetoric of Empire. See Riggsby (2006) 121-126 concerning the usefulness of postcolonial theory and Caesar.

evolve at different paces.²⁷ Therefore, Darwin asserts that it is the job of the colonist (more advanced society) to push the colonized (less advanced society) into a more evolved state. In doing so, Darwin asserts his biological theories apply to human societal evolution, in which an imperial force represents the forces of nature, and the native population represents the organism in the midst of evolution. Darwin believed technology and social/moral inequalities defined the difference between societal evolutionary tracks, but argues that growth and evolution are possible. Gobineau on the other hand, in his *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* (1854), believes that the differences between races and societies are natural, inherent, and absolutely unchanging.²⁸ He argues that only societies that are already developed have the ability to continue to progress and evolve. Gobineau theorizes that in contrast, “uncivilized” counterparts are unable to match their social “betters,” nor incite their own progression. Therefore, more developed societies will always be more developed than their “uncivilized” counterparts.

The ability for social evolution is the separating factor between the Darwin and Gobineau schools. To frame the two theorists in a Roman context, Darwin posits that barbarian societies, in this case the Gauls, Germans, and Britains could aspire to and attain Roman standards of society. In contrast, Gobineau represents their inability to ever match a Roman social erudition and technological sophistication. Although the juxtaposition of two different sociological theories is not always perfect, there is a strong resemblance between Caesar’s ethnography of the Gauls, Germans, and Britains and Darwin’s evolutionary ethnocentrism.

²⁷ Darwin suggest that Western societies are the epitome of social evolution.

²⁸ Spurr (1993) 62-66.

Throughout the *BG*, the Caesarian audience, although quite diverse, is meant both to understand the necessity of his war and to engage in active discussions about its purpose in the Roman streets and forum. Caesar reflects ideas from the Darwinian school to create a supportive and sympathetic reader within the ethnography.²⁹ The reciprocal relationship between reader and author was of the utmost importance. When Caesar sends back his yearly reports he is not only able to convey the day to day movements of his army and the importance of his conquest, but he also is able to stay relevant within the larger socio-political sphere of Rome.³⁰ Caesar as writer was reaching out to an audience of Romans who both supported and opposed his leadership and political career, and he hoped to continue fostering their support or to sway their opposition. I argue that Caesar's rhetoric in the *BG* pandered to his audience and their sensibilities in order to garner their support. Caesar wanted his audience to understand that the Gauls of Transalpine Gaul could be a value to the Roman empire as a province, much like Cisalpine Gaul.³¹ The ability to connect with his audience as a whole was invaluable to Caesar, considering support for his campaign was crucial for his own political career, social standing, and ambitions for Northern "pacification."

Caesar's ethnographic lens was a literary strategy meant to highlight how the Gauls were similar to the Romans in some cultural and social norms, but "barbarian" in others. Most

²⁹ If the Gauls can become more Roman and aid Rome in the future, they will be sympathetic to an extensive war that drains money and men from Roman households. If the Gobineau school was used by Caesar, he would prove the opposite and the cost added from the war would not have this 'sympathetic' function.

³⁰ For a comprehensive argument concerning the nature of the *BG* and the delivery of the work to Rome, see Wiseman (1998) pg.1-10.

³¹ A province in 81 BCE and all members made citizens in 49 BCE.

importantly Caesar implies that they had the ability for future social evolution and incorporation into Roman world. Scholars such as Andrew Johnston and Andrew Riggsby have argued that the ethnography of book VI paired with the military ethnographies of books I-VII illuminate Caesar's purposeful writing style.³² It is my intention to show how Caesar's writing strategy is meant to justify conquering Gaul.

There is no way to tell if Caesar is telling the truth in his ethnography. As Riggsby suggests in his book *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*, the Greek tradition of Gallic ethnography including Posidonius, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo offers a different version of the Gauls. Caesar's omissions and exaggerations then must be explained as purposeful. In fact, archeological evidence and further study of pre-conquest Gaul supports the conclusion that Caesar offers his own idiosyncratic account of the Gauls. As Johnston explains,

Order is the fundamental theme of the ethnographic excursus in book 6, *which is now acknowledged to bear little resemblance to the realities of Late Iron Age culture in pre-conquest Gaul*; indeed, the rubric of "factuality" has limited explanatory value for any ancient ethnographic representation. Thus, disentangled from "the facts," *the digression must be interpreted as thoroughly a rhetorical construct motivated by Caesar's textual aims.*³³

Johnston reminds us that Caesar was not an ethnographer, writing the *BG* for sociological or philosophical exploration. Caesar's "textual aims" fit his position as a statesman and a general. Caesar was not the first ancient author to write about the Gauls, however he was the first military commander and politician to create his own Gaul, namely a Gaul "disentangled from the facts" represented in previous ethnographies.

³² Riggsby (2006) 47-59 and Johnston (2018) 81-94.

³³ Johnston (2018) 88.

One example of this is Caesar's omission of the Bardic class of Gallic society. While previous authors stress the four major groups in Gallic society, Caesar points out in 6.13.1-6.15.2 that there are only three groups. The first is the military aristocracy, whose power comes from their control over their clients to engage in the annual raiding season. The second grouping is the Druids who are scholars, priests, and purveyors of knowledge in the Gallic society. Druidical power comes from ancient knowledge. Subsequently young men from the military aristocracy congregate around Druids for their expertise. The third group is the proletariat Gauls whom Caesar calls "slaves," they have neither power nor personal sovereignty.³⁴ Contrary to the Greek tradition, as seen in Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, Caesar completely omits the class of Bards who continue the oral traditions of Gallic society.³⁵ Instead Caesar gives this attribute to the Druids, which seems to be the socio-political class that piqued his interest the most.³⁶

Not only does Caesar purposefully omit certain features of Gallic society that are represented in the Greek tradition, he exaggerates others purposefully. These exaggerations can be seen in the scale of civilization, where Caesar also hyperbolizes the Greek tradition of describing people they believe to be "barbarians." This is most clearly found within his exploration of Germanic life. Caesar creates a hard line between the Germans and the Gauls, which is determined geographically by the Rhine river. He also shows a complete separation between the barbarity of their societies along with their geographical separation.

³⁴ *BG* 6.13.

³⁵ Riggsby (2006) 63 discussing Diodorus Siculus 5.31.5 and Strabo 4.4.4

³⁶ I.e. his 12-line description of them, his use of Divicicus as an example of Patron/client relationships, and his use of the pan-Gallic druid council throughout the work. He also dedicates *BG* 6.13-6.15 to the inner workings of their place in Gallic society.

In his article “*Nostris and the ‘Others’*” Andrew Johnston points out Caesar’s “invention of the Germanic society.”³⁷ In this article, Johnston supports the idea of a scale of civilization in which Caesar positions Gaul as a mirror for Rome. Using the mirror that is Gaul, Caesar can point out both the faults of Rome and the strengths of Gaul socio-politically. He argues that Gauls are on one hand stuck in the tropes of “Northern barbarity” and on the other hand displayed as affected/socialized by Roman presence. Caesar describes Gaul in terms of how its society compares and contrasts to Roman society. Germania on the other hand is described “in terms of lacks and absences.”³⁸ This is just one exaggeration that leads to further questions about Caesar’s rhetorical tactics.

In contrast to Caesar’s hard line of geographic and ethnographic differences between the Germanic and Gallic peoples, Greek ethnographers had a hard time creating distinctions between the two.³⁹ Strabo especially creates a homogeneous “Northern Barbarian” that closely resembles other Greek ethnographies such as the Scythians and Numidians of Herodotus.⁴⁰ By recognizing Caesar’s diversions from Greek historians, geographers, and ethnographers, the Caesarian reader finds singularities within the larger canon of Gallic ethnography that we can attribute to Caesar alone.⁴¹

³⁷ Johnston (2018) 89-91.

³⁸ Johnston (2018) 91: for example, their lack of property rights, lack of ‘proper gods’, lack of agriculture, lack of social stratification, and most importantly their lack of druids and sacrifices which Caesar sees as the most interesting parts of barbaric Gallic society. *BG*, 6.21-6.23.

³⁹ Krebs (2006) 111-120.

⁴⁰ Riggsby (2006) 55-56.

⁴¹ The main argument of Riggsby (2006) 47-53; the ethnography is uniquely Caesarian compared to the Greek ethnography.

I intend to use the ethnographic details that are uniquely Caesarian to show how Caesar “invented” a Gaul that fit his position as a conqueror and an author. In Caesar’s broad stroke ethnography of Book VI, it is clear that he is reaching out to his Roman audience for a multitude of potential reasons. Due to the nature of Caesar being both conqueror and author, he able to simultaneously justify the expansion of his wealth, stretch the reach of the Empire, and advertise his adventurous spirit.⁴² The social norms that Caesar fabricates make the Caesarian ethnography unique to the *BG* and his account of Gallic society. After a close reading of the ethnographic material in book VI, I will focus on one aspect of it, *clientela*, and reveal its importance for the larger narrative.

Caesar clearly exaggerates the social function of *clientela* among the Gauls, which is first described in Posidonius. Posidonius describes the “parasites” that eat around the military gentry, but this relationship is concerned with nothing more than dining traditions.⁴³ Caesar on the other hand uses *clientela* as the central piece for his ethnographic purposes because of the prevalence of patrons and clients in Rome. In the world of the late Roman Republic, *clientela* and its web of power relations deeply affected the political landscape. Caesar exaggerates these aspects in Gauls not only because the Roman landscape is dominated by *clientela*, but also because he

⁴² In this, I am addressing the wealth of ancient historiography that deals with Caesar's intentions in Gaul. I have broken this down into two schools of thought, The Suetonian Plutarch schools of thought. Plutarch paints Caesar as an adventurer in his correlation between Caesar and Alexander in his *Parallel Lives*. He does so to show that Caesar’s motivations for the Gallic campaign were that of an adventurer. Suetonius, in contrast, shows Caesar’s economic interest and paints Caesar as somewhat of a tyrant. He writes in his *Lives of 12 Caesars*, that Caesar only went to Gaul to justify the incentives of power and wealth that came with an illustrious campaign in Western Europe. I will argue that the ethnography suits his mission of conquest and that the work should be viewed with “Caesar the Conqueror” as his defining character, rather than “Caesar the Adventurer” or “Caesar the Ambitious”.

⁴³ Riggsby (2006) 47.

wants to comment on the implications of this system in Rome of the 50s BCE. Leaders such as Cicero, Pompey and Caesar amassed massive numbers of clients and in turn increased their personal power. I will argue that Caesar's exaggeration of Gallic *clientela* plays into this trend. I have chosen to focus on *clientela*, as it speaks directly to Caesar's internal and external motivations. In doing this, I will be able to show what purpose the ethnography served Caesar the general, the statesman, and most importantly, the conqueror.

