Education, Citizenship, Political Participation: Defining Variables for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Education, Citizenship, Political Participation: Defining Variables for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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May 1, 2012

Supervised by Dr. Eve Sandberg

I affirm that I have adhered to the Honor Code in this assignment
—S.R.
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1. Introduction

When the Bosnian War ended in December of 1995, after three and a half years of brutal ethnic conflict, there was tremendous hope for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. The war ended in the signing of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Republics of the Yugoslav Federation. The purpose of these accords was both to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to provide a framework for the reconstruction of Bosnia’s state institutions.¹ The accords were successful in bringing peace to Bosnia, but their reconstruction framework involved two factors that contributed to a lack of institutional growth in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the continued involvement of external actors in Bosnian affairs (through the establishment of international organizations intended to oversee Bosnia’s reconstruction process), and the decentralization of the Bosnian state (through the creation of two semi-autonomous entities within Bosnia: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska).² The puzzle that emerges from this flawed reconstruction process lies in identifying what went wrong in Bosnia. Were particular variables overlooked in this process, and if so, could they have led to a better outcome for Bosnia-Herzegovina? The importance of this question lies in the fact that, despite the ongoing efforts of policy-makers, Bosnia remains mired in instability with no constituent support for state

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¹ “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” or “Bosnia and Herzegovina” is, admittedly, a mouthful. It is acceptable to shorten it either to “BiH”—an abbreviation of the Bosnian “Bosna i Hercegovina”—or, simply, to “Bosnia.” In the interest of simplicity, I will refer to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” mostly as “Bosnia.”

² Foremost among the international institutions created by the Dayton Accords is the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose decision-making capacity still props up Bosnia’s institutions.

³ The ethnic makeup of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also referred simply as “The Federation,” is mostly Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Serbs live mainly in the Republika Srpska, also referred to as “The Republic.”
institutions. This instability increasingly leads to the possibility that Bosnia will erupt in another outbreak of ethnic conflict.

The problem inherent in the Dayton Accords is that it facilitated a limiting, one-dimensional approach to Bosnia's reconstruction. Dayton focused exclusively on restructuring Bosnia into a fully functional state—relying on the effectiveness of changing its institutional and structural framework. This type of reconstruction process fits into the category of “statebuilding,” defined as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state.” The problem with this type of process is that it does not explicitly provide for the forging of a national identity, or for a process of “nation building.” Processes of nation building focus more on the social aspects of reconstruction, and involve the construction of national identity using the power of the state. In other words, the aim of nation building is to unify citizens in order to mobilize them behind a parallel statebuilding process, and to ensure that they remain invested in the political stability of the state. In arguing for the importance of a shared sense of nationhood in Bosnia, I highlight the fact that nation building can increase the success of a parallel statebuilding process. With that in mind, I situate my argument with the literatures on statebuilding, made by Barnett R. Rubin, Susan Woodward,

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5 Ibid.
6 Nation building is defined as “actions undertaken usually by national actors, to force a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project.” Charles T. Call, *Building States to Build Peace* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 5.
and Stephen Krasner. In its discussion of nation building, this paper supplements these literatures.\(^7\)

In its oversight of the importance of nation building, I posit that Bosnia’s reconstruction process discounted the importance of three variables that could—even now, in 2012—encourage Bosnian citizens to forge a connection to their newly reconstructed state, and could, in turn, increase the effectiveness of the statebuilding process.\(^8\) I identify these three absent variables as *education* (a desegregated education system), *citizenship* (a cohesive sense of national identity), and *participation* (increased levels of political participation). I present these variables as cohesive set—they build off of each other, and must thus be used sequentially in order to successfully lay the groundwork for the restoration of Bosnians’ faith in state-level politics, and in order to increase the legitimacy of the Bosnian state.

In building an argument for these variables, I analyze the model of post-conflict reconstruction that was employed by the Clinton Administration in Bosnia in conjunction with an alternate model proposed by the academic, Stephen L. Burg. The purpose of this analysis is to pinpoint gaps in these models, and to explain these gaps in terms of their exclusive focus on statebuilding and their tendency to overlook variables that could have led to a process of nation building. This paper will demonstrate that, despite the current dysfunctional nature of Bosnian

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\(^7\) Nation building is defined as “actions undertaken usually by national actors, to force a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project.” Charles T. Call, *Building States to Build Peace* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 5.

\(^8\) It is important to note that although these variables should have been applied at the start of the reconstruction process in 1996, their application even now, in 2012, could be just as effective. I posit that these variables could be applied at any time in order to increase the functionality of Bosnia’s state.
institutions, and the instability of the state as a whole, these problems could be mitigated through the implementation of policies and institutions designed to support a desegregated education system, a cohesive national identity, and increased public participation in state-level politics.

In the first section of this paper, I will use the case study of Bosnia and its levels of stability in 2012 to explain Bosnia’s relevance as an example of a failed process of post-conflict reconstruction. I will explain Bosnia’s institutional structure as laid out by the Dayton Accords in order to catalogue how this structure has impeded Bosnia’s institutional growth. In so doing, I will offer specific indicators of Bosnia’s lack of growth since 1996.

The second section will offer the two models for conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction: first, the model that was ultimately implemented by the Clinton Administration; second, an alternate model proposed by the academic Stephen L. Burg, in 2005. The purpose of this section is to identify the gaps in these two models, and to analyze the gaps in terms of their exclusive focus on frameworks of statebuilding. Ultimately, this section will explain how the variables I have identified could fill in these gaps in order to solve problems that other models were unable to resolve.

In the third section of this paper I offer and detail the variables I have identified for conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction: education, citizenship, and political participation. This set of variables begins with the establishment of a desegregated education system—a system that I suggest would

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9 Steven L. Burg is an expert on ethnic politics, Balkan politics, Ethnic conflict, and conflict management. He currently teaches at Brandeis University.
have allowed younger generations of Bosnians to develop a shared sense of citizenship (or, a more homogenized notion of what it is to be “Bosnian”). This, in turn, would have inspired participation in state-level politics. Ultimately, I argue that these three variables could—even now in 2012—work to increase constituent interest in state politics, and thus to contribute to the legitimacy of the state. This section also offers an explanation of implications that these variables could have on future post-conflict cases. My fourth and concluding section will sum up my findings for the reader.
2. Methodology

Research Methods

I began my research at Oberlin College examining secondary sources—both books, and scholarly articles—on general theories of conflict mediation and post-conflict resolution, and on the history of the Bosnian War. Next, I examined reports from think tanks, scholars (theorists, practitioners, and their critics), as well as official reports from various international organizations including the United Nations, the International Crisis Group, and the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thirdly, I read the memoirs of actors who were directly involved in the negotiation process, including those of Chief Negotiator Richard Holbrooke, and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The second segment of my research was conducted at the Library of Congress, in Washington D.C., funded by grants from Oberlin College’s Politics Department (The Jere Bruner Research Grant), and Sociology Department (The Jerome Davis Research Grant). The purpose of this segment of my research was to collect primary and secondary sources, including congressional reports and official documents from President Clinton’s collection. This research was intended to inform my understanding of the Clinton administration’s decision-making process. I specifically read documents that explained how the opinions of actors in the administration affected the timeline of the United States’ decision to engage in the conflict.
Defending my Case Study

In order to determine if Bosnia was primed for continued analysis and study, I examined various sources that gauge Bosnia’s political, social, and economic stability up until 2011. My principal source for the analysis of Bosnia’s political, social, and economic stability was the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index, an online index that collects information from thousands of sources, and distills them into one cohesive set of indicators that detail the social, economic, and political pressures facing 177 countries. In 2005, ten years after the cessation of hostilities, Bosnia ranked twenty-two out of 177, placing it in the category of countries that are considered “critical.” Six years later, in 2011, Bosnia ranked sixty-nine in the index, rising to the category of countries that are in “danger,” but are no longer “critical.” While Bosnia’s level of stability has risen considerably between 2005 and 2011, steady improvement is not enough to suggest that Bosnia has achieved the level of stability necessary for it to be categorized as a fully functional state.

In 2010, Bosnia’s lowest rankings in the fourteen subcategories of social, political, and economic pressures were in the subcategories of “rise of factionalized elites,” and “vengeance seeking group grievance.” The rankings in these categories are particularly excellent indicators that the Dayton Accords did not manage to resolve root causes of the conflict—the country's experiences with the factionalized elites of its three main ethnic groups, and long-term political and social grievances.

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10 The Fund for Peace’s index defines “state failure” as a variety of factors that include the loss of physical control of its territory, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, and the inability to provide reasonable public services. The Failed State Index, Frequently Asked Questions: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-faq#5

11 The Failed State Index, Conflict Indicators: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=indicators
amongst these groups. Bosnia’s low rankings in these important categories suggest dangerously low levels of stability for a transitional country. As a state in its post-conflict years, Bosnia had not made significant progress towards becoming a stable and functional nation. This source, and each of the other sources that I referenced, point to the fact that, in the fifteen years after the implementation of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia has failed to achieve optimal levels of political stability; thus, Bosnia proved to be ripe for analysis.

Therefore, in choosing a case study, I chose to focus on Bosnia, and Bosnia alone. My project involves the analysis of multiple social variables (such as education, citizenship, and political participation) and the implications of Bosnia’s reconstruction process are so complicated and so specific to Bosnia’s own process, that a comparison, or the use of multiple case studies would not add anything to my argument. Thus, I elected to employ Bosnia as a single holistic case study in order to effectively explain and analyze the factors in full detail. In looking at Bosnia alone, I am able to fully examine the intricacies of its reconstruction process, and to analyze my variables within and across the case study.12

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3. Literature Review

Barnett R. Rubin, Stephen L. Krasner, and Susan Woodward analyze distinctly different points in the statebuilding and peacebuilding processes of post-conflict and transitional states. Barnett R. Rubin and Stephen L Krasner analyze the very beginning of the statebuilding process, where the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a successful transitional government are the most pressing goals. Susan Woodward instead analyzes a later stage in the post-conflict reconstruction process, and thus is able to focus on longer-term problems of reform.13 My analysis focuses primarily on the establishment of a transitional government, however Woodward’s work is important in highlighting the potential long-term effects of a flawed reconstruction process. Before proceeding, it is important to call attention to Rubin’s warning that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should not be conflated. A sustainable ceasefire, Dayton’s first goal, was an acceptable standard for keeping the peace, but it was insufficient for having consolidated or institutionalized peace.14

Rubin further argues that statebuilding and peacebuilding operations require the short-term assistance of external actors, as failed or failing states lack the resources and state capacity necessary to autonomously “implement sustainable

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14 Rubin defines statebuilding as “the interrelated establishment and stabilization of control of the means of legitimate violence and authority, combined with the mobilization of resources to sustain these institutions, constitutes the process of statebuilding.” Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding”: 31.
transformation of political structures and statebuilding.” The crux of Rubin’s argument hinges on his definition of three factors: coercion, capital, and legitimacy. He posits that these three factors must be incorporated into an externally organized statebuilding process in order to successfully assist a transitional state in becoming a fully functional nation-state.

