U.S. Democratization Efforts in Haiti and Iraq: Implications for Future Policy Makers

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U.S. DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS IN HAITI AND IRAQ:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS

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I. UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

INTRODUCTION

What does a democratic government look like? Countless scholars, politicians, and leaders have tried to define it, and countless others have tried to export or transplant democracy to countries they consider to be undemocratic. U.S. policy makers, among others in Western countries, assume that this form of government is not only the best form of government, but that it is universally desirable. Since its founding, the United States has believed that its liberal democracy, with a representative and divided government, as well as free trade and the protection of personal property rights, to be exemplary. We believe that we are unique: a shining city on the hill—an example for the rest of the world to follow. Historically, this phenomenon is known as American Exceptionalism. In fact, at various times, we have sought to both maintain and export our particular democratic practices so that others could follow our example. Thus, when it comes to democracy, the United States attempts to export its values because it believes it is exceptional. Yet time and time again, policy makers who seek to export democracy are met with disappointment and criticism. If in the future, the United States decides it again wants to pursue democratization abroad, it is necessary for policy makers to modify their practices, as recent attempts at democratization, most relevantly to this thesis in Haiti and Iraq, have only produced failures.

Haiti and Iraq were chosen as the case studies for this project for several reasons. First, they represent two military interventions to promote democracy in modern history that came to be viewed as the central foreign policy initiatives of two U.S. presidents, only to end in disaster years down the road. Second, both efforts occurred as the world was entering a new era after the

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end of the Cold War, giving U.S. policy makers unique opportunities to craft new foreign policy strategies. Finally, these two Presidents, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, who initiated these interventions, represent the two major political parties that have endured in the United States for hundreds of years. These cases of military intervention are significant then, because they demonstrate continuity between Democratic and Republican administrations: regardless of party, democratization is an ongoing pillar of U.S. foreign policy—it is not a partisan issue. Thus, in the study of U.S. democratization efforts, Haiti and Iraq are important cases for understanding U.S. policy makers’ failures to export successful models of democracy.

For the purposes of this thesis, I analyze the events in Haiti between 1991 and 1997 (the year the United Nations ended its mission in Haiti) and the events in Iraq between 2003 and 2006 (the year in which the United States backed Maliki as Iraq’s Prime Minister). These dates were chosen not only because they encompass the duration of each intervention, but also because they provide perspectives on the damage done after each democratization project was prematurely labeled a “success.” In the Haiti case, success was announced upon Aristide’s return to his country in 1994, whereas in the Iraq case, success was announced upon the transfer of governance from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Iraq in 2004. Both military interventions began with US-led invasions to topple the current regime, hoping to secure democracy by force, and both ended in disaster. Despite these bookended similarities, the context for each case was very different, not to mention the geographic, cultural, economic, and political distinctions between the two. President Clinton, in attempting to stem the flow of drugs and refugees from a deteriorating Haiti while simultaneously balancing American ideals to maintain democracy and human rights around the world was backed into a corner by his own promises, and had no political choice but to invade. President Bush, on the other hand, had promised a war on terror
and the protection of the United States’ oil resources, as well as the promotion of democracy around the world, and delivered this promise in the form of a war on Iraq. One key similarity between these two cases, however, is the confidence of the United States that it would not only be simple to export democracy to a foreign country, but also universally welcomed. Furthermore, both cases exemplify the now widely discredited notion that conducting elections is synonymous with constructing democracy. Years later, these two countries are still grappling with the effects of the United States’ destructive decisions. So how is it that between two different administrations, opposing political parties, and ten years, similar mistakes were made? The important question I ask in this study is: in the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to implement democracy in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, where did the democracy planners go wrong in their democratization efforts, and how did these mistakes further each country’s failure to democratize successfully?