A Note on Translation

For this paper, I will be using two different translations of the *BG*. The primary translations I have used for this work are *The Landmark Julius Caesar*, a translation of the entire body of Caesarian *Commentarii*, by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Robert B. Strassler. In addition, I have also consulted James J. O'Donnell's recently published *The War for Gaul*. The Raaflaub translation highlights Caesar's literary approach. It takes more of a holistic viewpoint and includes more broad footnotes that focus primarily on Caesar's references to Roman culture, social norms, and other works of literature. In taking this approach Raaflaub and Strassler have provided a *BG* that is centered within Roman society and literature. I have also chosen to use the O'Donnell translation since it highlights a central theme of this paper, the purposeful nature of Caesar's rhetoric. O'Donnell and I share the opinion that the *BG* should be looked at as a work meant to justify Roman colonialism, in which Caesar used the *BG* to solidify his position as a conqueror. The combination of both translations will allow for a contextualized and focused reading, which I will show how Caesar interacts with both the Roman world and his individual reader. I have also translated certain passages with the guide of Professor Chris Trinacty that highlight fundamental arguments and central themes of this paper in particular.

Section II: *Clientela* in the Ethnographic **Excursus**

As I discussed in the last chapter, scholars have challenged the ideas represented in the ethnographic excursus of Book VI, attempting to find a more representative history of Gallic society during the late-Iron age. Authors such as Johnston, Shadee, and Andrew Riggsby vary in method. For example, Johnston discusses the interplay between the Germanic and Gallic ethnographies and the concept of using ethnography to “mirror” Roman society. Shadee suggests the appearance of a separation between the northern barbarian societies and Gaul using Caesar's geographic ethnography, for example his use of the Rhine.⁴⁴ Johnston challenges the reality of the ethnography, in particular, the barbarianizations of Roman social norms.⁴⁵ Riggsby also discusses the differences of the Germanic and Gallic ethnographies in a concept he calls the “‘other’ and the other ‘other’” using concepts apparent in the ethnography such as nomadic fluidity, difference in civilizations, and religious beliefs to separate the Germanic and Gallic ethnographies.⁴⁶

Outside of comparing and contrasting how Caesar presents the Gauls and Germans, Riggsby focuses on the ethnographic context in which Caesar is writing, particularly the intertextuality between Caesar's account and Greek ethnographies of the Gauls. Riggsby attempts to define Caesar's divisions of Gaul and the multitude of nations, regions, and tribes, stating that Caesar changes these geographic and political barriers to suit his own needs. This diversity of methodology and approach to reading the ethnography allows us to use a variety of

⁴⁴ See Shadee (2008) 158-180.

⁴⁵ See Johnston (2018) 81-94.

⁴⁶ See Riggsby (2018) 68-80.

tools in reading the ethnography such as othering, mirroring, intertextuality, barbarianization, and Romanization.

Despite the variety of viewpoints and tools used to read Caesar's ethnographic details, the ethnographic excursus of book VI is still somewhat jarring to the Caesarian reader. In the middle of the book, Caesar makes a dramatic and noticeable shift in style, voice, and subject material. At the beginning of book VI, Caesar is in full campaign mode. The tone of the beginning of book VI resembles the rest of the military narrative. The opening sections inform his reader of the day to day movements of the army, interactions with the Gauls, and progress being made across the Rhine. Preparing for an attack on the Germans, Caesar takes a moment to let the reader know that a shift in narrative is about to take place, he writes:

As we get to this point, it seems appropriate to set out how Gaul and Germany live and how these nations differ from one another.⁴⁷

Caesar wants his reader to know that a change in subject is coming, and wants us to make note of the change. In fact, scholars have made note of this change, and provided a multitude of reasons for it.

In *The War for Gaul*, O'Donnell claims that the reason Caesar pauses the military account to discuss the differences between the societies at this point in the narrative is because he is about to discuss warfare with the Germans rather than the Gauls, and he wants his reader to know the difference.⁴⁸ O'Donnell writes that Caesar's "reader of yearly installments would not remember what he had said about them and their German neighbors at 4.1-4."⁴⁹ Raaflaub agrees

⁴⁷ *BG* 6.11 (trans. O'Donnell).

⁴⁸ O'Donnell (2019) 140.

⁴⁹ O'Donnell (2019) 141.

with O'Donnell and adds that Caesar included the excursus to either A) justify entrance into the Germanic landscape or B) distract the reader from the fact that little was gained in the second crossing of the Rhine.⁵⁰ Although this is a valid argument for Caesar's reintroduction of Germanic/Gallic ethnography, there is a difference between the ethnographic moments of IV.1-4 and the excursus of book VI: the depth to which Caesar indulges his reader in Gallic ethnographic details.

In Book IV, Caesar gives only 4 sections to his reader concerning the barbarity of the Germanic lifestyle. Caesar focusses on particularly barbaric traits mentioned by other ancient ethnographers of Northern barbarians such as wearing animal skins, strange diet/lack of agriculture, and abnormal size. Despite Caesar denoting the excursus as a comparison between Gallic and Germanic societies, the themes of book IV are almost completely repeated at the end of the ethnographic excursus. Although Caesar does add interesting factors such as the never-ending Hercynian forest and magical creatures, the excursus of book VI is primarily a deep dive into Gallic society.

Whereas book IV only discusses the basic customs of Germanic life, in the ethnography of book VI Caesar places the societies of Germany and Gaul in direct opposition to one another. This allows the Caesarian reader to compare and contrast the two societies and see a clear difference between Gaul and Germany on the scale of civilization. The intention of this comparison is to show Gaul's resemblance to a more archaic Rome than a barbaric/Germanic North. So, although Raaflaub and O'Donnell see the Germanic campaign of book VI behind the digression, I believe it gives the Caesarian reader a better view of Gallic society and customs with an eye towards their potential as future clients.

⁵⁰ Raaflaub (2019)

Caesar makes a noticeable shift in how he crafts the Gallic ethnography. He goes from informing the reader about the campaign in the military narrative to entertaining the reader with exciting in-depth cultural analysis. Although I believe that the Germanic ethnography is essential to the *BG* as a whole, there is something particularly interesting about the Gallic ethnography that demands a close attention.⁵¹ In the Gallic ethnography, Caesar coalesces bits of ethnographic information that he has already shared with his reader, such as human sacrifice and a reliance on rumor. However, it is Caesar's comments on the hierarchical structure of Gallic society that have direct ramifications for his political and literary career.

The ethnography has several distinct sections, focusing on a broad range of Gallic elements of society compared to the Germans:

- 6.11- Gallic society is reliant on hierarchical divisions and political factions from nations to individual households. They primarily run on a two-nation system.
- 6.12- When Caesar arrives in Gaul, the Aedui are one powerful nation and the Sequani the other. The Sequani added the Germans and Orgetorix as a patron which changed the balance of power in Gaul. Caesar evened out the power balance.
- 6.13-Two classes in society, Knights and Druids, commoners are slaves. There is a pan-Gallic Druidical council which leads the political and judicial world, particularly presiding over the penal system and keeping the peace between the two powerful nations.
- 6.14-Druids do not participate in military affairs and are the scholars and religious leaders of Gallic society.

⁵¹ See Johnston (2018) pg. 84 for the importance of the German ethnography and Kraus (2018) pg. 277-288 for Caesar in Tacitus' *Germania*

- 6.15- The Knight class of Gallic society participate in *clientela* as patrons. They lead the tribes during the annual warring season, which ended when Caesar arrived.
- 6.16-Gauls practice a form of *Do ut Des* human sacrifice, in which they burn criminals and vagrants in a wicker man.
- 6.17-Digression on Gallic religion-they worship similar Gods with Mercury at the center of their pantheon.
- 6.18-Gauls are descended from Hades, they count by nights, sons are not seen in public with their fathers.
- 6.19-Dowries are given by both families in Gallic weddings. Men have power of life and death over their wives and children. Families and slaves are interrogated after the death of a *pater familias*. Funerals are extremely lavish and the Gauls practice conspicuous consumption-animals, items, and even clients are burned with the dead.
- 6.20- The Gauls use rumor as fact, particularly in matters of governance and war.
- 6.21- German barbarianization-No gods other than the sun and moon, no druids or sacrifices, they hunt and exercise for war even children, they abstain from sex for as long as possible as it makes them taller and stronger, men and women bathe together naked.
- 6.22-Germans do not farm, only eat meat and milk, they have no property ownership and property is chosen by a magistrate so men can focus on war rather than farming and expanding personal wealth.
- 6.23- No common magistrate in times of peace, banditry is a common practice to keep military men hardened. Practice *xenia*, and guest friendship is very important.

- 6.24-Gauls used to be more powerful than the Germans, however due to contact with the Romans, the Gauls have become less barbarian and the Germans now have more *virtus* than the Gauls.
- 6.25-6.28: Digression on the magical Hercynian woods, a never-ending forest which is home to Ox/unicorns the shape of deer, giant Elk, and small elephants with giant horns.

These sections can be divided into two separate categories. One section is complete barbarianization, which primarily focuses on Gallic religion. Caesar presents a “bizzaro world” in which he takes Roman cultural themes such as religious beliefs and assigns the Gauls the direct opposite belief (6.16-18, 20,21-28). It is somewhat comical how Caesar tells the Roman reader that rather than being descended from Jupiter, the Gauls are descendants of Hades, or how rather than counting by days the Gauls count by nights. Caesar presents Gallic religion as simplistic compared to Rome, yet draws a hard line between their level of barbarity compared to the Germans; after all, the Germans don’t even believe in the gods, only the Sun and the Moon. These “bizzaro” qualities are basic barbarianizations that let the Caesarian reader know that Gaul is not as civilized as Rome. Historically, the ethnographic excursus has attracted attention due to these qualities.⁵² I recognize the interest in the extreme ethnographic qualities of the *BG* and the historical necessity to accurately depict the Gauls in opposition to Caesar’s account.⁵³ However, I am more interested in what Caesar believed held together Gallic society. Caesar begins this inquiry into Gallic by finding similarities between Gallic and Roman societies.

⁵² One can see this emphasized in the recent *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (2018) in articles by Rüpke, Batstone, Krebs, Riggsby, and Johnston.

⁵³ For the actuality of Gallic society see Cunliffe (2018) 211-238.

A great example of this is VI.19, in which Caesar presents a quasi-Roman nuclear family with the *pater familias* at the head of a household. Although this might seem like a small shared custom, it gives a level of social complexity, or natural social order to the Gauls that is familiar to Rome. We must remember that the Roman reader would for the most part be unfamiliar with Gallic society, and these small cultural similarities ground Caesar's argument for larger cultural similarities such as *clientela*.