Rubin’s definition of “coercion” hinges on a) the involvement of a transitional international security provisions, b) the establishment of new security agencies or the reform of existing ones, and c) the provision of security for political processes. In other words, the use of “coercion” in a statebuilding process leads to higher levels of internal security in a transitional state. “Capital” takes the form of both international financial assistance for recovery, and reconstruction; as well as the development of efforts to invigorate both the national economy, and the fiscal capacity of the government. The inclusion of “legitimacy” as a factor in a statebuilding process can enable states to “develop inclusive, fully representative, and capable government; to protect the rights of broad participation; and to shield vulnerable people from threats.” Though partially dependent on initial conditions within the transitional country, the outcome of a peacebuilding operation relies on the successful manipulation of these three factors.

Rubin’s work highlights the notion that the involvement of external actors in peacebuilding and statebuilding operations is not inherently problematic. Problems with external involvement arise when the assisting state considers its own needs

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15 Rubin, 41.
16 Burg attributes the development of these three factors to Charles Tilly.
17 Rubin, 28-29.
and security interests over those of the transitional state.\textsuperscript{18} Such operations can appear to undermine transitional administrations instead of working to assist them. Rubin discourages any involvement in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes that is based solely on security interests, and suggests that external actors must legitimize their objectives in order for their involvement to be welcomed by local actors.

In order to successfully legitimize their objectives, external actors must help the transitional governments establish a broad consensus on the form of government institutions, and on the “structure of the state to which officials will be elected, as well as on the electoral system and administration.”\textsuperscript{19} In other words, international statebuilding operations must help establish a functional government, but this government cannot exclusively rely on external actors for assistance. The purpose of peacebuilding and statebuilding operations is to rebuild the legitimacy of government institutions by increasing political participation, and by increasing the government’s capacity to mobilize and deliver resources.\textsuperscript{20} Rubin posits that building national capacity for security and legitimate governance is also “key to sustaining peace.”\textsuperscript{21}

Here, Krasner’s theory of sovereignty offers an alternative to Rubin’s vision of the nature of external involvement in peacebuilding and statebuilding. Krasner’s theory hinges on the assumption that state legitimacy and sovereignty is necessary in order for a transitional state to become a full-fledged nation state. Sovereignty

\textsuperscript{18} Rubin, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{19} Rubin, 35.
\textsuperscript{20} Rubin, 43.
\textsuperscript{21} Rubin, 34.
theory posits that badly governed states, if left to their own devices, are unable to solve their own problems. This is due largely to their limited administrative capacity, and to their inability to maintain internal security. Krasner argues that the policy tools currently available to external actors—governance assistance and transitional administration—are inadequate for increasing the sovereignty and capacity of these ailing states. In light of these inadequacies, Krasner argues for alternative institutional arrangements supported by external actors—such as *de facto trusteeships* and *shared sovereignty contracts*—to be added to the list of policy options for dealing with failed or post-conflict states.

Krasner’s definition of contemporary international legal sovereignty involves the recognition of states as juridically independent territorial entities. The overarching notion of Krasner’s conception of sovereignty (also referred to as Westphalian, or Vatellian sovereignty) is the idea these states are not formally subject to external authority. Sovereign states have *de facto* autonomy, implying that states should refrain at all costs from intervening in each others’ internal affairs.22

Krasner argues that the international political system has seen the emergence of “post-Westphalian sovereignty,” wherein the dictates of Westphalian sovereignty are ignored by powerful states in the face of a perceived security crisis. Using the case of Bosnia as an example, Krasner points out that “the president of the United States or the prime minister of Britain did not have to argue that sovereignty [was] dead in order to place NATO troops in Bosnia.” In fact, he argues that the

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rationale for the deployment of these troops may well have been that their purpose was “to restore effective domestic sovereignty to Bosnia.” Krasner argues that external intervention can be considered as directly in line with the notion of sovereignty as long its apparent purpose is to restore domestic sovereignty to the transitional state.

The use of de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty contracts could decrease the security threats posed by these unstable states, and could also assist transitional states in achieving optimal levels of stability. A de facto trusteeship would involve a major state or international organization assuming protectorate responsibility for a transitional country. Use of a de facto trusteeship would allow international actors to assume control over the local politics of the transitional state for an indefinite period of time. Krasner’s conception of a shared sovereignty contract follows in a similar vein—these contracts would increase joint authority structures in transitional state and would also allow external actors to assume responsibility for the politics of the transitional state.

Krasner argues that the use of de facto trusteeships and shared sovereignty contracts would not necessarily strip the transitional state of all decision-making capabilities. Ideally, both options would necessitate considerable involvement from local political actors and would involve accountability mechanisms to systematically engage local actors in order to avoid hindering local statebuilding efforts. Bosnia’s experience with external governance exemplifies Krasner’s understanding of what could happen if an externally led reconstruction process failed to involve such

accountability mechanisms. In Bosnia, the lack of these mechanisms led to the excessive and continued presence of external actors. As such, the transitional administration never successfully transitioned into a full-fledged and fully functional government.

An alternative explanation for the failures of Bosnia’s transitional administration is that residual ethnic issues have hindered the successful achievement of state-level legitimacy, and have ensured that the Bosnian polity remains more committed to local, ethnically based politics than to politics on the national scale. Krasner’s understanding of the failure of Bosnia’s transitional administration, coupled with Bosnia’s lack of successful state-level politics relates directly to the importance of using “legitimacy” to help transitional administrations achieve nation-state status.

It is hard to fault the polity itself for its lack of commitment to state-level politics. The phenomenon of low political participation in Bosnia is reflective both of the fact that the state has never shown a commitment to assisting its constituents, and of the fact that the system set up by the Dayton Accords necessarily decentralized the Bosnian political system to the extent that there was no incentive for political participation at the national level. While participatory politics does not equate to liberal democracy, it does offer a mechanism for “aggrieved social groups to feel that they have both a voice and a stake in the national political system.”24 Participatory national politics could provide Bosnians with an alternative outlet for venting their ethnic frustrations.

While Krasner’s sovereignty theory fits neatly into Rubin’s category of “legitimacy,” Susan Woodward’s variables relate instead into Rubin’s variable “capital.” Woodward agrees with Rubin’s assertion that one of the essential means of successfully reconstructing a state is to use capital in the form of international financial assistance for recovery, for reconstruction, and for development of efforts to invigorate both the national economy and the fiscal capacity of the government. However, in the Bosnian case, Woodward does not believe in channeling aid through the state. In 1999, four years after the implementation of the Dayton Accords, Woodward viewed the Bosnian state as having lost the legitimacy necessary to achieve economic reform at the state-level. As such, Woodward does not even attempt to find a solution that would allow for the regrowth of Bosnia’s institutions. Woodward claims that capital could support “the development of the political institutions and a political climate” and that this could “enable the people themselves to generate solutions,” but that this would have required a more stable environment and support network at the start of the statebuilding process.

Instead, Woodward’s capital-based proposal for revamping the Bosnian economy involves the early staged entry into liberal European economic regimes in order to encourage private-sector development and to reduce the state’s economic role. Apart from her perception of the state’s lack of legitimacy, the other pitfall of channeling aid through governments is that it would reinforce state patronage and protectionism, and inhibit “new private businesses and cross-border economic

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ties.” As a solution to her perceived problems of state-legitimacy, Woodward advocates for the use of cross-border cooperation on the basis of mutual economic self-interest, claiming that this would be less likely than state initiatives to be disrupted by political disputes.

Woodward’s call for the channeling of external financial aid to non-state institutions differs slightly from Rubin’s recommendations. In Rubin’s eyes, this use of external funding is dangerous, as it could be used to fund “the creation of national capacities, institutions, and the development of parallel systems that suck capacity out of national institutions and create unsustainable white elephants.” Rubin’s conception of capital and external aid in post-conflict situations is that it should be used to enable the state to encourage investment, free markets, and economic development.” This process could increase the legitimacy of external actors, and of the post-conflict state through the provision of international resources, or capacities capable of covering initial gaps in the process.

I focus my paper on the early stages of the reconstruction process—the stages analyzed by both Rubin and Krasner. My hope is to understand what went wrong with the Dayton Accords in order to find a realistic and viable solution for rebuilding Bosnia’s badly reconstructed state institutions.

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27 Ibid.
29 Rubin: 43.
4. The Case Study: Explaining Bosnia-Herzegovina

The conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction process ultimately implemented by the United States was successful in that it managed to end the brutal Bosnian War. The failure of this process lay in the fact that it did not successfully increase the state’s capacity for self-governance. The continued involvement of external actors in Bosnian politics has lowered the incentive for local actors to participate in the reconstruction process through attempts to implement much needed reforms to its political, social, and economic institutions. Bosnia’s unemployment rates, levels of government corruption, and lack of economic growth all point to the fact that, over the past fifteen years, Bosnia has not experienced the healthy growth that would have emerged from the implementation of successful reforms. In analyzing the reasons for this lack of growth, I first examine the political institutions established by the Dayton Accords.