In order to understand these failures, we must begin by examining our understanding of democracy, and why, despite years of accumulated knowledge and presumably the best intentions, our aspirations for democratization continue to defy the timelines of many democracy planners, as well as the hopes of the states they attempt to democratize. This disconnect between the blueprints for democratization and the results of its implementation should lead one to define democracy more carefully. If U.S. foreign policy makers believe it is possible to model and export democracy, we must thoroughly define the characteristics of a working and sustainable democracy so we know the ways in which to assist in creating change in the future. By recognizing what democracy planners misinterpreted in their endeavors, we can modify practices

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2 Throughout this thesis, when referencing democracy, I am referring to the system of government, whereas when referencing democratization, I mean the practice of transitioning to a democratic political regime. In the case of Haiti and Iraq, this act of democratization occurred externally through the United States’ invasion of both countries.
of democratization for the future, should it ever be attempted again. Here, I am not advocating for such actions. Rather, I am suggesting that if a future administration pursues democratization abroad, it must be conducted with greater understanding of democracy, and fundamentally different implementation practices so that the United States does not wreak havoc in yet another state.

The definitions of democracy should inform the blueprints for democratization. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, it is important to engage in the intellectual endeavor of illuminating previous scholarship on democracy and democratization because it is necessary to make clear what U.S. policy makers should be trying to achieve as well as the characteristics by which we can evaluate the Clinton and Bush administration’s attempts to export democracy to Haiti and Iraq. As a result of the findings in this study, I argue that due to an inadequate understanding of the universal characteristics of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s historical, political, and social contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to democracy (including competing incentives for the invasion), the Clinton and Bush administrations both failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, and in fact left each country worse-off than it was before the United States’ involvement. Furthermore, these two examples suggest that the very practice of externally motivated and enforced democratization cannot lead to a sustainable democracy, unless policy practices are significantly modified in the future. Even though these countries are geographically, economically, and culturally very different, the Clinton and Bush administrations made similar mistakes in democracy planning in each, making the question of defining democracy and its relationship to democratization absolutely essential in any possible future endeavor.
This thesis proceeds in the following manner: The subsequent theoretical section identifies and expands upon several post-WWII democracy and democratization theories, chosen due to their significance and their representation of the field as a whole, and frequency of citation by other scholars of democracy. This selection includes theories of democracy, democratization, and transitional governments from authors such as Robert Dahl, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Seymour Lipset, Robert Putnam, Joseph Schumpeter, Arend Lijphart, and Samuel Huntington. According to available citation analysis metrics, Linz and Stepan, Lipset, Lijphart, Dahl, and Huntington’s most popular publications have been cited over 10,000 times each, with some cited up to approximately 45,000 times. Putnam and Schumpeter’s title works in this thesis have been cited approximately 37,000 times alone, not including their other popular publications. Moreover, these authors have all been published in top tier journals in the field of political science according to the impact factor (h-index) of each journal. Thus, even decades later, political scholars and policy makers alike still see them as the benchmarks of democratization studies. In addition to this, I also bring in contemporary work done by authors such as Laurence Whitehead, Thomas Carothers, and Fareed Zakaria to represent the more recent trajectory of the academic field. These authors are by no means a complete selection, but for the purposes of this...


paper, they most effectively communicate a nuanced understanding of democracy and
democratization. Next, I will apply the characteristics of democratic structures identified in the
literature review to Haiti and Iraq in order to evaluate the military interventions in the two
countries. To do this, I will provide an analytical structure differentiating the identified
democratic characteristics into three categories. These three categories (Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of Democracy, and Obstacles to
Democracy) serve as the framework by which I consider each country.

With Haiti, first I will examine the conditions in the country prior to the invasion, then
look at the claims the democracy planners made regarding their democratization plans. Then, I
analyze what actually occurred, followed by an explication of the aftermath. The chapter on Iraq
will mirror in sequence the discussion of Haiti’s failed democratization. Finally, I will offer a
comparison of the two cases together, thinking about what these patterns can tell us about
democracy planning for the future. By building on the democracy theorists that I discuss,
presenting new categories with which to evaluate democratization efforts, and closely assessing
the United States’ failure to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq, this paper will contribute to
the literature on democracy and democratization and offer lasting lessons for policy makers to
take into consideration, should the United States (for better or for worse) continue to undertake
such endeavors.
**WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?**