What particularly piques my interest is how Caesar approaches Gallic *clientela*. In the first section, Caesar does not describe the differences between Gallic and Germanic society, as he said was the purpose of *excursus*, but rather delves into a lengthy description of Gallic state and individual *clientela*, Caesar writes:

In Gaul, factions divide not only all the nations, regions, and districts but almost every household. Leaders of these factions are those men who in the estimation of their followers are believed to have the highest authority; to their judgment and decision are deferred all the most important matters under deliberation. This practice seems to have been established from ancient times to ensure that no one among the common people should lack support in a conflict with a more powerful person. For no one allows those among the people for whom he is responsible to be treated violently or unfairly, and if anyone acts contrary to this principle, he loses all authority among his people.⁵⁴

In this section, Caesar demonstrates Gallic hierarchies as a network of reciprocal relationships between the powerful and the less powerful. There are two interesting cultural similarities in this section that connect Gallic and Roman social functions. Firstly, in Gaul, political and judicial power is based on one's clients. Therefore, the more clients a man has, the more power he has in the judicial and political realm. As a *populares* politician with a large number of clients himself, Caesar understood this more than anyone, and his recognition of the Gauls' ideas on power can

⁵⁴ BG 6.11.2-4 (Trans. Raaflaub)

be seen as self-serving, particularly due to the crafted nature of the ethnography. Secondly, Gallic *clientela* was created in the “ancient times” to protect the weak from harm. This is remarkably similar to the view of Roman *clientela*, if we believe the depiction found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

After Romulus had distinguished those of superior rank from their inferiors, he next established laws by which the duties of each were prescribed... **He placed the plebeians as a trust in the hands of the patricians, by allowing every plebeian to choose for his patron any patrician whom he himself wished.** In this he improved upon an ancient Greek custom that was in use among the Thessalians for a long time and among the Athenians in the beginning. For the former treated their clients with haughtiness, imposing on them duties unbecoming to free men; and whenever they disobeyed any of their commands. **They beat them and misused them in all other respects as if they had been slaves they had purchased.**⁵⁵

In Gaul and Rome, *clientela* was meant to protect the weak from the abuses of the strong in its historical/mythological beginnings. Despite the historical founding of Gallic *clientela*, Caesar tells us many times that Gallic *clientela* does not protect the weak, particularly the common people. Only one section later Caesar informs us that “only two classes of men enjoy any kind of distinction and honor, since the common people are treated almost like slaves.”⁵⁶ This interesting paradox shows the difference between Caesar’s sources on the history of Gaul and the actual conditions in Gaul. It seems the actuality of *clientela* in Gaul during Caesar’s campaign resembles less the *clientela* of Romulus’ Rome but rather the ancient Greeks in pre-Solonic Athens who abused their clients and treated them as slaves.

⁵⁵ *Dion. Hal.* 2.9.2 (Trans. Cary).

⁵⁶ *BG* 6.13.1 (trans. Raaflaub).

Having introduced individual *clientela*, Caesar then gives us a lengthy description of Gallic State *clientela* and the two patron states who compete for the patronage of all the Gallic tribes. He writes:

This same way of doing things prevails in Gaul at large, for all the nations are divided among two factions. When Caesar came to Gaul, the leaders of one faction were the Aedui, those of the other the Sequani. **The latter had been weaker, as far as their own resources were concerned, since from ancient times the Aedui enjoyed the greatest influence and had a large number of dependents.** The Sequani had therefore allied themselves with the Germans and Ariovistus, winning them over with great sacrifices and lavish promises. After several battles went their way, and all the Aedui aristocracy were killed, the Sequani had gained such an advantage in power that they were able to bring most of the clients of the Aedui over to their side.⁵⁷

Caesar tells us that the Aedui, like the most powerful individual patrons, enjoy power throughout Gaul due to the number of their client tribes. However, conflict and political strife is introduced by the Sequani when they partner with the Germans. The Aedui, having lost their power, have no control over the region and the bidding of the Sequani's new patrons: Ariovistus and the Germans. This power imbalance shows the frailty of state *clientela* in Gaul. The Germans introduce non-Gallic patrons to the political realm of Gallic state *clientela*, which as Caesar tells us in 6.12.5, led Divicius to approach the Romans in friendship for aid. This is interesting as according to Caesar of Book I, this is not the truth.⁵⁸

In book I, Caesar tells us that the Helvetian entrance into the Roman province is what spurred the campaign.⁵⁹ It is not until the end of book I that Caesar introduces Ambiorix and the

⁵⁷ *BG* 6.11.5-6.12.3 (trans. Raaflaub).

⁵⁸ Wiseman (1998) 1-10 suggests that the work was sent out in yearly reports and read aloud as well as copies given to the literati and political class, which greatly diversifies the "Caesarian reader."

⁵⁹ *BG* 1.10.3 (trans. Raaflaub).

Germans and Divicicus' call for aid. It is particularly striking that Caesar chooses to shift the justification of the war as a defense of *clientela* and the stability of Gaul, rather than a protection of the Roman province in “short haired” Gaul.⁶⁰ Particularly as the next lines reframe the rest of books II-V as a shifting state *clientela*. This device is usually subtle, however in 6.12 Caesar literally frames the events of the military campaign in books I-V very clearly. He writes:

In other respects, as well, the influence and status of the Aedui had been enhanced, and the Sequani had lost their position of leadership. The Remi had stepped into their position. When it became clear that the Remi were as influential with Caesar as the Aedui were, those nations that, because of ancient feuds, could by no means ally themselves with the Aedui submitted as clients to the Remi. The Remi protected their clients carefully and in this way held on to their new and rather suddenly acquired position. Hence at that time the situation was such that the Aedui were considered by far the first in leadership and status, and the Remi held the second.⁶¹

This section of the ethnography is shocking, as the logic of what Caesar is saying changes our understanding of the *BG* as a whole. He is redefining his entire campaign using *clientela*, and expects us as the audience to go along with him. This information, although lumped in with the rest of the *excursus* as “ethnography” is not purely ethnographic. It defines more exactly the political realm of Gaul in its divisions, while the remainder discusses the Gauls as a homogenous people. This section rebrands the military campaign as a game of Gallic state *clientela* in which Caesar is now a major player. So, understanding that the *excursus* has been miscategorized for so

⁶⁰ Omrani (2019) 40; a reference to provincial Cisalpine Gaul, the short hair is a nod to the Roman civilization process of provincial Gaul. Another synonymous term is “Toga wearing Gaul”

⁶¹ *BG* 6.12.6-9 (trans. Raaflaub).

long, what would the Caesarian reader make of a section that reintroduces us to the purely Gallic war in which *clientela* is a major socio-political tool?⁶²

This introduction into the factionalism of Gaul and the effects of Gaul's state *clientela* are meant to refocus the Roman audience. After all, at this point in the military narrative, Caesar's "Gallic war" has made diversions from fighting just Gauls. After the distractions of the British and German campaigns, Caesar is informing his audience that this information will be vastly important, and foreshadows the purely Gallic war to come in which state *clientela* will play a large role. The campaign against Vercingetorix is heavily rooted in Gallic factionalism and *clientela*, however if we are to believe the idea the Caesar is writing yearly reports, he wouldn't have known the role *clientela* would play. Caesar is refocusing an audience that he knows he will soon be returning to. Caesar's focus on loyalty and the strength of his leadership will have direct ramifications on his return to Rome and it is clear that Caesar is speaking directly to his reader in this section.

Unsurprisingly, book VI is not the first time Caesar mentions Gallic *clientela*, nor is it the last. In each new challenge of the campaign, from the Helvetii to Vercingetorix, Caesar displays how his Gallic allies and enemies change alliances, gain friendships, and add patrons and clients alike. The first two sections of the ethnographic *excursus* bring up questions of how Caesar is writing the *BG*, his intentions while writing, and the reality of Gaul during the death throes of the Republic and Caesar's rise to absolute power. In this essay, I will keep these questions in mind while I dissect Caesar's use of *clientela* throughout the *BG* and the implications of its use.

⁶² Rather than focusing on Britain, Germany, and Gaul, together, this section refocuses the military narrative to concern Gaul alone.

Section III: *Clientela* and Framing the Gallic Socio-Political Landscape

Turning to the Roman world, *clientela* was the reciprocal relationship between patrons and clients and a cornerstone of the Roman socio-political hierarchy.⁶³ *Clientela* permeated relationships between powerful individuals and their followers from the mercantile world, street gangs, the forum, and even foreign lands. In a political sense, it has been argued that *clientela* was the glue that held together the Empire for hundreds of years. In his work *Foreign Clientelae*, concerning the power of *clientela* in Rome and abroad, Ernst Badian writes,

The mystery of the cohesion of the empire through successive civil wars, and despite manifest misgovernment now becomes more intelligible. **The empire was based on the personal loyalty of leading men throughout the provinces to leading families at Rome**, and this attachment proved to be independent of political vicissitudes and, as we have seen, on the whole unaffected even by the fortunes of those families.⁶⁴

Although Badian's *Foreign Clientelae* has come under methodological scrutiny, this quote shows the strength of *clientela* within Roman society.⁶⁵ Badian suggests that foreign *clientela* was so stable and concrete that it was able to withstand the shifting tides of political power

⁶³ Fundamental works include Damon (1998), Badian (1997), Jehne and Polo (2015), and May (1981).

⁶⁴ Badian (1997) 262.

⁶⁵ Particularly in *Foreign Clientelae, a Reconsideration*, a collection of essays written for the 'Provincial clientelae in the Roman Empire: a reconsideration' conference at University of Zaragoza. The two biggest criticisms of Badian are given by Francisco Pina Polo, who questions the validity of using an onomastic approach in Principate epigraphy to identify the continuation of foreign clientelae, and Angela Ganter, who uses P.A Brunt's deconstruction of urban *clientela* to question the power of foreign *clientela* as an effective tool of social integration. Their arguments do bring up major flaws in Badian's methodology, however I believe their essays do not discredit Badian's concept of the power of foreign *clientela* for state interconnectivity as represented in this quote.

during the Empire. Although Badian is discussing *clientela* in the peak of the Roman Empire (2nd Century CE), *clientela* was also the glue that held together powerful hierarchies such as personal, political, and state relationships in the late Republican period. There was a certain power in *clientela* which made it a unique pillar of Roman society in what we think of as an ever-changing socio-political world. This ancient interpersonal bond, which had roots in the very foundations of Rome, withstood to the end of the Byzantine period, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Caesar used it regularly to frame the narrative of the *BG*.⁶⁶

In Rome, *clientela* was a reciprocal relationship, in which, high-class patrons received political support and social prowess and their lower-class clients received services such as legal representation and financial support. For example, one interesting feature of Roman *clientela* is the *salutatio*, in which clients would address their patrons. This public address allowed patrons to show off their power and status, and in exchange clients would receive money, food, or social favors such as introductions for business (*commendatio*). The relationship of *salutatio* and *commendatio* created a form of “cultural cohesion” that maintained the socio-political hierarchy, where the powerful flaunted their power and received political support and their less influential clients were able to navigate the political world with support. *Clientela* stratified political hierarchy by enforcing the reciprocity of powerful individuals and their supporters.