In laying the framework for the structure of these institutions, the accords’ first move was to decentralize the structure of the state. First, the accords split the country into two semi-autonomous entities: The Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ethnic makeup of these two entities is fairly homogenized—the vast majority of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks live within the Federation, while Bosnian Serbs live mainly within the Republic. The decision to

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30 The Washington Agreement, signed on March 18, 1994, had recognized the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a semi-autonomous entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The political significance of this decision was two-fold: firstly, it helped appease Bosnian Muslims who viewed the creation of the Federation as a first step towards recognition, and it served as a ceasefire agreement between the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Washington Agreement the territories held by the Croat and Bosnian national forces was divided into self-governing cantons that made up the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intention of this division was to prevent the continued dominance of one ethnic group over another.
grant these entities complete autonomy over local political decisions has had a detrimental effect on the capacity of state-level institutions.

In delineating the entities around ethnic lines, the accords guaranteed that the political processes of these two entities would be grounded in ethically based issues. The accords’ creation of sub-national, or regional politics also ensured that the Bosnian polity would be more invested in regional politics than in politics at the national level. As a means of further decentralizing the decision-making capabilities of the state-level government, the accords established second-level units of local autonomy—“cantons” within the Federation, and “municipalities” within the Republika Srpska.

The structure of the cantons emphasizes their political autonomy. The cantons operate as mini-states-within-states, each with their own carefully established system of governance and distribution. Each canton has its own assembly of twenty to thirty-five delegates. Cantonal assembly chairpersons nominate cantonal premiers, who in turn nominate their own ministers. Cantonal governments are confirmed by a majority vote of the cantonal assemblies, while municipal mayors and city councils are directly elected.31 Interestingly, the political institutions of the Republika Srpska are comparatively “much more centralized and streamlined.” The Republic has a president, and a government headed by a prime minister and sixteen ministries. The parliament has eighty-three seats. Given the large Serb majority—the Republic is considered a homeland for Serbs living in

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Bosnia—there are few Croats and Bosniaks in positions of authority, except for where such ethnic diversity is required by quotas.\(^3^2\)

The drafters of the accords understood to some extent the effect that the entities’ influence would have on the functionality of Bosnia’s national government. In order to establish a more functional government at the state-level, the Bosnian Constitution, outlined by the Dayton accords, established a multi-tiered structure of national political institutions: a three-person presidency, a fifteen-person upper legislative chamber (House of Peoples), and a forty-two-person lower chamber (House of Representatives); together, the two chambers make up the Parliamentary assembly. In an attempt to give the three ethnic groups equal decision-making capabilities, the composition of the national governing bodies is, determined on the basis of a “strict ethnic calculus.”\(^3^3\) The presidency consists of one representative from each of Bosnia’s three “constituent peoples,”\(^3^4\) and deputy ministers are drawn from a different constituent community than their ministers. The House of Peoples, a much smaller institution, consists of five Bosniaks, five Croats, and five Serbs. The House of Representatives is the one institution that allows for a more varied ethnic membership as its members are elected directly from the territory that they represent: two thirds are elected from the Federation, and one third from the

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\(^3^4\) The Dayton Accords assign the status of “constituent people” only to Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats—a label that affords the three ethnic groups equal collective rights. Even though the Bosniaks are the clear majority in the country, Croats and Serbs reject the “minority” label, which connotes non-constituent status. The lack of rights afforded to non-constituents has made it very difficult for other ethnic minorities, and children of inter-ethnic marriages to attain official recognition as citizens.
Republika Srpska.\textsuperscript{35} Even at the state-level, divisions within the government have incapacitated Bosnia-Herzegovina's institutions. The country's political makeup facilitates political actors' inclination to base decisions off of the needs of their particular ethnic group. This allows them to avoid considering the needs of the country on the whole.

This use of a strict ethnic calculus in divvying up political positions, coupled with the creation of power-sharing state-level institutions suggests that the drafters of the accords were greatly influenced by the principles of consociationalism.\textsuperscript{36} Although these principles are based on an acceptance of ethnic pluralism, their application to post-conflict political systems has been blamed for any resulting institutionalization of ethnic divisions.\textsuperscript{37} The three-way power-sharing system was implemented both to restrict any possible attempts on the part of Croat and Serb nationalist elites to rally for partition, and to ensure that each ethnic group would be equally represented. However, this system has proved to be ineffective. Constituents remain uninterested in supporting presidential candidates, in spite of their categorization by ethnicity.

This ineffectiveness calls into question the entire ethnically divided nature of the Bosnian state. The consociational structure of Bosnian politics—specifically the power-sharing system and the determining of positions based on an ethnic


\textsuperscript{36} The principle of consociationalism was developed by Arendt Lijphart as a means of resolving the Netherlands’ ethnic crisis in the early 1900s. The purpose of consociationalism is to encourage ethnically segmented societies to sustain or build democracy through power-sharing systems. Countries such as Lebanon, Nigeria, Belgium and Switzerland all have countries that operate on consociationalist principles.

\textsuperscript{37} This critique of consociationalism can be attributed to Donald L. Horowitz, who argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification ethnic divisions, such as in Lebanon and Nigeria.
calculus—has successfully been implemented in other post-conflict states, namely in Switzerland, and the Netherlands, raising the question of why this model allowed for the regrowth and reconstruction of these states, but failed to provide for similar results in Bosnia. The answer lies in the considerable likelihood of another eruption of violent ethnic conflict in Bosnia. At the time that the consociational arrangements were made for Switzerland, and the Netherlands, the risk of another outbreak of war for each was highly unlikely. This was due largely to the fact that the resources necessary to start another intra-state conflict were much harder to come by during the reconstruction processes of these two states. Simply put, these states could not have afforded another eruption of violence. Bosnia, in contrast, had and continues to have the resources and the military capacity necessary to support another violent conflict. Additionally, it does not have the state capacity necessary to prevent such an eruption. The importance of forging a cohesive national identity is magnified by its potential ability to prevent a second devolution into violent conflict.

The fact that the governmental structure laid out by the Dayton Accords has not allowed for the healthy growth of Bosnia’s state-level institutions means that Bosnia has not successfully transitioned into a fully functional state. The lack of capacity endemic in Bosnia’s institutions has reflected on its rates of growth, as evidenced by the following economic and political indicators. The first indicators examined fall into the categories of the political and the economic and are particularly suggestive of a lack of growth.

In 2011, Bosnia’s overall unemployment rate was 43.3%. The CIA World Factbook ranks the unemployment rates of 200 countries, and places Bosnia close to
the bottom—in 188th place. A comparison to Serbia’s unemployment rates contextualizes this statistic, and suggests its gravity. Serbia’s unemployment rate was 23.6% as of 2011—this is far more representative of the regional norm.

Tracking Bosnia’s unemployment rates over time makes it clear that matters have not improved since Dayton’s implementation. Between 2000 and 2011, these rates fluctuated steadily between 35% and 43.3%. There was no real pattern to these fluctuations, and certainly no suggestion of improvement.

The Heritage Foundation’s 2012 Index of Economic Freedom rates the overall economic freedom of 179 countries. Bosnia’s overall economic freedom score for 2012 was 57.3. This ranking places Bosnia in the category of countries whose economic status is “mostly unfree.” Bosnia ranks in thirty-eighth place out of forty-three European countries, indicating that Bosnia’s performance is well below the regional average. Bosnia’s overall score is .2 points worse than it was last year. The index suggests that its performance deteriorated partly as a result of the global economic slowdown, and partly as a result of the problematically slow pace of transition to open-market politics. As per Woodward’s argument, explained in Section 3 of this paper, this slow pace can be attributed to the fact that Bosnia did not transition into liberal European economic regimes early enough in its

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38 Countries were ranked in descending order. The country that was in spot number 1 (Monaco) therefore has the lowest unemployment rate. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html?countryName=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina&countryCode=bk&regionCode=eur&rank=188


reconstruction process. As a result, Bosnia’s capacity for steady transition has been noticeably stunted.

The index also examines political indicators, and suggests that Bosnia’s decentralized political structure is another reason for its low ranking. Bosnia’s two entities have entirely different tax policies. This has resulted in confusing economic discrepancies between the two entities, and has contributed significantly to the entire country’s lack of economic growth. Another significant political problem contributing to Bosnia’s lack of economic freedom are high levels of political corruption that have plagued Bosnia since Dayton’s implementation. Widespread corruption discourages production and contributes to Bosnia’s “worrisome” lack of entrepreneurial activity.\(^{41}\) Bosnia ranks thirty-two out of one hundred for freedom from corruption.\(^{42}\) To contextualize Bosnia’s score: The Netherlands rank at 88, Slovenia at 64, Montenegro at 37, and Serbia at 35. While Bosnia’s levels of government corruption are not significantly lower than in neighboring countries, they are significantly lower than those of other countries in the greater European region.\(^{43}\)

The issue of corruption correlates to the high levels of Bosnian government expenditure, which totals half of the domestic output. These high levels result in chronic budget deficits, and contribute to Bosnia’s ever-growing public debt. Corruption also reflects on Bosnia’s continuously weak rule of law—another sector that was constructed by the accords. Local courts are constantly subject to political

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Ibid. A score of 100 denotes a country completely free from corruption.
interference—cases are often affected by corrupt government officials’ ability to sway court decisions. The state-level bureaucracy is, on the whole, intrusive and affects day-to-day political activity.⁴⁴

Bosnia performs much better in social indicators, such as education levels and literacy rates. The school life expectancy of students in primary through tertiary education is fourteen years. This places Bosnia only slightly below the United States and the United Kingdom, who both have sixteen years as the average school life expectancy. There is a lack of current data about the primary school net enrollment ratio in Bosnia, but between 2007 and 2009, 87% of the relevant population was enrolled in primary school.⁴⁵ As a reflection of the high school life expectancy, Bosnia’s literacy rate is 96.7%, only slightly below Slovenia, at 99.7%, and well above other post-conflict countries such as Lebanon (87.4%), and Rwanda (70.4%).⁴⁶

Why are Bosnia’s social indicators more reflective of growth and institutional stability? While it difficult to draw any substantive conclusions, the fact is that these indicators reflect the capacity of sub-state institutions, not the capacity of those at the state-level. Education is organized at the level of the Federation and the Republic, and while Bosnia’s education system is plagued with other problems,

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⁴⁶ Literacy is defined as “age 15 and over can read and write.” The CIA Factbook, Field Listing: Literacy. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html#bk
these social indicators suggest that the entities’ institutions indeed are more functional and stable than state-level institutions.47

Bosnia’s political and economic stability—as described by the indicators analyzed above—suggests that lack of growth across all categories has been consistent since Dayton’s implementation. This phenomenon highlights the effects of Dayton’s two main problems, as described in the introduction of this paper: the continued involvement of external actors in Bosnian affairs, and the decentralization of the Bosnian state. In sum, an analysis of these indicators suggests that the state-level institutions created by the accords have failed to provide for a state capable of self-governance, and of significant growth over time; while the institutions created by the two autonomous entities have proved as much more effective and capable of reform.