In his seminal work, *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl traces the history of democratic societies over 2,500 years, and comes to the conclusion that effective democracies, no matter how varied, require a common set of fundamental standards.\(^5\) Dahl believes that democracy can be preserved and advanced, although there are key differences between an ideal and actual democracy. Ideal democracy relies on theoretical ideas and values that Dahl views are implicit in any democracy, which are not easily quantifiable. Actual or functional democracy, on the other hand, relies on key political institutions within the governing body of the state. In explaining ideal democracy, Dahl gives us five basic characteristics that every democracy *must have*. First, there must be equal and effective participation. Second, there must be voting equality. Third, there must be enlightened understanding. By this Dahl means that within reasonable time limits, each member of society must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about the government’s policies and subsequent consequences. Fourth, there must be control of the agenda: the members of the political society must have the exclusive opportunity to decide what matters are to be placed on the agenda. Fifth, there must be an inclusion of adults. While the list of characteristics for an ideal democracy is rather theoretical, as explained previously, Dahl’s list of fundamental necessities for a large, functional democracy is more specific, and recognizes the critical importance of institutions within a democracy.

To understand the working democracy, we first need to decode what Dahl means when he says that political institutions are absolutely necessary in order to maintain a functional democracy. Dahl defines institutions as democratic arrangements, which gradually become practices, and then finally settle into institutions. Thus, the following institutions are *required* in order to achieve democratic goals: a large, successful democracy demands the practice of free,

fair, and frequent elections leading to elected officials, sustained freedom of expression, alternative sources of information (the media), associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship. Although the first three qualifications are fairly self-explanatory, the last two deserve further clarification. Dahl’s definition of associational autonomy is the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations within a civil society, such as political parties or other activist groups. Following that, inclusive citizenship requires that no adult subject to a state’s laws can be denied the rights that are afforded to all citizens and are necessary to the political institutions listed previously. To accomplish these practices, the creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution is paramount. Dahl goes on to divide characteristics for a large functional democracy between those that are necessary, and those that will further the endeavor of democratization, but are not absolutely essential to the creation of the democracy itself.

Dahl’s characteristics that he claims are necessary for democratization to occur include control of the military and police by elected officials, a democratic political culture, and finally that there be no strong foreign control hostile to democracy. While the first and third are clearer goals to attain, creating a society that views democracy positively and exists in a similar political culture implies that the subgroups within civil society all view the democratic government and the political institutions that sustain them in an analogous way. Some, like Dahl and Huntington, have argued that a fairly homogenous society (Japan, for example) in terms of culture, religion, and ethnicity may be necessary for successful democratization, while others, such as Linz, Stepan, and Lipset, contend that successful democratization may only require common democratic values held by all citizens.

These criteria lead us to Dahl’s favorable characteristics for democracy: a modern market economy and weak sub cultural pluralism within civil society. The latter condition brings us to a
key point of debate in the literature on democracy and democratization. Do different cultures matter when constructing a democracy? In terms of their citizens’ views on democracy, Dahl seems to believe that similar views on democracy are required. He goes on, however, to address this question of diverse culture by citing examples (US, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, and Canada) in which democracies have succeeded despite their social cleavages. This leads Dahl to the conclusion that the success of states with deep social cleavages depends upon the state fulfilling the remaining categories associated with democracy, such as a democratic political culture, free and fair elections, and sustain freedom of expression, to name a few. Therefore, in countries where all other conditions are favorable to democracy, the challenge of having a diverse citizenship can be more easily managed.

Although Dahl skillfully presents a comprehensive list of qualifications for institutional practices within a functional democracy, as well as criteria for what is needed or wanted in that successful democracy, a critique of his work—including that by Huntington, whom I discuss later—is that while he examines democracy, he does not adequately emphasize the importance of economic development. In other words, he does not address the concerns of those who argue that economic development is absolutely necessary if a state wishes to democratize. When discussing the conditions that are favorable for democracy, Dahl does not categorize a modern market economy as a necessity to democracy, only as favorable characteristic. In addition to this, when advocating for a somewhat homogenous society in terms of culture, political beliefs, and attitudes towards democracy, Dahl does not address other differences that occur within society, such as income inequality, reinforcing the previous criticism of Dahl’s lack of emphasis on the developmental issues for a new democracy.
Arend Lijphart, rather than placing social cleavages in a category that will most likely be detrimental to democracy, argues that they can be leveraged effectively in a system of *Consociational Democracy*, which unites fractured states for a common political goal. As opposed to Dahl’s individualized recipe for democracy, Lijphart champions the idea of group rights. The central tenets of consociationalism are government by grand coalition—essentially a cartel of elites—and segmental autonomy. The grand coalition governs the state as a whole while representing the segments of society that are culturally, ethnically, or religiously divided. By looking at Northern European states, Lijphart found that a once fractured state, when confronted with a common enemy, could unite to create multiple balances of power among the existing subcultures. Therefore, consociationalism is born from the relationship between political culture, social structure, and political stability.