In her work, *The Mask of the Parasite*, Cynthia Damon creates a division between this form of reciprocal *clientela* and the image of the parasite character in Roman comedy. The relationship of a parasite figure and their patron is more of an economy of sorts. These relationships are purely economic. The “parasite” character, often represented as comedic levity

⁶⁶ Brown (2000) pg. 321-346

in the plot of the plays, is able to do menial tasks and receive favors, particularly food.⁶⁷

Clientela on the other hand is more of an ancient code of ethics which the Romans elevated to the *mos maiorum*.⁶⁸ Damon does display the inherent problems of the *clientela* system, particularly the conflict between the powerful patron and the necessities of the client, however, to better understand the system Caesar is using in the *BG* we must understand the societal weight and respect given to *clientela* as a revered social construct in the Roman world.⁶⁹

Caesar was deeply interested in the cross-cultural similarities between Gallic and Roman *clientela*, and he makes note of *clientela* within the *BG* 14 times. Caesar uses this concept to show his Roman reader that the Gauls were not completely “uncivilized,” to justify the duration and purpose of his campaign, and to comment on how he would submit his power as the patron of Gaul. All of which inform Caesar’s reader of his ideas concerning *clientela* within Rome.

Caesar argues that *clientela* permeated many Gallic hierarchies in some form or another. Concerning *clientela*, Caesar either draws a parallel to Roman individual *clientela* or presents a dramatic barbarianization. Caesar starts drawing similarities between Roman and Gallic *clientela* when he explains that these relationships begin with filial fealty and hierarchy. The first level of the Gallic hierarchy, like in Rome, is the *pater familias*, whose primary “clients” are his family.⁷⁰ Caesar says that, like the Roman *pater familias*, the Gallic head of the household had the power

⁶⁷ Damon (1998) pg. 4, shows the contrast to Posidonius' use of ‘parasite’ in his Gallic ethnography.

⁶⁸ Damon (1998) 8.

⁶⁹ Damon (1998) 9-19.

⁷⁰ May (1995) 433-441.

of life or death over his family members and slaves, in addition they practice torture in order to solve problems of the household:

Men have power of life and death over wives, as over children. When a well born paterfamilias dies, his relatives assemble and, if there is suspicion about the death, they interrogate wives as they would slaves.⁷¹

Caesar continues comparing Roman and Gallic *clientela* by informing the Roman reader that the Knight (*eques*) class of society, similar to the Roman middle class *eques*, enjoys a higher level of respect and socio-political power. The Gauls in Roman fashion also equate a number of clients to wealth and a higher socio-economic status:

The other class is the Knights. When necessary and some war arises (which used to happen yearly before Caesar's coming, nations attacking other nations or repelling attacks) they all take part in war. The most fortunate in family and wealth have the most clients and slaves.⁷²

Like their Roman counterparts, Caesar suggests a Gallic *Cursus Honorum* where military service is implicit in wealth and socio-political position.⁷³ After establishing the concrete similarities between Roman and Gallic *clientela*, Caesar then compliments the Gauls on their loyalty to their patrons. Caesar's commentary on Gallic loyalty to patrons is apparent from the campaign against Orgetorix all the way to his defeat of Vercingetorix. Caesar reiterates this before the battle of Gergovia when he writes:

When they are recognized and Litaviccus' lie revealed, the Haedui hold out their hands in surrender, cast aside their weapons, and plead for their lives. Litaviccus and his followers---in Gallic custom abandoning patrons in the worst misfortune is very wrong--flee for Gergovia.⁷⁴

⁷¹ *BG* 6.19.1-3 (trans. O'Donnell).

⁷² *BG*, 6.15.1-2 (trans. O'Donnell).

⁷³ I.e. only the military class enjoys the privilege of clients and wealth.

⁷⁴ *BG*, 7.40 (Trans, O'Donnell)

Although he compliments Gallic clients' loyalty above, Caesar also takes time within the ethnographic excursus to point out the more barbarian aspects of *clientela*. There, he warps the loyalty he praises throughout the work by diverging from the Roman model of *clientela*, and adding that the Gallic patrons had additional powers of life and death over slaves and clients alike. In fact, Caesar points out a custom of the Gauls to subject slaves and clients to a fiery human sacrifice after the death of a patron.

Funerals, by Gallic standards, are magnificent and lavish. They add to the flames everything the living held dear, even animals. In recent memory, beloved slaves and clients were burned together after the regular funeral was over.⁷⁵

Although he is enlightening the Roman audience on a shared custom, this is the first barbarianization Caesar points to concerning Gallic individual *clientela*. It could be argued that the Romans did engage in human sacrifice in the arena, where slaves were sent to their death in gladiatorial combat.⁷⁶ This is a particularly intriguing argument, as these contests were often part of the funeral procession of powerful Roman. However, it would be appalling to a Roman sensibility to see the clients of a great patron like Decimus Junius Brutus fighting in the funeral games dedicated in his posthumous honor, or burning them alive on a pyre. In Rome clients were citizens, and would not be put to death without a trial and certainly not as a part of a funeral, whereas slaves could be subjected to any means of torture and death.⁷⁷ In showing the tie between human sacrifice and *clientela*, Caesar shows the conflation of *servitudo* and *clientela* in Gallic society.

⁷⁵ *BG*, 6.19.4 (Trans. O'Donnell)

⁷⁶ See Futrell (2006) 11-24 & Futrell (2001) 169-203.

⁷⁷ Roth (2011) pg. 71-94.

Caesar is very interested in Gallic *servitudo* as a concept within the *BG*, he uses a form of slave (*servus*) or slavery (*servitus*), 32 times within the work.⁷⁸ Caesar utilizes it most often to describe the common people of Gaul being ‘*in servitute*’ to the hierarchies of their society.⁷⁹ Caesar continues this rhetoric of comparing Gallic clients to Roman slaves in the relationship between the military aristocracy and their followers. Outside of familial bonds, military patronage made up a majority of Gallic *clientela*. These relationships were between war chiefs and their followers, mostly for the purpose of raiding or in the case of the *BG*, fighting with or against the Romans. Caesar points out in the *excursus* of book VI that the military aristocracy was one of the two major divisions of Gallic society, with the other being Druids and the rest of society being “slaves”:

In all Gaul, two sorts of men stand out in rank and esteem. (For commoners are treated almost like slaves, venturing nothing on their own, being asked no advice. Many, oppressed by debt or huge levies or vengeful potentates, swear themselves into service to nobles who have all the rights over them that masters have with their slaves).⁸⁰

This passage suggests an almost brain washed client with an utter lack of freedom or personal sovereignty. Similar to Athens before the Solonic reforms, the Gallic common class often sell themselves into a form of debt-slavery according to Caesar.⁸¹ Gallic clients and commoners alike were sacrificed like animals, killing themselves in dedication to their patrons, and, as the

⁷⁸ *BG* 1.11.3, 1.27.3, 1.33.2, 1.51.3, 2.14.3, 2.33.2, 3.8.4, 3.10.3, 4.5.3, 4.26.1, 5.19.1, 5.27.2, 5.45.3, 6.13.1-2-3, 6.19.2, 6.19.4, 6.36.1, 6.38.5, 6.40.3-6, 7.14.10, 7.20.9, 7.23.3-5, 7.34.1, 7.42.4, 7.50.4, 7.77.3-10-15-16, 7.78.4.

⁷⁹ IE Druids and Knights

⁸⁰ *BG*, 6.13 (trans. O’Donnell)

⁸¹ Blok and Krul (2017) 607-643.

Helvetian campaign of Book I suggests, participated in a form of forced migration at the whim of extremely powerful warlords.

The Gallic conflation of *clientela* and *servitudo* continues to be emphasized in Caesar's conception of nomadic fluidity. As Johnston and Gruen have argued, Caesar is interested in how freeing or debilitating nomadic fluidity can be to a society as well as the relationship between fluidity and social stratification.⁸² This directly reflects the freedom that Gallic clients give up in their *clientela* relationship. Caesar uses the German way of life to contextualize Gallic freedom and nomadic fluidity. Within the scale of civilization, the people of Germania experience a form of freedom through their nomadic lifestyle. Although Caesar is not arguing that they are freer than Romans, he argues for a different form of freedom. They lived in a proto-socialist society, where there was no ownership of land and power is set on an individual level.⁸³ Therefore, all members of society experienced a level of nomadic freedom. The reason Germanic fluidity equates to freedom is because of the lack of social stratification in their society, they have no *clientela* system, in contrast to the Gallic people who are highly stratified in their *servitudo via clientela*. There was no military aristocracy to force common Germans to move from place to place.⁸⁴ In fact, the Germans aren't even beholden to any form of property law:

No one has a definite and marked off portion of land as his own property; instead, every year officials and leaders assign parcels of land, in sizes and locations determined by their own judgment, to each of the families, clans, and groups of men who appear before them, and in the following year, they force them to move somewhere else.⁸⁵

⁸² See Johnston (2018) 83-85 and Gruen (1986) 63-65.

⁸³ *BG* 6.21 (trans. Raaflaub).

⁸⁴ I.e. the Helvetii in Book I, or the Menapi in book II.

⁸⁵ *BG*, 6.22.2 (trans. Raaflaub).

The Germans have their land chosen by lot; their gods, the sun and the moon, travel as they do; they have no worry of farmland as they persist on meat and milk, and their magistrates are only selected in times of war. They are completely free of hierarchy and completely geographically fluid. This would be the epitome of the barbarian in Rome.⁸⁶ A free and wild society with no law and order to protect them.

To truly separate the Germans from the hierarchies of Gaul and Rome, Caesar enlightens his reader that their magistrates are chosen by lot. Similar to the Gauls, their military leaders do have power of life and death over their soldiers, but unlike the Gauls, the Germans have no war chiefs to whom warriors and commoners subject themselves.

When a nation either defends itself in war or wages it, magistrates are selected to be in charge of war with the power of life and death. There is no common magistrate in peacetime, but leaders of regions and cantons give judgments and placate quarrels among their people.⁸⁷

By showing the relationship between social stratification and fluidity, Caesar invents a free Germanic society that is the complete opposite of Rome and sets up a half civilized, half barbarian Gaul. The society of Gaul, like that of Rome, is highly stratified. They participate in *clientela*, but their patrons, the military aristocracy, control all factors of life over the common peoples militarily, socially, and geographically. The lack of freedom, as we see above, is that the military aristocracy had the power of life and death over their clients, like a master would have over their slaves in Rome.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Cunliffe (2018) 211-238.

⁸⁷ *BG*, 6.23 (trans. O'Donnell).

⁸⁸ Bradley (1985) 1-8.