47 See Section Six of this paper for a discussion of the problems with Bosnia’s education system.
5. Two Models of Conflict Mediation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina

5.1 The United States’ Model: Mediating the Conflict

The Clinton administration’s actions during the Bosnian War can be analyzed in two distinct timeframes: the mediation phase—the phase that took place before the drafting of the Dayton Accords—and the reconstruction phase. In order to understand Dayton’s failures, it is necessary first to analyze the former. This section explains how the administration arrived at the drafting at the accords, and how it provided for the actual cessation of hostilities—Dayton’s first goal. Once the administration intervened, its mediation style was characterized by the promise of serious military retaliation in the face of a continued Bosnian Serb offensive; by the promise of the equal division of Bosnian territory if both sides agreed to constructively negotiate for peace; and by assurances of economic and political support during the reconstruction process.

President Clinton came into office during the second year of the conflict, when levels of violence had just begun to increase. George H. W. Bush, his predecessor, had not established measures for mediation or intervention prior to the end of his term—thus, it was left to Clinton to develop a solution to the conflict. During Clinton’s first years in office, when the conflict raged in full, his administration continuously avowed that the war was the exclusive responsibility of the Europeans. This belief derived from the idea that, in the post-Cold War world, without a looming threat of communism, European actors were finally ready to take control of and to solve their own conflicts. In the interest of granting Europeans autonomy over events on their continent, the administration was hesitant to commit
American troops to ending the conflict. This lack of engagement became problematic as the administration was soon faced with increased reports of human rights abuses and crimes against humanity.48

The United States’ initial involvement came in the wake of the Vance-Owen plan, a proposal negotiated by United Nations Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and the European Community’s representative Lord David Owen that necessitated the development of US troops to coerce acceptance of the plan through military means.49 The Clinton Administration rejected this plan, fearful that US public opinion in the post-Vietnam era would not support another prolonged deployment of troops. Instead of providing support to the Vance-Owen plan, Clinton’s administration responded by unveiling its first Bosnian policy: the “lift and strike”. This plan proposed the “lifting” of a previously implemented UN arms embargo, working under the assumption that the embargo had operated unfairly against the Bosnian Muslims, and had done little to prevent Bosnian Serbs from acquiring weapons from the Serbian Republic. The “strike” would involve the launch of NATO-led air attacks in order to rigorously enforce UN-no fly zones and to protect Bosnian Muslims during the transitional period where they would still be vulnerable. The successful implementation of this policy depended upon the cooperation of the UN, NATO, and the allied European forces.

49 The Vance-Owen plan involved the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous units and was predicated on the notion that the United States, NATO, and the UN would, if necessary, deploy forces to militarily coerce acceptance of the plan.
Ultimately, NATO, the UN, and the allied European forces rejected the “lift and strike.” Warren Christopher, Clinton’s Secretary of State at the time of the Bosnian War, who had been tasked with proposing the “lift and strike” to these forces, announced that the allies would only be convinced by the “raw power approach,” which necessitated announcing that the United States would go ahead with the plan, regardless of the allies’ support. This raw power approach was quickly rejected on the notion that it would risk a “major confrontation with the allies” and would leave sole responsibility for any failures that might ensue in Bosnia with the US.50

Clinton’s refusal to commit to ending the war for fear of eliciting a negative public reaction was not met with unequivocal support from his administration. As such, the administration’s failure to develop a comprehensive policy had a great deal to do with its internally divided opinion on the form that such a policy would take. As the administration continued to debate military and diplomatic options, the situation on the ground in Bosnia dramatically deteriorated. In late May, the Europeans called on the United States and Russia to provide troops to protect six Muslim enclaves that the UN had declared “safe areas.” Despite protection from UN troops, the European forces feared that the Bosnian Serb army would target these enclaves.

This move highlighted the problems of “multilateralism,” a post-World War II policy of cooperation among several nations. This policy greatly complicated the

decision-making capacity of any single state. Whereas “unilateralism”—the policy that allowed a single state to make decisions without consulting other states—allowed for speedy decision-making in times of crisis, multilateralism required taking the often-divergent goals of multiple nations into account. In further proof of the downfalls of multilateralism, Washington chose to “firmly rebuff” this plan, with Clinton “emphasizing that he would not send U.S. troops into ‘a shooting gallery’”\textsuperscript{51} This decision proved fatal—both to those living in the enclaves, and to the reputation of the United States’ Bosnian policy.

On July 6, 1995, the heavily Bosnian Muslim inhabited area of Srebrenica, allegedly under the protection of 400 Dutch UNPROFOR troops, was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces.\textsuperscript{52} In the days that followed, Bosnian Serb troops massacred over 8,000 Bosniak men and young boys. More than 25,000 women and children were displaced as a result of the massacre—sent either to refugee camps, or to the war’s infamous rape-camps. Soon after the massacre, Bosnian Serb troops declared that they would follow with a similar attack on the UN safe-area of Gorazde. In response to this new threat, NATO vowed to send a force into Bosnia in order to prevent a second tragedy at Gorazde. The United States’ openly stated commitment to NATO meant that, in a show of solidarity, it finally had to commit its own troops to ending the conflict. The Srebrenica massacre seemed to “hammer the near-final

\textsuperscript{51} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}:18.
\textsuperscript{52} The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was initially established as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. UNPROFOR’s mandate was to ensure that all areas that were established as “United Nations Protected Areas” were demilitarized, and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of an armed attack. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprofor.htm
nail in the coffin for the West’s Bosnia policy,” and highlighted for U.S. decision-makers the need to act immediately to end the violence.53

The administration’s meeting on August seventh was called in order discuss the various policy options available for ending the conflict. Antony Lake, one of Clinton’s chief foreign policy advisors, strongly urged a strategy that deployed troops on the US’s terms, not the UN’s or NATO’s. It was however Madeleine Albright’s (US ambassador to the UN at the time of the conflict) plan that eventually won Clinton’s approval. Her plan involved pushing a peace initiative based on an earlier recommendation that called for a 51-49% territorial split between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

In addition to seeking a cease-fire, her proposal also involved the development of a plan to build a viable, lasting peace in Bosnia through the assisted reconstruction of local Bosnian institutions. Most importantly, Albright’s proposal included the military and diplomatic muscle that had so long been missing from the United States’ policy. As a means of flexing this muscle, the administration pledged to deploy 20,000 troops as part of NATO’s “Operation Deliberate Force”—an air campaign intended to undermine the military capabilities of the Republika Srpska’s army. This air strike was intended as a means of enforcing the notion that the United States and NATO were firmly committed to the swift cessation of hostilities.

The one catch in the plan was that the United States would have to convince the leaders of the Yugoslav Republics not only to agree to this solution, but also to directly involve themselves in its creation. Thus, the next step for the Clinton

administration was to convince Yugoslav actors to participate directly in the official creation of this plan. Richard Holbrooke was tasked with putting together a team to fly to the region and to personally convince the Yugoslav leaders of the importance of their participation. The official conference took place from November first to November twenty-first at the Wright-Patterson air base in Dayton, Ohio. The participants from the region were Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who stood in for Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic; Croatian President Franjo Tudman; and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. The actors all entered the negotiations with drastically different levels of commitment to the achievement of a successfully negotiated outcome.

The structure of the conference was heavily dependent on the United States’ creation of an initial blueprint of the accords. The United States had left no room for the Yugoslav actors to participate in outlining the accords, or in filling in their content. The Yugoslav participants were left only with the ability to debate the details of the plan. Of course, the United States’ prior commitment to the use of force if the participants ultimately failed to conclude their negotiation made it inevitable that Yugoslav actors would eventually sign of the accords, even if the Yugoslavs found the accords to be imperfect. The United States and the other external actors seemed of the opinion that, in order to secure decent domestic governance in Bosnia, new institutional forms were required—forms that could potentially compromise Westphalian sovereignty for an indefinite period of time. The United States appeared inclined to opt for a shared sovereignty arrangement under which “individuals chosen by international organizations, powerful states, or ad hoc
entities would share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic sovereignty.”

While the signatories of the Dayton Accords were allegedly committed to the project of reconstructing the Bosnian state, the cessation of hostilities was the primary goal of the negotiation conference. By the time the Dayton negotiations took place, violence in the region had escalated such that it threatened the reputation of any involved external actor. The purpose of the Dayton conference was to find a peaceful solution to the conflict as quickly as possible—both in order to put a stop to the mass atrocities, and to reaffirm the legitimacy of these external actors by preventing the conflict from expanding into areas and countries not yet directly affected by the fighting. The time sensitive nature of this task meant that all other aspects of the negotiations and the accords were considered to be of secondary importance.

For the reasons enumerated above, the first goal of the accords became the negotiation of a “comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region,” to establish a durable cessation of hostilities, and accomplish this all as swiftly as possible. The Dayton Accords recognized what international actors had stubbornly been ignoring since 1992—that military involvement was necessary in order to return Bosnia-Herzegovina to a peaceful way of life. Furthermore, the accords established that a major contribution was required on the part of the

Yugoslav republics—namely, that the accords required the cooperation of these republics with the international organizations on the ground in order to achieve success. Mindful of this need for international assistance in the implementation of the accords, the signatories welcomed “the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement.”57 The accords did not make any specifications as to what would become of this force in the event that the implementation of the accords was not complete after one year.

Article II of the accords, titled simply, “Cessation of Hostilities,” outlined the various provisions of the accords that were intended to lead to a complete ceasefire. These provisions established that the signatories of the accords (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) were committed to a wide variety of peace-keeping actions including, but not limited to, the maintenance of civilian law enforcement agencies that would operate in accordance with internationally recognized standards; full cooperation with international personnel; and the avowal to avoid committing any reprisals, counterattacks, or unilateral actions in response to violations of the accords by another party. In short: the accords represented an unbreakable promise by the signatories to cease any and all hostilities immediately, and to ensure that there would be no further outbreaks of violence.