Typically, political stability depends on overlapping group membership within a society—by this he means that the segments of society we divide ourselves into have some fluidity in membership. However, in consociationalism, this is not a requirement. Lijphart suggests that when confronted with an external threat, a grand coalition forms to prevent the fragmentation of the state into hostile subcultures. With a grand coalition, the cabinet includes extra parties so that it can represent the views of a broader portion of the public, and a minority veto system to ensure that all groups are represented equally. In a contentious society with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, a grand coalition government sidesteps many of the problems that would surface in a majority-rule form of government. He concludes that for consociational democracy to succeed, there first must be a government by coalition, a second element of segmental authority, a proportional electoral system, and finally a

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mutual veto for the protection of minority interests. More than this, the consociational democracy must satisfy the following requirements: first, the elites must have the ability to accommodate divergent interests of subcultures. Second, the elites must have the ability to transcend cleavages. Third, the elites must have a commitment to the maintenance and survival of the system, and finally there must be an understanding of the perils of political fragmentation.

If we recall Dahl’s qualifications for democracy, Lijphart’s set looks quite different. This system of government profoundly contrasts with the majority-rule ideal of Dahl’s democracy, and is often viewed as controversial because it exists on the basis of deep social cleavages, ranging from ideology and religion to ethnicity and language, and prioritizes the treatment of groups as a whole over one’s individual equality within society.

Lijphart, like Dahl, lists for us a series of favorable conditions that correspond with consociational democracy. Unlike a traditional democracy, a multiple balance of power and a multi-party system among the segments of a plural society are more favorable than a dual balance of power, i.e. a two-party system.\(^7\) In addition to this, Lijphart’s research suggests that smaller countries adapt to consociational democracy more favorably than large countries. For example, the largest country he studied was the Netherlands, which had a population of less than 12 million in 1960. As Haiti’s current population is about 10.3 million people, this characteristic bolsters Haiti’s candidacy for consociational democracy. Iraq, however, has a population of about 33 million, but possesses a pluralistic, fractured society much closer to the kind that Lijphart describes than that of Haiti. Nonetheless, both the internal and external characteristics of small countries are beneficial for consociational democracy in different ways: internally, elites are more likely to know each other and meet often, whereas externally, small countries are more

likely to feel threatened by their neighbors, reinforcing the concept that when presented with an external threat, the segments of society will unite to create a grand coalition government. Therefore, it would be difficult to assume that group-based consociational democracy can flourish anywhere—like individual-based liberal democracy, there are certain conditions that appear to be necessary for its success.

With a nuanced understanding of Lijphart and Dahl’s theories of individual and group-based democracies, we can now examine Samuel Huntington’s more economically driven consideration of democratization in order to broaden our scope of how to best evaluate attempts at democracy. In Huntington’s *The Third Wave*, he explains that if a given country lacks certain favorable internal conditions, it is unlikely to democratize, even in the snowballing third wave of democracy, which he claims began in the 1970s.\(^8\) Relying on Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions—i.e. democracy cannot exist without political parties and without elections—Huntington outlines various obstacles to democracy.\(^9\) Huntington believes these obstacles include: virtual absence of experience with functional democracy, leaders of authoritarian regimes, absence of commitment to democratic values among political leaders, certain non-western cultures that are particularly hostile to democracy, lack of economic development, and finally, poverty. While Huntington believes that Islam and Confucianism are particularly hostile to democracy, it is important to note that Indonesia, which hosts millions of Muslims, maintains a functional democracy, pointing to the fact that there is nothing endemic to Islam that is inherently anti-democratic.