The separation between Rome and Gaul comes in the form of their geographical fluidity. Like the Germanic tribes, the Gallic peoples are also highly nomadic and have no conception of land ownership. Due to the friction between social stratification (*clientela*) and nomadic lifestyle, common people are forced into a form of strong-arm nomadic lifestyle where only the military aristocracy had the power to decide where the tribe went. This explains why Caesar saw the common people of Gallic societies as “slaves” to their forced mobility via their warlord patrons. This can be seen in the first campaign against Orgetorix and the Helvetians. Orgetorix gains power through his many clients and is able to control the movement of the Helvetians away from their ancestral homeland and to the Roman province.⁸⁹ Despite Orgetorix’s death, his supporters among the military aristocracy continued the mission and forced the Helvetian commoners to pack up their lives and burn their homes as they went. So, is Caesar’s conquest actually an attempt to emancipate Gaul? While there are moments in which Caesar signals the benefits he brings to Gaul, I believe Caesar’s Roman reader would probably not be interested in Caesar the Gallic Emancipator.⁹⁰ Caesar presents his Roman audience with his ability to acquire a valuable new vassal state; a Gaul that is already on the path towards civilization and has an analogous concept of *clientela*.

Here, Caesar is focusing primarily on the militaristic aspects of Gallic patronage, and describing Gallic commoners as “slaves.” Caesar argues that individual *clientela* was less advanced and downright barbaric in Gallic society compared to Rome. With the combination of his use of slavery and fluidity, Caesar presents a Gallic lower and middle class that are slaves to

⁸⁹ *BG* 1.2.1-1.4.4 (trans. O’Donnell).

⁹⁰ Particularly the parenthetical in *BG* 6.15.1 (trans. O’Donnell) “*which used to happen yearly before Caesar’s coming, nations attacking other nations or repelling attacks*” Caesar shows that he is actively pacifying Gaul, and changing the warlike Gallic *mores barbarorum*.

their own social stratification. Through the conflation of *servitudo/clientela* as well as the concept of nomadic fluidity/forced migration, Caesar presents to his reader the barbarity of Gaul, yet he also initiates their ability to become more Roman. Caesar warps Gallic *clientela* from the dining traditions presented by Posidonius and offers the Roman reader a proto-Rome that can be taken in as a province and Romanized or “pacified” by conquest. By doing this he opens the door to frame his conquest as such, a just war that would support his own state clients (the Aedui) and make clients of all Gaul, a newly civilized province that would be loyal to Rome.

From Clients to Client Kingdoms

With most of Gallic society being slaves to one military leader or another, how could Caesar possibly civilize them? He answers this question through his conception of military *clientela* and the traditional Roman model of conquest. Caesar argues that he is able to civilize Gaul through his conquest and turn them into a client kingdom. In order to understand how Caesar fits Gaul into the custom of client kingdoms, we must look at Roman military *clientela* and the system of client kingdoms to see how Caesar connected Gaul to the tradition of Roman conquest. A great example of this model of conquest comes to us in the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Concerning foreign *clientelae*, he writes:

It was not only in the city itself that plebeians were under the protection of the patricians, but every colony of Rome and every city that had joined the alliance and friendship with her and also every city conquered in war had such protectors and patrons among the Romans as it wished.⁹¹

This quote is particularly relevant as Dionysius is Greek and Greece was conquered nearly 100 years previous to his writings. Due to his position as a non-Roman writing in the Roman world,

⁹¹ Dion. Hal. 2.11.1 (trans. Cary).

Dionysius gives us a unique perspective into the practices and methodologies Rome used in its conquered provinces. As a recently Romanized Greek, having been through the process which Caesar is imposing on Gaul, Dionysius understands the practical use of state *clientela* within the bounds of Roman conquest.

Recent scholars have challenged the effectiveness of client states presented by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. One of these questions comes from Angela Ganter in her article “Decline and Glorification: Patron-Client Relationships in the Roman Republic”.⁹² Ganter argues against theories of foreign *clientela* and social integration by deconstructing the relationship between foreign and urban *clientelae*. Ganter is correct in her assessment that Badian overestimates the power of foreign *clientela* as a mode of Romanization and cultural cohesion in reality, particularly in her assessment on the lack of volunteerism in both urban and foreign *clientelae*. Despite the consequences of forced *clientelae*, Dionysius shows us that state *clientela* was viewed as a major tool in conquest and the mediation of relationships between Rome and its provincial/client states.

In the history of Roman foreign affairs, there was a complicated system of both formal and informal connectivity. The formal policy of treaties and pacts, such as the six treaties between Rome and Carthage were rarely used in the military interventions of the Roman state.⁹³ Due to a lack of formal conflict resolution, individual bonds between Roman and foreign leaders stratified peace between nations, particularly in Roman interventional wars. More formal agreements like treaties were overshadowed by less formal bonds of *amicitia*.⁹⁴ More often than not, the ties that

⁹² Ganter (2015) 43-56.

⁹³ Serrati (2006) 113-118.

⁹⁴ See Badian (1997) 60-61, 68, and 111.

bound the Roman state and their foreign allies were those of friendship. This allowed Roman generals and politicians alike to maneuver around laws of engagement and the formal alliance politics.⁹⁵ This policy was in full force as early as the Illyrian war of 229/8BCE, and particularly during the 2nd Macedonian war.⁹⁶

In his work, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Erich S. Gruen argues that the 2nd Macedonian War was a watershed moment in the history of Roman interventionism.⁹⁷ The 2nd Macedonian war represented a fundamental change because the terms *amici* (friends) and *socii* (allies) became one in the same. Therefore, the policy of *amicitia* became the traditional mode of diplomacy for military intervention during the wars of expansion from the second century BCE on. When Rome extended *amicitia* to an individual or particular government, a Roman leader would offer a form of protection in which Rome would simultaneously aid their friends, and expand the bounds of their own empire.

Gruen argues that with the conflation of *amici* and *socii*, *amicitia* and *clientela* also became synonymous. Roman generals would require an exchange of reciprocal *fides* from their Greek allies for Roman *amicitia* in the form of military aid. If we understand *clientela* as a reciprocal exchange of political alliance from *clientes* to *patroni* for services such as protection, financial

⁹⁵ Badian describes this as “Imperial Enfranchisement”, which included foreign clients to take the name of their Roman patron into their new Romanized name, see Badian (1997) 260-263.

⁹⁶ Gruen (1986) 79.

⁹⁷ Gruen (1986) 81.

support, or judicial representation, then we can understand interventional *amicitia* as a form of military patronage.⁹⁸

This form of military patronage or traditional Roman conquest can be seen particularly in Pompey's wars in the East. When reading accounts of Pompey Magnus' campaigns against Mithridates, it is easy to get bogged down by all the kings he engages with and the *clientela* politics he practices.⁹⁹ Like Gaul, the East was massive, it encompassed lands from the former Persian Empire, to Judea, Cilicia, Syria, Galatia, Parthia, and many others. Each of these territories had different rulers and different opinions on the Roman conquest. To deal with this vast landscape, Pompey extended *amicitia* and his support to *rex sociusque et amicus* such as Tigranes, Deiotarus, Phraates, and many others to systematically drive out Mithridates. His mission was ultimately successful and with it came his triumph in 61BCE.¹⁰⁰ However, as Robin Seager tells us in *Pompey: A Political Biography*, not only did Pompey become a famous Roman with unprecedented wealth after his campaigns in the East, but the relationships he made with Eastern rulers made him the patron of entire provinces and kingdoms.¹⁰¹

These relationships, although separated by the Mediterranean, were directly linked to the power Pompey had in Rome. In his approach to amassing power and foreign clients, Pompey

⁹⁸ Caesar too conflates *amicitia* and *clientela* in Gaul, as Gruen wrote "by the Second Century, *amicitia* was simply a euphemism for clientship" (54). This is an important distinction because Caesar uses the term *amicus* far more than *cliens* to describe his Gallic allies, however, the relationship is better described as patronage than mere friendship.

⁹⁹ Seager (1979) 50-65.

¹⁰⁰ For description of *Rex Sociusque et Amicus* and other extensions of *Amicitia* in Roman expansionist policy see Gruen (1986) 13-53.

¹⁰¹ Seager (1979) 55.

laid out a sort of blueprint for Caesar by showing that Roman ideas of *amicitia* and *clientela* could be wielded as means to conquer. Pompey's successes in the East laid the ground work for Caesar to engage in a campaign in which he could both divide and conquer a vast land mass such as Gaul and gain allies to increase his political influence in Rome. The Pompeian model was to create allies and use those allies to replace the ruling class (established native governments) with a Roman state apparatus. In order to conquer Gaul and "civilize" them (by his ethnocentric view point), Caesar needed to use the traditional mode of Roman conquest on the Gallic "barbarians" rather than Eastern. Caesar does this in three ways 1) creating his own form of "Gallic Kings" that acted as his footholds in the Gallic politics, 2) showing the Gauls' ability to practice state *clientela*, and, 3) justifying the continuation of the war by showing the stasis of Gallic state *clientela*.

Unlike Caesar, Pompey had the aid of *rex sociusque et amicus* in the East that allowed him to establish and maintain control over newly conquered Roman territories. The East was familiar to the Roman reader: they had established cities, familiar socio-political hierarchies, and known customs. Pompey's eastern campaigns also had the "aid" of powerful enemies such as Mithridates.¹⁰² The power of these "big bad" villain archetypes allowed the everyday Roman to justify Pompey's campaign. One only needs to look at the Carthaginian wars against Hannibal and his father to find that nothing unites the Roman people more than a despotic foreign adversary.¹⁰³ Pompey's wars in the East fit a model of Roman conquest that began in the third century BCE, a traditional conquest between kings, consuls, and allies.

¹⁰² Gruen (1984) 569-610 shows Pompey's "general militaristic patronage" over the East.

¹⁰³ Chlup (2009) 17-38.

Gaul was not entirely a traditional conquest. As Caesar tells us, Gaul, like Rome, had no kings. In fact, in the first campaign, Orgetorix was sentenced to death for attempting to become a *rex*.¹⁰⁴ As Caesar suggests, it is a period in Gaul's socio-political development in which there are no kings and no republic. The only hierarchy within the Gallic society was based on *clientela*.

Due to a lack of absolute leadership in the form of kings or consuls, Caesar has the opportunity to “introduce” the Republic to a country reminiscent of Rome after the fall of Tarquinius Superbus. Therefore, Caesar had to be more creative and purposeful in his approach to contextualize and justify the conquest of Gaul for his Roman audience. Caesar used two main strategies in mapping traditional Roman military patronage onto his Gallic campaign: the use of *rex sociusque et amicus*, and the implementation of patron states. Caesar first followed in the footsteps of previous successful conquests and created his own form of *rex sociusque et amicus*. These Gallic “kings” took form in political advisors such as Divicicus the Aedui and military leaders to whom he extended the tradition title of *amicus senati populiue Romani*, such as Commius the Atreban, Cingetorix, and Piso the Aquitanian.¹⁰⁵

In books I and II, Divicicus the Aedui, perhaps Caesar's greatest ally in Gaul, aids him by giving political support, being a voice for Rome in the pan-Gallic druid council, and warning Caesar of rebellions and future enemies.¹⁰⁶ These actions gave Caesar the ability to solidify his Gallic position from the start of the campaign, which allowed him to go back to the Aedui as an

¹⁰⁴ *BG* 1.4.2.