Dayton’s provisions included the assurance that this initial post-negotiation peacekeeping process would have some oversight, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would have some military assistance even after the one-year mark. This involved the establishment of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) composed of “ground, air, and maritime unites from NATO and non-NATO nations.” This force was tasked with promoting permanent reconciliation between all Yugoslavian actors, and with establishing lasting security and arms control measures. Though the IFOR was given unimpeded authority over the monitoring of any suspected military activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not all peace-making responsibilities were given to international actors. The accords also tasked the Parties with the provision of a safe environment for all people in the republics, and with the disarmament of all armed civilian groups (except for authorized police forces) within 30 days after the implementation of the accords.59 60

These provisions of the Dayton Accords can be attributed in part to the fact that, in drafting the accords, the Clinton administration implemented a new and distinct approach to the traditional strategy of conflict resolution. In the past, the success or failure of peace negotiations depended on “whether a particular conflict was ripe for resolution.” In this traditional strategy, the shared perception of the conflicting parties that a negotiated agreement was desirable acted as the determinant for this “ripeness.” Dayton differed from this negotiating strategy in

58 Ibid.
59 “The Parties” was the moniker given to the three signatories of the Dayton Accords: the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
that its negotiations, and its reconstruction framework, were enacted on a timetable convenient only to the United States. Thus, the decision-making process vis-à-vis which provisions would actually be included in the Dayton structure was rushed and poorly thought out.

The effects of the administration’s mindset soon became glaringly obvious. It did not take long for local and external actors to realize that the implementation structure was dangerously decentralized and effectively ensured that “responsibility and authority would rest with no single individual or institution.”\textsuperscript{61} As such, it appeared that the implementation suffered from an “enforcement gap.” Bosnian political parties failed to reach a consensus on core post-conflict issues, thus necessitating the decision-making assistance of a vast array of international institutions. Although post-Dayton Bosnia played host to fewer agencies than it had during the days of United Nations rule, Dayton allowed far too many to remain involved in the process, including but not limited to NATO, the UN, the UNHCR, the OSCE, the EU, the World Bank, the IMF. In spite of the decentralized nature of Dayton’s implementation, it was clear by the middle of 1996 that this first promise of the Dayton Accords—the cease-fire, cessation of hostilities, and separation of forces—had been “a resounding success.”\textsuperscript{62} However, the accords’ second goal, the successful reconstruction of Bosnia’s economic and political institutions, proved far more difficult to meet.

\textsuperscript{61} See Richard Holbrooke’s \textit{To End a War} (New York: Random House, 1998).
The crux of this second goal lay in the fact that it was intended to establish a situation on the ground that would allow external actors to make a timely exit from Bosnia. However, the accords had established international organizations, such as the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the accords, thereby ensuring that external actors would necessarily remained involved in the reconstruction process. Thus, even though the accords did manage to design and create new institutions for Bosnia, the growth of these institutions was stunted by their overreliance on external actors. This added both to the widely held perception that the Bosnian state was not legitimate, and worked to limit public interest in political participation—suggesting that the accords ignored variables that could have created populist support for its statebuilding framework.
5.2 The United States’ Model: Dayton’s Promises for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The parties agree that the establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region. To this end, they agree on the importance of devising new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defense force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the Parties’ respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. They have approved the following elements for a regional structure for stability.\(^\text{63}\)

In attempting to provide for Bosnia’s reconstruction, the entire second half of the accords was devoted to outlining the structure of Bosnia’s political system. In analyzing this section of the accords, we can determine the Clinton administration’s actual model of post-conflict reconstruction. The independent variable of this model is the actual cessation of hostilities—the bringing of peace to Bosnia. The model’s dependent variables are peacebuilding (providing for lasting peace in Bosnia), and statebuilding (the building and strengthening of state institutions). These dependent variables provided for the actual reconstruction of the country. These variables also ultimately failed to stabilize and rebuild the country [see appendix II].

The accords’ provisions for peacebuilding, the first dependent variable, included the establishment of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF’s role was to maintain peace on the ground, and to ensure that civilian police forces remained in line with international standards.\(^\text{64}\) The accords also established the Office of the High Representative in order to ensure that the accords would be implemented peacefully and successfully. The Office of the High Representative was given the power to facilitate any difficulties that arose in implementing the accords.

\(^{63}\) The Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B: Regional Stabilization, Article 1.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52579.htm

\(^{64}\) The Dayton Accords, Annex 11.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52596.htm
The implementation process entailed a particularly wide range of activities, including a “continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees’, and the holding of free and fair elections.”

The problem with the accords’ provisions for peacebuilding is that they were overly reliant on the assistance of external actors. While the OHR was helpful in kick-starting the process of political, social, and economic reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it soon became a crutch upon which the state’s weak political institutions could lean for assistance. To this day, the OHR has had to step in countless times to impose policy decisions where Bosnia’s national political institutions have proved incapable of doing so on their own. That such a powerful crutch has existed for upward of 15 years has meant that Bosnian state-level institutions have had little incentive to govern autonomously, and have failed to prove themselves as functional and capable of legitimate governance.

The signatories of the Dayton Accords was vocally dedicated to establishing Bosnia as a state based on “democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures,” with the intention of producing “peaceful relations within a pluralist society.” This suggests that the main purpose of the accords was to assist the Bosnian state in regaining acceptable levels of political legitimacy through measures

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to assist the transitional administration. Dayton’s peacebuilding operation initially seemed in line with what Rubin defined as the ultimate goal of peacebuilding operations: assisting the transitioning state in its attempts to legitimize their state power. However, the OHR’s power and influence extended far beyond the point where it actually lent necessary assistance for Bosnia’s transition. The OHR, and other international organizations and institutions that remained behind in Bosnia have failed to provide the resources necessary to actually build national capacity for security and legitimate governance.

In providing for statebuilding, the second dependent variables, the accords laid the framework for elections and arbitration in Bosnian, outlined the Constitution, and restructured Bosnia’s political system—these measures are described in full detail in Section 4 of this paper. The Constitution established the power-sharing presidency, and decided upon the precise structure of the House of People and the House of Representatives. In addition to outlining a detailed plan for the structure of Bosnia’s national government, the agreement officially recognized the Republika Srpska as one of two semi-autonomous entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina (the other, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Dayton’s acceptance and recognition of the Republika Srpska as an autonomous entity came as a heavy blow to the Bosniaks, who had expected the international community to punish Serb wartime atrocities by reincorporating the Bosnian Serbs into a highly centralized state—a plan that would have put the

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68 The Dayton Accords, Annex 4.
Bosniaks at the forefront of state-level politics.\textsuperscript{69} This hope of centralization was not realized. Ultimately, much of Bosnia’s governance takes place from within these two autonomous entities—not, in fact, at the state-level. Dayton’s creation of the canton and municipality structure within these entities only served to further decentralize the state.

Here, it is possible to pinpoint the three main problems with the administration’s model. Firstly, the model set the stage for the development of a state that was overwhelmingly decentralized, and organized around ethnic, as opposed to state, politics. This first problem has had significant implications on levels of participation in Bosnian state-level politics. The second problem was that the accords’ provisions for peacebuilding, as well as their establishment of the OHR, entrenched the need for the international community’s oversight in all facets of the reconstruction process. This effectively ensured that state institutions in Bosnia would not experience appropriate levels of growth. Finally, Clinton’s model did not make any provisions for nation building. This has ensured that Bosnian citizens feel no connection to their state. Thus, they remain un-invested and uninterested in its development.

The Clinton administration’s reconstruction model did not take into account variables that would have allowed for the regrowth of civil society in conjunction with the regrowth of political institutions. Had Bosnia’s reconstruction model incorporated nation building, this would have mobilized the population behind the country’s parallel process of statebuilding, and would have increased public interest

in ensuring the functionality of political institutions. The importance of the three variables that I have identified—education, citizenship, and political participation—is that they would have allowed for this regrowth of civil society, and would have encouraged the Bosnian polity to organize around causes aimed at increasing state functionality.
5.3 Burg: A Critique of the Clinton Administration’s Model

The model for conflict mediation that Burg proposes is in direct response to his perception of the flaws in the United States’ and the international community’s Bosnian policy. Burg’s argument, and his proposal for alternate tactics of conflict mediation fill in some crucial gaps in the Clinton Administration’s process. However, I hold that his model does not go quite far enough. The importance of Burg’s model for my paper is two-fold: firstly, I use Burg’s model to show that, while alternate models have been proposed, they still have not managed to correctly identify the variables that are most important in conflict mediation and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Secondly, Burg’s assertions about using carrots as well as sticks, and of giving local actors autonomy in the crafting of solutions to conflict, could be applied in other ways, such as to the possibility of European Union membership. This possibility will be explained in detail this later in the section.

For the sake of clarification: here, Burg writes about the period before the official dissolution of Yugoslavia. Thus, any mention of “local actors” refers to the leaders of the Yugoslav republics (notably: Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Tudman, President of Croatia; and Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia-Herzegovina), not to actors within the entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Burg’s model for conflict mediation relies on the involvement of local actors as its independent variable. The model’s dependent variables are a credible threat of force, coupled with the offering of significant positive incentives and common positive inducements to the actors in the conflict [See Appendix II]. Simply put, his model takes a standard “carrot and stick” approach to conflict mediation. Burg
suggests that international actors should have involved themselves in the conflict only in so far as they could induce local actors to find solutions on their own. International actors in the Bosnian failed to immediately recognize the power of a carrot and stick approach in time to have allowed for a conflict-mediation and reconstruction process led exclusively by local Yugoslav actors.

Burg builds mostly off of the mistakes that he believes the Clinton administration, international organizations, and European made in handling the Bosnian conflict. Burg takes issue mostly with the fact that the initial response of external actors was not to find a way to assist the Yugoslav actors in crafting their own solution to the problem. Burg suggests that the most practical approach was one that linked the prospect of European recognition to the negotiation of a peace comprehensive settlement. This approach, a “carrot and stick” type approach, views recognition as the one possible reward that would have appealed to all of the actors, and views the use of military force as the one “stick” that would have sufficiently worried these actors.