Unlike Dahl, Huntington believes that when it comes to democratization, political leadership and economic advancement are the most important indicators of success, as he

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\(^8\) Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)

believes they are the most critical to a state’s health. The ability to fund institution building is necessary if one is to attempt democracy building. He reminds us, however, that even though an overall correlation exists between levels of economic development and democracy, no level of economic development alone can bring about democratization. Along with the people in the state, the political leaders must believe that liberal democracy is the best and only option. This departure represents a larger divide between theorists who either believe that democracy or development must come first when pursuing democratization. Fareed Zakaria, who will be discussed later in this section, feels similarly to Huntington: good governance and equal distribution of goods are essential to a functioning democracy.

Although Huntington believes in the power and importance of elections, as evidenced by his “two-turnover test,” he understands that defining democracy in terms of elections alone is limiting, and must be balanced with other criteria, such as those Dahl puts forth. Unlike the previous authors, Huntington cautions us to remember that when evaluating a democracy, the stability of the system in question differs from the very nature of the system itself. In other words: democracy planners must remember that when exporting democracy, even if every criterion we have seen listed was in place, democracy would not flourish unless the government in question had stability as well. For Huntington, stability—or the state’s level of institutionalization—and its security apparatus go hand in hand. The greater the levels of violence within governmental transitions, the harder it is to successfully democratize. Security, just like any governmental institution, helps ensure the longevity and stability of the government in question.

10 In The Third Wave, Huntington posits that the true test of a successful transition to democracy is when an incumbent part is voted out office, followed by its successor, without a collapse in the democratic constitutional order.
While Huntington is concerned with stability, theorists Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, in their work *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, are primarily concerned with the legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of a government in order to maintain democratic practices.\(^\text{11}\) Like the previous authors discussed, Linz and Stepan have their own criteria in defining democracy, but as we have now come to expect, their definition differs slightly from what we have seen before. Linz and Stepan argue that a democracy can be defined by the following: legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives, freedom of association, speech, and other basic freedoms of person, free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of those leaders’ claim to rule (elections), inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process, provision for the participation of all members of society, and the freedom to create political parties and conduct free and honest elections. These criteria suggest a balance of institutional necessities as well as the more basic values that we associate with ideal democracy. Linz and Stepan seem not only to be considering democracy conceptually and all that it entails, but also the conditions of the country itself along with its civil society that helps to establish its government. Much like the theorists previously discussed, they work to enhance our idealized understanding of liberal, individual democracy and the values that it assumes, while simultaneously considering its more difficult and pragmatic institutional needs.

Additionally, Linz and Stepan are also concerned with dissecting how to maintain a democracy, rather than just how to create one. They focus on the concept of legitimacy as defined by Max Weber: if a political regime is legitimate, it means that its participants have certain beliefs or faith in regard to it, which are based on either legal, traditional, or charismatic

authority. Accordingly, they find that legitimacy is either granted or withdrawn by each member of society, and that only the passing of time, or a charismatic leader can reinforce democratic institutions in their stages of infancy. Efficacy is judged as the sum of a government’s actions over a long period of time, and is heavily influenced by comparisons to other state’s functions. Finally, the effectiveness of the government in question can either work to forward the legitimacy of the democracy or it can quickly cause its population to lose faith, and thus reduce legitimacy. Linz and Stepan provide a counter-balance to Huntington’s assurances that security and stability ensure a democracy’s survival: while it is difficult to define and understand what brings about legitimacy, even the most stable and secure state will eventually fail without it. Political parties return as a recurring theme for these two as well, however they complicate the idea of political parties by suggesting that an opposition party, if it works outside the rules and norms of the new democracy, can be a force of destabilization and crisis. If we can recall from Huntington and Schumpeter, a representational party system leads to the most stable kind of democracy because it allows for organized opposition and healthy change that is reflective of the will of the people within the state as whole. However, if subsequent parties attempt to overthrow the system and bypass the rules and norms of the democracy, which are created by the political institutions put in place, the results will likely be destructive.