¹⁰⁵ Cingetorix: 5.3.2, 5.4.3, and 5.57.2. Commius: 4.21.7, 5.22.3, and 6.6.4. Piso: 4.12.4-6

¹⁰⁶ Particularly 1.3.5, 1.16.5, 1.18.1, 1.41.4, and 2.5.2 This relationship was influential to Caesar's campaign until book 7.34, where they suddenly turn against Divicicus/Caesar and join the final rebellion of Vercingetorix.

ally from the campaign against the Helvetii, until they betray him and join Vercingetorix's campaign in book VII. Due to his clientship, Divicicus, like Pompey's allies in the East, gave Caesar a foothold to begin a traditional Roman conquest of replacing the political status quo of Gaul with Roman rule.

When Caesar first arrived in Gaul, the Aedui and Sequani were the two biggest patron states, with the Aedui higher on the pecking order. In order to gain prominence over the Aedui, the Sequani added the Germans (Ariovistus) as their patrons and become the most powerful Gallic patron nation. The addition of Ariovistus and the Germans created friction between the two dominant Gallic nations, disrupting statewide *clientela*. In showing this power struggle, Caesar shows the Gauls' inability to practice peaceful state *clientela* without Roman intervention.¹⁰⁷ This power imbalance and the German problem caused Divicicus to travel to Rome to acquire a non-Gallic patron for the Aedui.¹⁰⁸ After the defeat of the Sequani, the Remi became the next powerful patron nation. Therefore, the war against the Remi and all following campaigns are the natural duty of Rome as an honorable patron state. If Caesar did not defend his own clients (the Aedui) there would be yet another struggle for power leading to an unstable Gaul.¹⁰⁹ Caesar continuously expands his geographic definition of Gaul until Rome and subsequently Caesar were the *patroni omnis Galliae*.¹¹⁰ In doing so, Caesar created a new model for client kingdoms

¹⁰⁷ *BG* 6.11-12.

¹⁰⁸ It should be noted that Caesar suggests that Rome had already been in *amicitia* with the Aedui and that Divicicus was already a friend of the Roman state, however there is no evidence that seems to suggest this, other than possible contact through the existing Roman province in Gaul.

¹⁰⁹ I.e. the yearly wars between nations *BG* 6.15 (see above p. 24 & 34).

¹¹⁰ When Caesar firsts introduces Gaul, he discusses only a third of the landscape, his original *tres partes*. He expands the boundaries of Gaul continuously as he introduces new threats to

that fits the “uncivilized” structure of Gaul as well as the Roman model of conquest, Romanizing through systematic conquest.

Competing Patrons and the Rhetoric of Liberty

Having introduced the cultural similarities/differences of *clientela* in Gaul and Rome, and framing his conquest using State *clientela*, Caesar frames the final campaign of Vercingetorix as a competition between two rival patrons. The rebellion of Vercingetorix in book VII is a culmination of all the previous Gallic and Germanic leaders before him. He is organized, tactical, loved by the Gallic people, and wants nothing more than to undo the work of Caesar. In Caesar’s view, he is pacifying Gaul, but for Vercingetorix Caesar is enslaving the Gauls. Caesar would have us believe and recognize that Vercingetorix is the enemy which the Roman people should despise. Caesar frames their competition in this way to highlight the barbarian nature of Vercingetorix’s rebellion. As Caesar has discussed in the ethnographic excursus of Book VII, the Gauls conflate *servitudo* and *clientela*. Caesar’s patronage represents a Roman *clientela* that would free the common peoples through a “civilized” form of individual and state *clientela*. Vercingetorix, the closest thing to a Gallic Hannibal or Mithridates, represents the archaic status quo of Gaul. In book VII, Caesar shows the Roman reader the absurdity of creating a pan-Gallic rebellion to fight against their own process of civilization and freedom.

Caesar introduces his framework by writing in book VII:

Vercingetorix worked as enthusiastically as he had promised to recruit other nations, luring their leaders with gifts and promises. He picked men suited for the task, whose skillful speech or existing friendships could win others over.¹¹¹

pacified Gaul, explaining why he writes that “all of Gaul is Pacified” several times. For more on this see Riggsby (2018) 60-80.

¹¹¹ *BG* 7.31 (trans. O’Donnell).

This method of patronage is much different than Caesar's. Caesar is an outsider; as a foreign conqueror, his patronage is earned through victories won either through existing friendships or on the back of the Roman war machine. His patronage is also secured and upheld through a reciprocal exchange of hostages: Roman foreign *clientela* practiced by a Roman conqueror. Caesar argues that his form of patronage is much better and civilized than any Gallic patron. In the excursus Caesar writes:

The arrival of Caesar had changed conditions: the hostages had been returned to the Aedui; their patronage over their previous clients had been restored and new one established with Caesar's help (**because those who had attached themselves to the friendship of the Aedui found that they profited from better conditions and a fairer system of rule**). In other respects, as well, the influence and the status of the Aedui had been enhanced, and the Sequani had lost their position of leadership.¹¹²

With the Aedui as an example of his Gallic *clientes*, Caesar presents Roman *reciprocal clientela*. Caesar offers connections, military aid, and stability. What could Vercingetorix offer the people and nations of Gaul?

Vercingetorix is a native patron. He is well connected and uses existing friendships and promises of Gallic liberty to persuade clients to join his cause. Vercingetorix is able to unite the Gallic tribes and nations easier than Caesar, as he doesn't need to continuously maintain their fealty through "pacification." Rather Vercingetorix is using a method of patronage that was natural and deep rooted in Gallic society before Caesar. As a result of being part of a native resistance, Vercingetorix is able to add clients quickly and maintain them without the tricky process of pacification.

Caesar shows the clashing of his Roman patronage/rhetoric of conquest and the patronage of Vercingetorix/rhetoric of freedom perfectly in a speech delivered by Critognatus and

¹¹² *BG* 6.12 (trans. O'Donnell).

Vercingetorix's "last words". According to Caesar, at the end of his speech concerning Gallic freedom, Critognatus says:

So, what is my advice? Do what our ancestors did in the war (hardly equal to this one) with the Cimbri and the Teutones. Driven into towns and forced by similar need to **sustain life on the corpses of those whose age made them useless for fighting**, they never surrendered. If we did not have their example, I would still think it beautiful to establish our own and hand it on to posterity in the name of liberty. What war was ever like that? Ravaging Gaul and bringing huge disaster, the Cimbri finally left our land and headed elsewhere. They left us our rights, our laws, and our freedom. What do the Romans seek or want, driven by envy, but to settle in the farms and cities of a people they know are famed and powerful in war and to impose endless slavery (**servitutum**) on them? They fight wars for no other reason. If you do not know what goes on in distant nations, look nearby at Gaul reduced to a mere province, its rights and laws transformed, bowing their axes, oppressed in endless slavery (**provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute**)¹¹³.

It may be perplexing why Caesar would include this speech in the narrative of the *BG*. However, in looking closer at this speech, it is clear that Caesar is cleverly showing his reader the barbarity of Gaul through their conceptions of *clientela*.

Critognatus is part of the Gallic aristocracy, a select group of the society that because of their military status are able to collect the benefits of *clientela*. The primary benefit of Gallic *clientela*, as Caesar tells us in 6.13, is a massive number of commoners who serve as "clients" to a small number of warlord patrons. In actuality, this is not a reciprocal *clientela* relationship, as Caesar's reader would be accustomed to in Rome; Gallic *clientela* is more like Roman *servitudo*. Critognatus believes that if Caesar takes over as the ruling class of Gaul, then he will become a member of the common class and therefore a slave to his new Roman patron, as his clients are slaves to him. Caesar and his Roman reader conceive this as barbaric, since *clientela* is not slavery in Rome. Caesar wants us to acknowledge that Critognatus' view of *clientela* is so

¹¹³ *BG* 7.77 (trans. O'Donnell).

centered in barbaric thought that he can only see *clientela* as slavery. From the Roman perspective, they offer peace, societal advancement, and a place within the Roman empire, but Critognatus is blinded by the social norms of his Gallic forefathers that he cannot see the reality of what Caesar would bring to Gaul.

The combination of this rhetoric of freedom and total submission to one's patron is continued when Caesar writes after the battle of Alesia:

On the following day Vercingetorix called a meeting and pointed out that he had not undertaken this war to advance his own interests but to serve the cause of the common freedom. (**communis libertatis causa demonstrat**) yet now there was no choice but to yield to Fortune, and he offered himself to his fellow Gauls for whichever action they chose: they could take his life to appease the Romans or hand him over alive.¹¹⁴

It is clear that Caesar very carefully crafted this passage. Firstly, Vercingetorix continues the rhetoric that Caesar introduced at the beginning of his rebellion. The reason for this war was to preserve Gallic freedom and way of life, despite its apparent "barbarity," a nod to Caesar's use of Critognatus' speech. Secondly, he shows that while Vercingetorix is surrendering his position as a patron, he is also giving his life and all personal sovereignty over to the new *patronus omnis Galliae*. He offers himself as a mode of appeasement to Gaul's new Roman patron: Caesar. Even while surrendering the fight for Gallic freedom and customs, Vercingetorix follows the customs of Gallic *clientela* that Caesar so carefully illustrated in the excursus of book VI.

Caesar is allowing the Gallic perspective to provide a sort of rhetorical contest. Books I-VI show Caesar's rhetorical conquest in three main ways as I have argued previously: 1) highlight cultural similarities of Gallic and Roman *clientela*, 2) single out the barbarian aspects Gallic *clientela*, especially its similarity to slavery, and 3) civilize through state *clientela* conquest. By

¹¹⁴ *BG* 7.89 (trans. Raaflaub).

showing the Gallic perspective, like any good statesman, scholar, and rhetorician, he provides a counter argument in order to round out his argument. After all Caesar is writing in part for his enemies in the Roman Senate who believe his war is illegal, therefore he challenges his own argument with Critognatus to prove the barbarity of Gallic thought and indicate his own justification for the war.