It is important to note that mediation in Bosnia was especially complicated due to the precise structure of the conflict—specifically, the fact that it was both an internal struggle among nationalist parties with mutually exclusive territorial and political goals, and an international conflict between the Bosnian, Serbian, and Croat Republics. This made it especially difficult for international mediators to know when and how to intervene, and with which parties to negotiate. Nevertheless, the external mediators’ inability to gauge the appropriate means of intervention had a

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70 Burg, “Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans,”: 197.
detrimental impact on Bosnia’s ability to successfully rebuild itself. External actors set up a pattern of involvement that made it almost impossible for them to easily extract themselves from the process.

Burg, like Rubin, acknowledges the potential benefit of external involvement in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, but only to the extent that involvement is intended to assist and speed up the local governments’ ability to gain legitimacy and to begin the process of political reconstruction. Implicit in Burg’s argument is the notion that external actors should not blindly intervene in the affairs of other states. While Burg never explicitly links his argument to sovereignty theory, it seems clear that he agrees with the fundamental assumption of Westphalian and Vatellian sovereignty: that states should be free from intervention on the part of other states. Excessive levels of intervention are ineffective in processes of conflict resolution, and in any ensuing attempts at post-conflict reconstruction.

Burg’s understanding of Dayton’s failures hinges on mistakes that were made long before the United States’ initial involvement in the conflict. He posits that that the international community’s initial involvement established a need for the involvement of external actors in the post-conflict process. Burg argues that there were clear points in time where the international community could have handed decision-making power to the Yugoslav actors in order to ensure that they had the

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capacity both to solve their own problems, and to address the needs of their would-be constituents.

Given the international community’s failure to rely on the model’s independent variable, Burg argues next for the use of positive inducements, or “carrots,” Burg posits that there was “only one goal under the control of the international community that was sufficiently important to each of the regional leaders to constitute a positive inducement,” and that this goal was official recognition by the West.72 According to Izetbegovic, Bosnia considered itself as “a European country” whose people were “European people.”73 Thus, the possibility of integration into the wider European community was particularly enticing. Given this, Burg posits that the international community should have made it clear that recognition would be granted only to all of the Yugoslav regions simultaneously or to none of them at all—and then only in response to their peaceful settlement of all their disputes. This would have ensured the achievement of a non-zero-sum outcome to the conflict.

However, European actors failed to embrace this carrot and stick approach in a timely fashion. Once the opportunity to successfully use a “carrot” to induce cooperation amongst the Yugoslav actors passed, the importance of using a “stick” to actually end the violence was magnified. Burg’s critique of the United States’ approach to mediation was that involved a “lack of engagement and the concomitant absence of a credible threat of force.”74 This meant both that Yugoslav actors did not

73 The International Conference on Yugoslavia: London Session.
believe that the United States was serious about ending the war, and that the job of the external mediators was made more difficult because they had no “stick” with which to threaten the Yugoslavs.

The United State’s ultimate decision to employ a strategy of coercive diplomacy was successful in that it acted as a powerful enough stick to end the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, their use of coercive diplomacy was not strong enough to get to the roots of the conflict. The institutions that were created at Dayton did not include input from lower level local actors. As such, they did not successfully resolve what Burg refers to as the “fundamental existential conflict” between the groups. Indeed, these institutions left power and decision making abilities divided between the three major ethnic groups and between the central state and its constituencies (the Federation and the Serb Republic) and the lower units (cantons and sub-cantonal local governments).

What Burg suggests, but does not fully flesh out, is the idea that, had the international community successfully allowed Yugoslav actors to mediate their own conflict, these actors would have had to create their own post-conflict reconstruction strategy. This would have involved a locally initiated attempt at creating a functional system of governance—one that took all of the idiosyncrasies of this particular ethnic conflict into account. Such a process would have had a noticeable effect in the Bosnian case, where the Dayton Accords’ strategy for post-conflict reconstruction was fueled in large part by the agendas of international


mediators. If the Bosnians had been left to decide on the structure of their own government without the crutch of the Office of the High Representative, their political system would likely be considerably less frozen, dysfunctional, and mired in lack of reform than it is today.

In analyzing Burg, I was aware of the fact that his proposal for the use of a “carrot and stick” framework would have necessitated application long before the first shots were fired—before the mediation process even began. As my focus is on post-conflict reconstruction, not mediation, the importance of Burg’s model lies in its implications on actions that could have been taken later in the process. When Burg was writing, in 2005, the European Union had successfully integrated many post-conflict and post-communist states. The EU could have made up for its earlier mistakes in Bosnia by holding out EU membership as a carrot during the reconstruction phase. This could have been done according to Burg’s guidelines: the EU could have set the general parameters and goals that it required Bosnia to meet for membership, but could have let the local actors decide how to actually meet them. The goal of EU membership would have given the Bosnian population a common cause around which to rally, and would have increased their incentive to participate in the political process. Thus, the “carrot” of EU membership also has implications on my variables of citizenship and participation.

The “carrot” of European Union membership was successfully manipulated in many other Eastern and Southeastern European countries, including Croatia and Serbia, where the EU’s leverage pushed these countries toward democratization and other reforms. Though the process of entering the EU “entails a wider
transformation of domestic policy-making and a greater pooling of sovereignty than entering any other international organization in the world," EU membership offers tremendous benefits that can be uniquely effective in triggering “different mechanisms for domestic change in candidates.” 77 Most notably for the case of Bosnia, the “carrot” of EU membership has been known to lead to the “de-escalation of tensions between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities in many prospective EU members.” 78

Much like in these other Eastern European countries, the common goal of EU membership could have motivated the Bosnian citizenry to become more engaged in a political process. If the European Union had told Bosnia that it had to be a functioning democracy, had to have a market economy, had to rid its political parties of corruption in order to qualify for membership; but did not tell the Bosnians how achieve these goals, Bosnians would have had incentive to work together to find a solution to this common goal. The Bosnian population would have had a clear-cut reason to rally around a national cause, to actually participate, and to help the government arrive at this goal. While the importance of political participation in helping to rebuild a post-conflict state is apparent to most policy makers, it would be much less apparent to the average Bosnian citizen.

78 Ibid.
6. Education, Citizenship, and Political Participation: Introducing my Variables for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

While both the Clinton administration’s model and the model of Stephen L. Burg included essential elements for peacebuilding and statebuilding, they each overlooked the importance of variables that could provide for a process of nation building. The three variables that I propose: education, citizenship, and political participation, are based on my understanding of the importance of including this process in a country’s post-conflict reconstruction. These variables build on one another in order to increase constituent interest in the Bosnian state, and to increase the legitimacy and stability of the state [See Appendix III]. I present these variables as a set, meaning that the three must be implemented together in order to be effective. These variables could successful be implemented even today, in 2012.

6.1 Education

In defining variables that would work to restore Bosnian state legitimacy, I begin with education. Education reforms were not even considered by the Dayton Accords. As such, Bosnia’s education system remains almost entirely segregated on the basis of ethnicity—no Ministry of Education at the state level was ever established. The system instead involves twelve separate ministries of education: one for the Republika Srpska and the Federation, and an additional one for each canton. This divisive education system is problematic for two particular reasons: the assurance that ethnic tensions are institutionalized and will be passed down from generation to generation, and the further decentralization of Bosnia’s political and social institutions. The segregated education system has effectively ensured that
Bosnian children are taught “their parents’ nationalist hatred with government imprimatur.”

Dayton’s omission of a framework for educational reforms is especially disconcerting in light of the extensive body of research on the effects that desegregated education can have in decreasing tensions in multi-ethnic societies. Education has traditionally been regarded as “an institution that reflects the social differences that exist in society, and which are reproduced from generation to generation through socialization.” Many believe that desegregated education has the capacity to create social change through its identification and normalization of the sources of conflict. The contact hypothesis goes so far as to claim that increased contact amongst groups who live in close proximity can lessen ethnic conflict.

Consider, for example, Northern Ireland’s education reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or education reforms in the United States in the mid-1950s. Both exemplify the effectiveness of educational desegregation in reducing these social tensions.

The prototypical case used to prove the veracity of the contact hypothesis is Civil Rights-era United States, where educational desegregation was credited with a decrease in racial tensions. In the United States, one of the goals of the Brown v. Board of Education decision was to rethink historical relationships between groups in American society. Recent studies by Yun, Kurlaender, and Duncan (et al.) have

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81 Gordon W. Allport (1954) is often credited with the development of this theory, the “Contact Hypothesis” which claims more specifically that intergroup contact between individuals belonging to antagonistic social groups (defined by culture, ethnicity, language, race, nationality, etc.) can improve intergroup relations by improving understanding and reducing negative stereotypes.
shown that students who attend more diverse schools "have higher comfort levels with members of racial groups different than their own, an increased sense of civil engagement and a greater desire to live and work in a multiracial settlements relative to their more segregated peers." Researchers also concluded "that desegregated experiences for African American students lead to increased interaction with members of other racial groups in later years." These findings corroborate with earlier ones suggesting that white students in integrated settings exhibit more racial tolerance over time than their counterparts in segregated environments.

Northern Ireland is a comparable example of the contact-hypothesis phenomenon. Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, North Ireland had two separate, religously based education systems at both the primary and the secondary levels. In 1968, with the commencement of civil disturbances, the segregated school system became a source of concern for educators and activists who shared the belief that segregation would lead to the perpetuation of religously based violence and discrimination. Studies by Hayes and McAllister on the relative effects of segregated and integrated education systems in Northern Ireland have shown schooling to have a great effect on national identification and, most importantly for the purposes of this paper, constitutional preference.

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Protestants who attended an integrated school were more likely to "move away from their traditional territorial allegiance—maintenance of the link with Britain—and express an undecided position" on constitutional matters.\textsuperscript{84} Similarly, "Catholics who had attended either a formally or informally integrated school were significantly more likely to abandon their traditional territorial allegiance and support retention of the link with Britain than their colleagues who had attended a religiously segregated school."\textsuperscript{85} Northern Ireland’s experiences with integration suggest that inter-group contact during education can positively affect the willingness of divergent ethnic groups to support integrationist political approaches. This facet of Northern Ireland’s experience reflects significantly on the importance of an integrated education system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that integrationist schooling both encouraged students to move away from their traditional territorial alliances and fostered an increase in political support for an integrated state substantiates the importance of my variables in increasing state legitimacy for post-conflict states.