Seymour Martin Lipset, with liberal use of Alexis de Toqueville and Schattschneider, argues passionately for the indispensability of political parties in keeping with his democratization colleagues. He maintains that the conflict between the governing and opposition parties helps to establish democratic norms and rules. Therefore, a stable democracy

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requires a supportive culture, the rights of the opposition, free speech and assembly, rule of law, regular elections, and turnover in elected office. Again, we have this slippery category of needing a supportive culture, or similar views on democracy in order to embrace the state’s new government. For democracy planners, this perhaps suggests an intimate knowledge of the state’s political, social, and historical contexts before any attempts at democratization can be made. It is important to note that a stable democracy also requires a flexible time line—one that acknowledges the often-lengthy endeavor of institutionalizing democracy. Although none of the authors discussed (except Whitehead) mentions the concept of time directly, they all acknowledge that effective, legitimate, and stable institutions grow slowly. Lipset is the first of the authors discussed to really stress not only the importance of the rule of law, but also the necessity of a legitimate opposition party. Without an opposition party, a democracy can quickly turn into a dictatorship. The core of democracy thrives on debate—it would follow that on a larger scale, the institution could not survive without at least two strong, oppositional parties. The two-party system, however, must be supported by the norms and practices of the government in question, and viewed with legitimacy by the state’s citizens.

Furthermore, Lipset pays significant attention to considering democracy from a sociological and behavioral standpoint.¹⁴ Like Linz and Stepan, Lipset places importance on the relationship between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the political system. As there are so many differing cases, with so many nuanced and complex historical contexts, he suggests that academics cannot simply say that there is one set of social conditions (income, urbanization, and education levels) that are regularly associated with any kind of political system. This is why it is absolutely critical to examine each country and discern its unique characteristics before

attempting democratization. After cautioning democracy planners not to oversimplify, Lipset finds—much like his contemporaries—there are general trends that demonstrate what a democracy engenders. Democracies tend to have higher per-capita incomes, a higher degree of urbanization, a higher degree of education, and the ability to create voluntary organizations that further civil society. Huntington, of the development-first school, would endorse his assessments. According to Lipset, democracy requires a supportive culture (here, he is in agreement with Dahl and others), and newer democracies must be rapidly institutionalized, consolidated, and legitimized. To do this, he suggests that a strong civil society is required.

Here it is necessary to flesh out what civil society means within the context of democratization, and to discuss the benefits of its strengths or weakness. To talk about the importance of a strong civil society is to talk about Robert Putnam and his work on the significance of social capital. Comparing northern and southern Italy, Putnam et al survey the institutional performance of regional governments and find that in northern Italy, where citizens participate actively in sports clubs, literary guilds, and choral societies, the governments are more democratic. On the other hand, in southern Italy, where patterns of civil engagement are weak, the regional governments tend toward a hierarchy that lacks accountability and no systems in place for feedback, which in turn breed corruption and inefficiency. Putnam concludes by labeling these networks and norms of reciprocity within civil society as “social capital,” and argues that they positively impact functional governance because trust is engendered between the people and the state. In short: strong social capital is indicative of a strong civil society and institutional performance, which as we know is essential to a functional democracy.

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Among democratization scholars, there is a divide between those who believe a state must achieve economic development before it can have a democratic government, and those who believe that democracy can be built while the country is simultaneously developing its economy.

So far we have seen that even between such different forms of democracy as posited by Dahl and Lijphart, governmental institutions are required to maintain legitimacy and stability, and civil society must be allowed to organize independently from the government itself for a state to be considered democratic in any sense. Fareed Zakaria, however, suggests that while democracy might be flourishing, constitutional liberalism is not.\textsuperscript{17} Zakaria states that constitutional liberalism is not about the procedures and institutions in place for selecting government, but rather about the government’s goals and ideals. It encompasses the individual’s liberty and autonomy, which rests on tradition and rule of law. Labeling a country democratic neither ensures democratic practices, nor does it guarantee liberal constitutionalism. He suggests that we need to worry about what happens \textit{after} elections because democracy as the equivalent of good governance loses sight of the defense to an individual’s right to life, property, freedom, religion, and speech. As mentioned earlier, Zakaria also believes that economic development furthers the likelihood of a young democracy’s success. The United States, however, is so eager to legitimate and centralize young democracies above all else, that it has lost sight of liberal democracy. For Zakaria, a strong constitutional government is essential for a successful transition to democracy. If constitutional liberalism is forgotten, democracy becomes nothing but “a quaint exercise in rule-making.”\textsuperscript{18} Instead of putting forth criteria for successful democracy and strategies for democratization, Zakaria chooses to define the problem by taking a closer look at what the international community has settled for labeling its so-called democracies. He asserts that without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of a democracy in a divided society only leads to nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.