Showing that the Gauls would quite literally eat their own rather than change their barbaric ways of society proves the essential nature of Caesar's war.¹¹⁵ Caesar is providing the senate and streets with evidence that support his claims made in the *excursus* of Book VI. A close reading of how Caesar presents Gaul's ideals on liberty once again reveals barbarian tendencies within Gallic society that can be improved upon/stabilized by Roman rule. In the *Landmark Julius Caesar*, Raaflaub suggest that the Roman reader would have deemed Critognatus' speech as "vile cruelty" because of its mention of cannibalism which the Roman audience found "utterly repugnant."¹¹⁶ By showing the barbarity to which Critognatus was willing to subject his troops – literal cannibalism – Caesar is asking his Roman reader a simple question: at what point does loyalty become enslavement? Critognatus' speech and Vercingetorix's surrender reveal that the final Gallic resistance's purpose was to keep hold of the traditional Gallic way of life, rather than submit to Roman rule and the Roman way of life. However, the Gallic way of life included their practice of subjugating Gallic commoners through *clientela*. Critognatus is telling his clients, his

¹¹⁵ *BG* 7.77.

¹¹⁶ See Raaflaub (2019) 259, note 7.77f.

soldiers, who are indebted and as Caesar argues, enslaved to him, that to be “loyal” to their Gallic customs, his clients must continue the atrocities of their own enslavement.¹¹⁷

Caesar manipulates this Gallic rhetoric of liberty to suggest the transformation that Gaul could undergo once taken under the wing of the Republic and his own personal patronage. Rather than being slaves to their patrons as was Gallic custom, his conquest would implement the Roman “civilized” way of patronage that would make **clients** of all Gaul. Caesar offers Gaul a form of patronage that would do away with the lack of freedom “disguised” as Vercingetorix’s rhetoric of liberty. Therefore, it is somewhat comical that Critognatus points to the state of “short haired” Gaul when he says: “look nearby at Gaul reduced to a mere province, it’s rights and laws transformed, bowing their axes, oppressed in endless slavery.” The Roman reader would be perplexed at such a philosophy; after all the late Republic was one of the most violent eras of Roman history, rife with civil wars and violence. Caesar offers Gaul the ability to escape the civil strife of their own political turmoil, and what nation, including Rome would not want to be free of internal stasis and in a state of perpetual peace? To the Caesarian reader, Critognatus’ speech proves his classification as a barbarian. This speech is another example of Gallic barbarity, in which clients would be forced to eat their dead companions on the orders of their commanders. Caesar and Rome do not offer this form of state *clientela*. They offer a reciprocal relationship between Rome and a province as they did with Greece, Spain, and the nations of the East before.

This explains why Caesar continuously points to the Gauls’ habit of conflating *clientela* with servitude. Caesar purposefully enlightened his reader to the Gauls’ “uncivilized” way of

¹¹⁷ Similar to the rhetoric of slaveholders during the American civil war, arguing that Africans who had been enslaved were ‘better off’ in the traditional “southern way of life.”

patronage. Even the *soldurii*, men with status in their own right, had to participate in this barbaric tradition that Critognatus holds so dear.¹¹⁸ In this Caesar indicates to his reader that Gallic views on freedom were so skewed and barbarian that they would fight against the Romans and in doing so, their own common process of civilization and freedom from the barbarity of Gallic *clientela*. Caesar uses *clientela* to show his Roman audience that the only way for Gallic peoples to truly be free, was paradoxically through Roman conquest and eventual absorption into the Roman sphere of influence, thus showing Caesar's ethnocentrism and Darwinian resemblance.

In Caesar's rhetoric of *clientela*, he illuminates a shared custom between the Gauls and the Romans (*clientela*) and in doing so showed his Roman audience his creation of a new model that would serve as the groundwork for a Gallic Client Kingdom. He did so in order to create a sympathetic reader who would see the Aedui as a potential client of Rome; a value added for the collection of land, troops, and taxes, but also in essence, a group that would resemble their own clients. Caesar highlights the extremism of certain aspects of Gallic patronage to show how deep-rooted loyalty is in their society. Caesar is telling his reader that if the Gauls were willing to sacrifice themselves for their patrons, then with Roman pacification, what would they be willing to do in defense of Rome? Not only does Caesar show the benefit of his war by highlighting Gallic *clientela*, he creates a reader that would view his war as a just defense in the name of patronage. If the Aedui and Gaul itself were clients of Rome, and Rome would one day reap the benefit, then it would be extremely dishonorable for Caesar to abandon them in their time of need.

¹¹⁸ For explanation of *soldurii* see *BG* 3.22 (trans. Raaflaub).

Caesar's readers/listeners would have been both clients and patrons alike.¹¹⁹ In framing the conquest of Gaul as ultimately based on *clientela*, Caesar made his reader contextualize and sympathize through their own personal experience. Would the Roman reader abandon their clients and still expect to gain the benefits of patronage? By stressing this social system/obligation, the *BG* becomes a narrative of Caesar aiding Gallic clients and turning Gaul into a "pacified" client kingdom. To do so, Caesar needed to support his client kingdoms continually, lest they fall into the hands of another Gallic nation or patrons such as Vercingetorix who would lead to destabilization, barbarianization, and the loss of Gaul's clientship. By framing the socio-political hierarchy of Gaul as *clientela* at the state and individual levels, Caesar could graft it onto his own social rhetoric to justify his campaign.

A counter argument to this is that Caesar had no need to justify his war in Gaul. He was a popular leader, with the support of the people, and after the wars of expansion, the common Roman would need no justification for his war. However, in the political turmoil of the Late Republic, Caesar needed to justify his war in some way. If he had not, he would have to face the punishments of political rivals such as Cato the Younger, who suggested Caesar be arrested for an illegal war or turned over to the Germanic enemy to suffer in whatever way the barbarians saw fit.¹²⁰ Cicero would later write in *De Republica*:

Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be just, no war is considered just unless it has been proclaimed and declared, or unless reparation has first been demanded.

¹¹⁹ His *Commentarii* would have been recited aloud to inform the people of Caesar's yearly process, so the work truly transcends the class barrier that might plague some written Roman literature (although most poetry was recited at *recitationes*). See Wiseman (1998) pg.1-10

¹²⁰ Morrell (2015) 73-93.

But our people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole world.¹²¹

Caesar would have his Roman readers believe that there is no greater cause for a war than to defend clients and friends of Rome. The provocation of his just war came when the Aedui, a people in *amicitia* and *clientela* with Rome, requested aid. His continuation of the war represented a continued defense of added clients and added friends against the barbarity of Gallic *clientela*.

Mafioso Clientela: A Warning to Rome

Using *clientela* as a major justification not only creates a motivation for the eight-year campaign, but it also allows Caesar to confront his Roman audience and their own practices of *clientela*. Caesar was not the first to write about Roman *clientela*, nor the first to interrogate problems with the *clientela* system. Plays such as the *Miles Gloriosus* by Plautus also presented a sort of exposé of its social function. In the play, Plautus explored the relationship between the Braggart Soldier (Pyrgopolynices) and his parasite (Artotrogus). It has been argued by Fontaine in his article “Before Pussy Riot: Free Speech and Censorship in the Age of Plautus” that through a series of allusions and jokes, Plautus presents his audience anti-tyrannical messages concerning free speech. Therefore, the *parasite* character serves as a warning for the audience to the negative aspects of *clientela*.¹²² The parasite character feeds the ego of his patron, blinding him to the reality of his life and in turn, receives money, food, and gifts. It could be argued that Caesar, in his comparison of Gallic and Roman *clientela*, also presented a warning to his Roman

¹²¹ *De Republica*, 3.35 (trans. Keyes).

¹²² Fontaine (2016); also see Plutarch’s *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, a discussion on the negative aspects of *clientela*, which also conflates *amici* and *clientes*.

reader. However, if the rhetoric of Caesar is to be seen as colonial/imperial as I have argued above, then the *BG* is not so much a critique of *clientela* as a reiteration of its power.

I believe that the relationship between Caesar and his Gallic *clientes* served as a very serious warning to the people of Rome. For instance, when all of Caesar's Gallic clients join with Vercingetorix, we see how Caesar deals with unruly clients. He unapologetically does not allow the noncombatants of the Mandubii into the Roman fortifications, as they were prepared to fight against Caesar in the first place. He writes:

The Mandubii, who had let them into the town, are required to leave with their children and wives. When they reached the Roman fortifications, they wept and prayed to be taken in and fed as slaves. But Caesar put out guards on the ramparts and forbade their admission. (*At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi prohibebat.*)¹²³

Caesar is letting the Romans who may be plotting against him and supporting his enemies like Cato the Younger, know that as soon as they are prepared to go against him, there is no pleading to extend mercy, even from women and children.

It could be argued that in contrast to Caesar's use of absolute violence is his use of *clementia*. In a diverse canon of accounts, Caesar often extends a noble clemency to his Roman enemies. This clemency can be seen in stories of even Caesar's earliest career in which he spares his piratical kidnappers.¹²⁴ Most notable is Caesar's use of *clementia* in the Civil Wars, in which Caesar extends mercy to Roman adversaries such as Cato and Brutus. As David Konstan argues in his 2005 article "Clemency as a Virtue," clemency was a novel idea in the death throes of the Republic. He writes that Caesar was "the first Roman to elevate restraint to the status of a

¹²³ *BG* 7.78 (trans. Raaflaub).

¹²⁴ Osgood (2010) 320-322; Caesar's *clementia* is dependent on the source, Plutarch says Caesar crucifies them, however in many accounts represented in Osgood, he shows them clemency.

policy.”¹²⁵ Caesar was unapologetic and very clear about his use of *clementia* and dispatched it, in the Civil Wars period.¹²⁶

However, Caesar of the *BC* and his later political career is not the Caesar of the *BG*. He has a different enemy and his political career is not as solidified as it is after crossing the Rubicon in 49 BCE. Due to this, Caesar very rarely dispatches *clementia*, in fact, Caesar only makes mention of *clementia* twice in the entire work.¹²⁷ An example of Caesar not showing clemency is the Aedui, who for eight years of the campaign were Caesar’s closest Gallic friends and allies and who for eight years of the campaign were Caesar’s closest Gallic friends and allies were not safe from Caesar’s lesson about patronage.¹²⁸ The Aedui and the rest of the surviving soldiers of Vercingetorix were given as slaves to his soldiers for their defiance, “one for every man.” Caesar does tell us that some of the Aedui and Arverni are spared so that Caesar may “use them to win over their nations.”¹²⁹ However, if it wasn’t for their position as a stabilizing force in the new trans-alpine Gallic province, and a value to Caesar, it can be very easily argued that they would have faced the same fate as the Menapii. This should not be seen as what Konstan describes as “pragmatic clementia” as the Aedui are not Romans, and it would be teleological to assert Caesar’s later political practices into the *BG* without any textual evidence. Particularly as slavery to Caesar’s soldiers is not act of clemency.

¹²⁵ Konstan (2005) 340.

¹²⁶ Konstan (2005) 344.

¹²⁷ *BG* 2.14 & 2.31.

¹²⁸ *BG* 7.89.

¹²⁹ *BG* 7.89 (trans. Raaflaub).