Like Northern Ireland’s in the 1970s, Bosnia’s education system as of 2012 consists mainly of schools that are entirely segregated by specific regional policies.\textsuperscript{86} In arguing for a desegregated school system in Bosnia, there are logistical hurdles that must be addressed—namely the fact that spatial divisions between the two

\textsuperscript{84} Hayes, Bernadette C. and McAllister, Ian, “Integrated Education, Intergroup Relations, and Political Identities in Northern Ireland”: 473.
\textsuperscript{86} Even the few schools that are officially “integrated” teach a so-called “national group of subjects.” These subjects include mother tongue, literature, geography, history, and nature and society, allowing students to be divided out by ethnic identification in places where history and ethnic identity could have implications on the subject matter. Students in these “integrated schools” are then taught subjects like math and science in a trans-ethnic setting.
entities provide limited opportunity for school desegregation. Ideally, a desegregated school system would incorporate students from all three ethnic groups. Given the territorial distribution of these ethnic groups, this would be close to impossible short of suggesting a complete overhaul of the Federation and the Republika structure. Nonetheless, neither the Republika Srpska nor the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are entirely ethnically homogenous. While the republic is predominantly Bosnian Serb, some Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats do live within the Republic’s borders. The Federation, on the other hand, contains fewer Bosnian Serbs, but boasts fairly well-distributed percentages of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats—cantons are never, in fact, entirely homogenous.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, while Bosnia’s current ethnic divisions by region would not allow for a perfectly equal distribution of ethnic groups in every school system, the possibility for learning amongst ethnically diverse peers still exists.

The ethnically divided education system in Bosnia has lead to increased ethnic tensions, and a general confusion about national history and identity. Young people are educated within their own ethnic groups, precluding the possibility of developing future cross-ethnic ties. Predictably, Bosnian students are taught three different, often mutually exclusive histories of the Bosnian War. Each of these histories identifies a different ethnic group as “the aggressor” and “the victim.” This ensures that, starting at a very young age; students are taught that their neighbors are to blame for the injustices faced by their particular ethnic group. The “implicit and explicit separation and exclusion” that this phenomenon of segregated schools

\textsuperscript{87} Herzegovina-Heretva Canton, and Central Bosnia Canton are, notably, the most ethnically missed of the ten cantons in the Federation.
conveys “has asserted itself in ways never imagined in pre-war Bosnia.”

The city of Vitez in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of many places where the school district struggled desperately with issues of ethnic tensions in the education system. Vitez suffers from a problem that is endemic in Bosnia—the older generation is still hyper-aware of the fact that, though they now live as neighbors, they were fighting against each other only a fifteen years ago. The ethnic tensions in Vitez, like most cities in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, exist mainly between the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, not the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs. The higher concentration of Bosnian Serbs in the Srpska Republika has made it so that the Federation has an especially high percentage of Croats and Bosnian Muslims. While these two ethnic groups were not pitted against each other as savagely as the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian War, tensions still run high.

Vitez experienced a considerable lack of reconciliation between amongst the older generations living in the city. Parents still remember the war vividly—some even fought on either the Bosniak or Croat side. These parents remain unwilling to send their children to school with children of other ethnic groups. Said Borislav Krizanac, a Croat flooring installer, “I would rather move out of town than send my child to a mixed school. . . .there is big hatred there.” Despite this, Vitez, like a few other cities, has experimented with the idea of a “mixed school.” Vitez’s mixed

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90 Ibid.
school, now called the Vitez Primary School, hosts 820 students in the Croat main building, and 500 Muslims in the annex. The schools operate on the same schedule, but they are taught completely different curricula. Though the students are technically separated, children say that fights are common and are often triggered by ethnically charged comments.

According to the Bosnian Federation’s Minister of Education and Science, Damir Masic, there are thirty-four schools in the Bosnian Federation that can be categorized as “divided.” While they differ in some respects, the unifying feature is that they all teach a separate curriculum to each ethnic group. While some members of the older generation are still hesitant about sending their children to school with members of other ethnic groups, Bosnian’s education ministers are aware of the problem that the perpetuation of these divisions have caused, and believe unification to be a priority. However, the fact that education policy has been run exclusively by the Federation’s ten cantons since 1996 makes the achievement of such unification nearly impossible.

Some international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), still believe that education reforms could effectively reduce ethnic tensions, even at later stages in the reconstruction process. The OSCE’s efforts have been multi-faceted, and have been based on the underlying conclusion that “the division of a curricula into three different and often mutually-opposed versions of history poses a considerable threat to the possibility of a shared
sense of citizenship and future social cohesion in BiH.”91 The OSCE is of the opinion that this problem manifests itself most evidently in Bosnia history textbook industry, where the content of textbooks has remained highly politicized. To date, the different textbooks used by each ethnic group have actively promoted “competing narratives of victimhood.”92 Some even contain “nationalism and hatred towards other groups and religions.”93

The OSCE has recommended that the textbook industry be reformed in order to offer Bosnians a more unified understanding of the country's history. This recommendation is predicated on the notion that any promotion of post-war reconciliation would install greater tolerance in younger generations of Bosnians. In 2004, the OSCE set up two commissions—one for history and one for geography—in order to develop guidelines for these textbooks.94 These commissions seek to ensure that all students in Bosnia have a basic understanding of the history and geography of all three ethnic groups, and seek to ensure that any disputed histories are explained correctly.95 In suggesting that education about difference could instill in Bosnians a greater acceptance of their peers’ background, the OSCE’s policy recommendations echo the tenets of the contact hypothesis. Through contact with children from other ethnic groups who were learning the same history, these students would have been able to develop a sense of what it meant to be a member

92 Ibid.
94 These commissions each consist of one Serb, one Bosniak, one Croat (from both the Federation and the Republic), and one representative for national minorities.
95 Helene Harroff-Tavel, “Tackling School Textbook Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
of the Bosnian nation, as opposed to a member of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb ethnic group.

6.2 Citizenship

The relevance of developing a sense of national identity relates directly to my second variable, citizenship. The importance of the shared sense of citizenship that would emerge lies in the assumption that, when citizens feel connected to each other and to their state, they become more invested in working to ensure the state's functionality. This phenomenon works in the other direction as well. Due to the apparent lack of constituent interest in state-level politics, political actors in Bosnia have seen no real incentive to enact change, or to look after the needs of their constituents. The importance of efforts to desegregate the education system, and to teach acceptance at an early age lie in their effects on the average Bosnian's sense of citizenship, as well as in their implications on Bosnians ability (or inability) to trust in their political system.

Even today, in 2012, the implementation of a desegregated education system, and concomitant teaching of one historical narrative of the Bosnian War could lead to the emergence of sense of belonging to the Bosnian state outside of belonging to a particular ethnic group. This sense of belonging, or shared sense of citizenship could allow Bosnian citizens to form an attachment to their nation and to their state. This could subsequently encourage citizens to build an interest in state-level politics as a means of perpetuating the stability of their state.
Citizens form connections based on the “ways in which they govern themselves and agree to be governed, [and] by the organization of their conflicts in differences.” 96 Thus, it is precisely in turbulent periods of constitutional change that a shared sense of citizenship is most important. Citizenship theory posits that a unified and shared conception of citizenship may help keep political contestation to a minimum, and help to restore faith the government. When institutions face a process of redevelopment, a “robust notion of citizenship” can greatly assist in the development of new, more functional institutions—ones that are made stronger by the citizenry’s faith in their ability to become fully functional.

Citizenship theory also highlights the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constitution defined citizenship in ways that did not encourage a sense of connection to the state. Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords outlined the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Article I.7 of the constitution defines the citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and states that Bosnian citizens are also official citizens of their respective entity. The constitution makes it clear that Bosnians cannot simply be citizens of the state—they must also be a citizen either of the Federation, or the Republic. This ensures that Bosnian citizens are effectively required to hold dual-citizenship: one for their actual nation, and one for their territorial region. As such, the constitution’s provisions of citizenship do not foster a unified notion of what it is to Bosnia. Instead, they highlight the notion that Bosnian citizens are ruled equally, if not primarily, by the entity in which they live.97

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96 This theory was developed by Herman Van Gunsteren. See *A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies* (Westview Press, 1998)
97 The Dayton Accords, *Annex 4, Article I.7*. 

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of “citizenship,” these provisions overlooked the vital role that citizenship can in state reconstruction—both in the sense that “citizens should play an active role in it [and] in the sense that the constitution should foster citizenship.\textsuperscript{98}

6.3 Political Participation

A unified sense of citizenship has been a proven catalyst for political participation. Thus, the decentralized nature of the Constitution’s definition of citizenship is a partial explanation for Bosnia’s lack of political participation, my third variable, at the state level. This lack of participation can also be attributed to the fact that Bosnian citizens do not see state-level politics as directly affecting their own lives. Bosnians are, however, much more motivated to participate in local governance processes, because they view them as having an actual calculable impact on their ways of life, and on the region in which they live. Governance processes at the sub-state level remain organized around the interests of specific ethnic groups and are concerned “with actions of a group or an individual arising from the imputation of common ancestry to themselves or to others.”\textsuperscript{99}

This reality relates directly to the fact that, since the implementation of the Dayton Accords, all facets of Bosnian life have been organized around ethnic boundaries. A culture of tolerance, one that is invested in the wellbeing of the state, cannot develop in a society that is predicated on institutionalized ethnic barriers. My third variable, political participation, is key to reorganizing life around issues at

\textsuperscript{98} Van Gunsteren, \textit{A Theory of Citizenship}, 5.
the state-level and ensuring that Bosnians regain interest in participating in politics that do not speak purely to ethnic interests. I posit that once Bosnians develop a shared sense of citizenship through desegregated education, an interest in state affairs and politics would surely grow.

The lack of political participation in Bosnia is evidenced by voter turn out rates in national elections. Voter turnout for the 2010 presidential election was only 56.49% of registered voters, compared to a 70.74% who voted in the 1998 presidential election.\textsuperscript{100} It is particularly worrisome that these rates actually decreased over time. A state experiencing a successful transition out of conflict would instead have exhibited calculable signs of improvement in its levels of political participation during the first few post-conflict elections. Take Rwanda and Serbia, as examples of post-conflict states exhibiting a steady rise in voter turnout rates: Rwanda experienced a 96.55% turnout for its Presidential election in 2003, and a 97.51% turnout for its presidential election in 2010.\textsuperscript{101} Serbia, a state that did not experience comparable levels of conflict, but merits comparison due to its proximity to Bosnia, experienced a 47.75% turnout in 2004, and a 68.12% turnout in 2008.\textsuperscript{102}

Voters in Bosnia have justified their lack of participation in elections by stating that “all politicians are the same,” and that none of them have a reputation

\textsuperscript{101} International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Rwanda. http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?id=192#pres
\textsuperscript{102} International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Serbia. http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?id=190#pres
for keeping their word. These widely held beliefs suggest that political corruption acts as a barrier to participation. As a means of ensuring a rise in political participation, Bosnia would therefore have to implement a process to reform and de-corrump its political parties.

Generally speaking, the original purpose of political parties was to provide transparency and legitimacy to the government through representation of constituent interests. Political parties ideally play a significant role in the “improvement of democratic institutions and the attainment of more liberal and accountable governance.” As such, they are held partially responsible for developing citizens’ capacity to make democracy work through “routine forms of political participation, but also [through] the skills and propensity to organize for a better, more just, and inclusive democracy.”

In post-conflict states, political parties rarely meet these objectives. Weak or ineffective parties have often been faulted with endemic lack of political participation. As political parties have failed to provide these goods, they become part of Bosnia’s root problems of instability, and it becomes necessary to reform them in order to resolve the systemic issues with political participation. In order to resolve these issues, Bosnia would have to tackle issues of corruption within its political parties, and would have to ensure that these parties accurately represent the interests of their constituents. In Bosnia, political parties remain divided along

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103 Joanna Kakissis, “Is Bosnia One Step Closer to Unity—or Collapse?” Time World (October 4, 2010). http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023347,00.html
ethnic lines and try to gain popularity by “corralling their constituencies into ethnic voting blocs.” Three main ethno-national parties thus dominate the political scene: the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ). These parties remain rife with corruption, and voters understand that Bosnian state-level politics are more about power and profit than about the representation of constituent interests, be they ethnic or national.  

The goal in increasing political participation is to encourage the interest of political actors in working to develop a more inclusive, fully representative government capable of implementing reforms and policy changes as needed. In post-Dayton Bosnia, political actors lack the incentive to represent their constituents. This contributes significantly to the instability of the Bosnian state. Bosnia is, technically speaking, a participatory democracy. However, citizens feel no inclination to participate, as their interests are not well represented.

**Synthesizing My Variables**

The purpose of my set of variables is to initiate a process that would end in increased levels of state legitimacy. A state that experiences a rise in political participation can assume that its citizens have some faith in the ability of state-level politics to contribute to the improvement of the status quo. These variables run in a sequence: I posit that decentralized education would lead to a unified notion of

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citizenship, which, in turn, would lead to increased levels of political participation. It can be inferred that, were the Bosnian state to experience increased levels of political participation, increased state legitimacy would quickly follow. A desegregated education system would naturally lead to increased levels of state legitimacy by increasing Bosnians’ sense of national identity, and thus increase interest in political participation at the state-level, including voting in elections and organizing around non-ethnic political causes. As explained in the previous section, increases in political participation could also be brought about with the use of incentives, or the identification of a common goal, such as potential EU membership.

While these three variables offer long-term solutions, I posit that their application even now, in 2012, could increase the legitimacy of the Bosnian state. While the application of these variables in 1995, at the start of the reconstruction process, could more quickly have resolved Bosnia’s problems with institutional instability, their application now could eventually lead to the emergence of a more stable state for future generations. In offering these variables, a goal is to offer policy makers an alternative method of rebuilding post-conflict states. The aim is not to discount the importance of statebuilding, but rather to suggest the importance of simultaneously employing a process of nation building.

It is important to note that regional policy-makers have not overlooked the immediate importance of finding a new solution for Bosnia. In April of 2012, twenty analysts, economists, journalists, politicians, professors, and NGO activists

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collectively analyzed the current situation in Bosnia in order to predict five possible scenarios for the country’s future in thirteen years. Two out of these five scenarios foresee another outbreak of violence, and predict another attempt at international intervention and stabilization—not a particularly desirable outcome for Bosnia.\textsuperscript{108} The conclusions of these experts suggest that Bosnia is running out of time. A nation building process could prevent another devolution into violence, but it would have to be initiated sooner, rather than later.

7. Conclusion

While the Dayton Accords were successful in ending Bosnia’s bloody ethnic conflict, the country experienced far less success with its process of post-conflict reconstruction. I found that the flaws in Bosnia’s reconstruction hinged on two factors: the excessive involvement of external actors in the reconstruction process, and the decentralization of the state through its division into two entities. These factors can be faulted with the country’s high levels of instability and low levels of political participation; as well as its high rates of unemployment, government corruption, and public debt.

In identifying “what went wrong in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” I looked to the reconstruction model that was ultimately implemented by the Clinton Administration in order to establish if the lack of specific variables left holes in this reconstruction process. This model involved a great deal of laying the groundwork for future institutional growth, but involved very little analysis of whether or not this groundwork would actually enable growth. The administration’s model also lacked consideration of the importance of mobilizing the population of a post-conflict country behind its reconstruction process. Institutional growth is difficult without constituent support, for without it, political actors can lack incentive to reform. With that in mind, I identify the main flaws in the administration’s reconstruction model: its exclusive focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding, and its subsequent ignoring of the importance of nation building in garnering support for these other processes.
In further building an argument for the importance of my three variables, I looked at an alternate reconstruction model proposed by Stephen L. Burg—involving a “carrot and stick” approach to conflict mediation. Burg’s conception of this approach involved offering Yugoslav actors an incentive to cooperate whilst threatening them with military intervention in the event of a refusal to cooperate. While the timing of Burg’s model does not directly correspond to the timing that I focus on in my argument, Burg’s model has significant implications on ways that cooperation amongst Bosnia’s divergent ethnic groups could be encouraged today, in 2012.

Today, the greatest conceivable incentive for cooperation in Bosnia is the possibility of EU membership. Burg’s “carrot and stick” approach could be applied to Bosnia through the lens of this membership—were the EU to promise Bosnia membership if, and only if, they met certain parameters for reform, this could give the Bosnian population concrete incentive to join together and petition for these reforms. A common goal could inspire greater levels of political participation, as Bosnians would be inclined to work together to rally for reforms and for the establishment of more functional institutions.

The purpose of analyzing these two models is to suggest that another means of increasing participation and legitimacy involves the use of the three variables that I ultimately identified as missing from the reconstruction models of Clinton and Burg. These three variables—education, citizenship, and political participation—would supplement Bosnia’s statebuilding process with one of nation building, thereby mobilizing the public behind Bosnia’s reconstruction process. The first
variable that I identify, *education*, is defined by the desegregation of Bosnia’s education system. Bosnia’s current segregated system has led to an increase in ethnic tensions, and a general confusion about national identity and history.

I found that the United States’ and Northern Ireland’s experiences with desegregated education suggest that contact between members of conflicting social groups can indeed work to decrease tensions. Northern Ireland’s experience is particularly important, as its desegregated education system resulted in citizens voting outside of their religious and territorial preferences on issues that reflect the interests of the state on the whole. I believe that desegregated education in Bosnia could have a similar effect of encouraging citizens to vote outside of their ethnic preferences and could install a greater tolerance in younger generations of Bosnians.

I posit that desegregated education could lead to the emergence of a cohesive notion of citizenship—my second variable. Citizenship in Bosnia is defined both at the state-level, and at the entity-level—increasing Bosnians’ confusion about where to place their loyalties. This decentralization of the very notion of citizenship has further increased the likelihood of Bosnians feeling more connected to their entity than to their state. As I see it, unified and shared conception of citizenship could help keep political contestation to a minimum, and could help Bosnians build an attachment to their state. A unified sense of citizenship could also increase Bosnian’s interest in the stability of their state and could encourage Bosnians to invest in building and maintaining this stability.
I conclude that this increased interest could manifest itself in an upsurge of *political participation*, my third variable. However, in order for Bosnia to experience a *significant* rise in political participation, it would have to invest in a complete reform of its political parties. The purpose of a political party is to accurately represent the interests of its constituents. Endemic political corruption in Bosnia has made it such that political parties are committed more to financial gain than to accurate representation. The aim in reforming political parties is to ensure that the interests of constituents are well represented. This would result in the initiation of a cycle whereby accurate representation would encourage constituents to participate in state politics, and their participation would continue to inspire political actors to fight for institutional reforms.

The intention behind arguing for the implementation of these variables is the notion that their use could ultimately improve the success of Bosnia’s statebuilding process. Implementing a set of policies and institutions designed to support a desegregated education system, a cohesive national identity, and increased public participation in state-level politics, could improve Bosnia’s chances of overcoming its experiences with failing political and economic institutions; chronic unemployment; government corruption; and high levels of public debt.

Bosnia’s instability and lack of growth contribute to the ever-increasing likelihood that the country will re-erupt in a statewide outbreak of ethnic violence. In closing the gaps in Bosnia’s current process of post-conflict reconstruction, the hope is to decrease the possibility of another war, and to lay the groundwork for the
restoration of Bosnians’ faith in state-level politics—thereby increasing the legitimacy of the Bosnian state.
Appendix I
The Clinton Administration’s Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction:

- **Cessation of Hostilities/Peace Implementation**
- **Peacebuilding:** ensuring the longevity of peace
- **Statebuilding:** strengthening state institutions
Appendix II
Burg's Alternate Model:

Locally developed solution

Positive Inducements for Cooperation (Carrot)
Credible Threat of Force (Stick)
Appendix III
My Variables for Post-Conflict Reconstruction:

Education  Citizenship  Participation
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