In his destruction of the rebellion and with the Aedui serving as a reminder of such, Caesar shows his clients in Rome the price they will pay if they devalue his patronage: full Mafioso vendetta violence. Caesar meant to show that, like any conqueror, he was able to wield the power he acquired in Gaul within the Roman political landscape without remorse.¹³⁰ Despite his use of *clementia* in future works, the entire thematic use of *clientela* justified Caesar's conquest of Gaul. It was also meant to show that when the "good faith" of *clientela* is broken, as it was in Gaul, Caesar the Conqueror had one mode of correction, pacification by means of the sword.

¹³⁰ The best example being Sulla whose march on Rome was built on the back of his primary conquest into Jugurtha, Cilicia, Gaul, and the Social War and whose second march was prefaced by the first Mithridatic War.

Conclusion: The Value of the Gallic Pacification

Throughout the *BG*, Caesar often uses the term “pacified.” Famously and confidently in *BG* 2.34, only 2 years into his Gallic campaign, Caesar writes *his rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata*, translated by Raafaub as “With all of Gaul pacified by these successes.” Caesar uses derivations of *pacare* 10 times throughout the *BG*, and in each time, meant to describe that either a new land, enemy, or all of Gaul has been brought to pacification by Caesar and his army.¹³¹ In my first reading of the *BG*, I believed that this was meant for Caesar to show the Roman people Caesar’s achievement. I believed that for each new pacified land and people there would be an added part of his triumph in Rome. However, understanding how essential *clientela* was to Caesar’s campaign and the narrative, I now believe that this pacification was meant to show the value Gaul and its newly subdued people added to the Roman empire.

In the preface of his newly published translation *The War for Gaul*, James J. O’Donnell presents the complexities of Caesar’s narrative, and its untold brutality. O’Donnell tells us that there is a divide between what Caesar wanted us to feel and believe, and the actuality of ancient warfare. He writes concerning the realism of Caesar’s military campaign:

War is a mad, unnatural thing. Killing is hard work and dangerous; the life surrounding the few days of actual battle is arduous... a real victory doesn’t take place on the day of the battle, but the next day or the next week. The victory is won when the defeated commander decides not to risk another battle. He may be short on manpower or food, or perhaps he is not confident that his men will have the will to respond well if he commands them. Or is it won when a community decides not to muster forces and fight but to pay protection money instead and settle for subservience?¹³²

¹³¹ *BG*: 1.6.2.4, 2.1.2.2, 2.35.1.1, 3.7.1.1, 3.11.5.2, 3.28.1.2, 4.37.1.3, 5.24.72, 6.5.11, 7.65.4.5

¹³² O’Donnell (2019) pg. xii

O'Donnell argues that the winning of a war is not entirely decided upon by the tactical elements that Caesar describes in agonizing detail. Wars such as Caesar's are the actualization of bitter violence, resulting in loss of life to such an extent that a communal breaking of spirit is created, a "pacification" in Caesarian terminology. The brutality of war, which Caesar leaves out of his campaign narrative, is the very thing we should keep in mind while reading the *BG* and writing about the it's rhetorical purposes.

From a modern perspective, I am extremely sympathetic to the Gallic cause, particularly Critognatus' speech. It is an emotional speech that truly sheds light on what is at stake for the Gallic inhabitants. Echoes of this rhetoric are seen in almost every anti-colonial, native resistance in history. In this speech, Critognatus delivers a Gallic equivalent to William Wallace in the Film *Braveheart* or the creed to the Irish Easter Resistance of 1921, "*Tiocfaidh ár lá*" or "our day will come" both Celtic receptions of this original Celtic resistance, and Caesar purposefully includes it in the text. Obviously, a modern reader will sympathize with Critognatus as a freedom fighter because of our modern conceptions of freedom and colonialism. In fact, as Bijan Omrani points out in his book *Caesar's Footprints*, Vercingetorix and his rebellion inspired French nationalism during the Napoleonic era. In fact, Vercingetorix's rebellion inspired Henri d'Orleans to write a dedication to Vercingetorix and his righteous cause in 1859, going as far to say, "he is not even without the hollow of martyrdom" while comparing him to Joan of Arc.¹³³ Napoleon, who took a particular interest in the *BG* erected a statue of Vercingetorix at Alesia in the emperor's own image.¹³⁴ Caesar's Roman reader would not share in this sentiment. The Roman reader would be

¹³³ Omrani (2019) 107.

¹³⁴ Omrani (2019) 80.

faced with a classical question that we face, even in modernity: what cultural norms separate a freedom fighter from a terrorist?

Yet Caesar's rhetoric was meant to detract from the death and enslavement of hundreds of thousands of Gallic men, women, and children. Caesar would have his reader believe the *BG* is a "captain's log" of battles won, tactics used, and territories conquered in the name of Rome and all her glory. To completely take such a narrative as fact ignores the wake of Caesar's conquest of Gaul, what some have called a Gallic Holocaust. Understanding Caesar's use of *clientela* as a cover for imperialism, helps to uncover that Caesar's writing did not represent the actuality of the war of Gaul, but a purposeful and highly propagandized version of events. However, the untold story of the breaking of Gaul fits Caesar's narrative of the "value added" of Gaul. Through pacification, Rome now has a client kingdom, with soldiers ready to fight for it, who have the ability to fight like Romans. A breaking of wills or pacification as Caesar puts it is the very thing that makes a great soldier, and if the Gauls are as loyal as the *soldurii*, and have the ability to become Romanized militarily, then Caesar the conqueror has added value to the Roman state: amassing a million troops awaiting to be trained across the Alps.

When discussing the value of pacification to the Roman state, one only needs to look to the *soldurii* to see how Gaul would benefit Caesar and Rome. Despite their lack of Roman tactical proficiency, Caesar reminds his reader at every turn that Gallic soldiers are extremely loyal and very brave.¹³⁵ The loyalty of the Gauls is best represented in Caesar's description of the *soldurii*. The *soldurii* show their dedication to the military aristocracy in dramatic fashion

¹³⁵ I.e. the *virtus* and *ratio* dichotomy presented by Johnston in "Nostris" and "The Other(s)" in which Gallic warriors have a barbaric *virtus* and Caesar's soldiers, the superiority of *ratio*.

that resembles that of honorary suicide. Caesar tells us that when the *soldurii* of a powerful Gallic patron dies, they either plunge themselves into death on the battle field or commit suicide:

While all our men were occupied there, Adiatunnus, their supreme commander, appeared from another part of the town with 600 loyal men they call **soldurii**. They share life's goods with others to whom they vow their friendship. If any violence befalls them, either they endure the same fate together or commit suicide. In the memory of men there has been no man who refused to die himself when someone to whose friendship he was pledged was killed.¹³⁶

There is almost an excitement to the language in this passage that contrasts to the very matter-of-fact and dry style of the rest of the military narrative. In this exaggeration, although clearly a barbarianization, it shows the true dedication that Gallic clients had for their military patrons.

Here Caesar defines the bounds of Gallic loyalty. After all, how different are the *soldurii* from Caesar's troops who give up their own bodily autonomy for 8 years on the campaign? The separation between the Roman soldier and the Gallic *soldurii* is their **total** dedication, to give their lives to the last man. Although Caesar does glorify men such as his supporting officers and, in rare occasions, individual centurions, their achievements as represented in the *BG* are far from a dedication to give their lives to the last man for their commander.¹³⁷ Although barbarian in nature this total sacrifice of life is astonishing. Caesar wants to show his Roman audience that after pacification, Romanization, and Roman military professionalism, these Gauls would be excellent additions to the Roman army as an extension of his Gallic patronage.

¹³⁶ *BG* 3.22 (trans. Raaflaub).

¹³⁷ Commanders such as Cicero's younger brother Quintus are given glory particularly because of their connection to power in Rome and Caesar only mentions two non-officers by name in the entire work, Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo who compete in a contest of bravery while fighting the Nervii under Quintus Cicero, *BG* 5.44.

Not only is Caesar showing the value of their new Gallic clients to the Roman State, he is sending a very clear message to his political enemies in Rome. He just spent eight years “pacifying” one million future troops and added a massive power to his political tool belt. Caesar is sending a very clear message to his rivals and enemies in the senate, who are threatening to take away his *imperium*. He doesn’t need all Roman soldiers to march on Rome. For the entirety of the *BG* Caesar has used Gallic auxiliaries and the magnificent German cavalrymen.¹³⁸ He now has pacified Gallic men, who have been civilized through conquest and who are willing to do his bidding militarily.

In his essay in *Foreign Clientelae Reconsidered*, Pragg writes concerning *auxilia externa*:

The importance of such relationships [foreign *clientelae*] and military service that goes with them, serves to be a more central place in our analysis of Republican Imperialism.

This article argues that in Badian’s *Foreign Clientelae*, Badian vastly overlooks how dependent Rome was on these auxiliaries gained in foreign campaigns. Pragg posits 4 modes of recruitment for *auxilia externa*: 1) allies: Caesar has used allies such as the Aedui for a majority of the work, 2) client kings: such as Caesar’s Gallic *rex sociusque et amicus*, 3) subjected peoples: the products of Caesar’s “pacification”, and 4) mercenaries: such as the German cavalrymen which Caesar gives such high praise to.¹³⁹ Caesar has all four methods of recruitment and, as Andrew Riggsby argues in his book *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*, Caesar has spent seven books of the *BG* describing their increasing skill and Roman techniques in warfare.¹⁴⁰ The value of Caesar’s

¹³⁸ For the renown of the German Cavalrymen see *BG* 4.2.

¹³⁹ For Caesar’s German cavalrymen see *BG* 7.65 and 7.67 where they are extremely effective against Vercingetorix.

¹⁴⁰ See Riggsby’s (2006) 157-189; Riggsby argues for an apparent Romanization in how the Gauls fight over the seven books of the military campaign.

campaign is not simply land and taxes, but hundreds of thousands of newly pacified soldiers, which explains why he gives such high praise to the *soldurii* or his German cavalry mercenaries.

This reminds us that we must acknowledge Caesar's rhetoric as that of a conqueror who massacred a third of the Gallic population and enslaved another third.¹⁴¹ This is more than just the rhetoric of Gaul's process of civilization, it is actual subjugation posed as the rhetoric of liberation. Caesar wants his reader to believe that the Roman state is civilizing and freeing Gaul from the bounds of their slavery by defeating Gallic patrons, as this was his justification for conquest. In reality, Caesar is justifying stretching the bounds of an empire to suit his own personal gain. In a close examination of Caesar's rhetoric of *clientela* in the *BG*, the Caesarian reader is able to see the motivations and characteristics of how Caesar presents himself as the author. In doing so, we see how Caesar's political, military, and literary motivations coalesce through *clientela* to project his image as Caesar the Conqueror.

¹⁴¹ If we take Caesar on his word, the number of murdered and enslaved is over 1.5 million Gauls.

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