\textsuperscript{17} Fareed Zakaria “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy” (Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997) pp. 22-43.
\textsuperscript{18} Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” 34.
Additionally, when writing in light of the Iraq War, Zakaria discusses the concept of militarized democratization as it relates to implementing and exporting democracy abroad, essentially positing the idea that versions of militarized democratization will not work for the developing world.\textsuperscript{19} By militarized democratization, he means the military endeavor to invade a country, and then democratize it by force, disregarding the will of the people for the assumption that the entire world believes democracy to be the best form of government. In the United States’ efforts to advance its visions of liberal democracy, free trade, and protection of personal property rights around the world, administrations are too quick to call a state democratic and to agree with Fukuyama’s claim that the West has won. If a state claims that it has successfully democratized, but acts more like a dictatorship or autocracy, the United States should not be labeling it as a democracy. Overall, Zakaria has a less positive outlook on the possibilities of democratization than his contemporaries. However, he does not rule it out completely—democracy planners simply have to be aware that when they are chasing democracy, they must be on the lookout for liberal constitutionalism as well. Without it, these transplanted, young “democracies” will be democratic in name alone.

Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment adds to the debate on democratization by examining the process of creating a democracy from an aid-driven standpoint.\textsuperscript{20} He contends that while the rhetoric regarding democracy promotion is far more hopeful than its less-consistent policy reality, progress has indeed been made (he refers to this as the “learning curve”) and therefore the endeavor of supporting burgeoning democracies should not be ignored. Carothers considers cases that were mainly monetarily based, as opposed to the addition of military intervention seen in Haiti and Iraq, and finds that while democracy cannot be exported like a

commodity, it does not grow from within without outside influence. By this, he means that the forces of globalization make it impossible for a transitioning country to avoid outside impact or modeling. He also asks his readers to remember that democracy promotion does not require perfection from the promoters (i.e. the United States). When critiquing the act of externally assisting transitioning countries with monetary aid, he states that the greatest problems involve a lack of local ownership over the programs in addition to a lack of flexibility in a too-short time frame. He reaffirms other scholars who agree that democracy programs cannot be one-size fits all, and suggests that we move beyond institutional modeling, wherein a country attempts to reproduce the forms of institutions seen in an already established democracy.

Finally, Laurence Whitehead contends that democracy is best understood as an open-ended engagement with flexible parameters and no clear finish line. His view on democracy and democratization somewhat goes against what this paper has previously discussed, because he views democratization not as something that can ever be achieved, but as something that is always an ongoing process. So what is there to be done if democracy has no strict rules and no clear end point? He suggests that if democratization theory is to be examined at all in light of contemporary experience, states must approach transplanting democracies abroad with the notion that to insist on a set of standardized outcomes regardless of context would be both historically and culturally insensitive. The definition of democracy should remain contestable simply because all worthwhile conceptions of this form of government must incorporate in some capacity the ability for a legitimate opposition to challenge the governing authority. Are there better recipes for success? Whitehead does not provide us with a clear answer. As Whitehead focuses more on challenging the act of democratization than any of the previous authors

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discussed, it is more profitable to consider why he takes issue with the act of transplanting democracy than to list and analyze his criteria for democracy. Despite our sophisticated understandings of democracy as studied over the years by Dahl and his contemporaries, Whitehead asserts that the act of transplanting democracy cannot be achieved unless it is considered as an ongoing process with no end point in sight.

When it comes to the act of democratization, Whitehead firmly believes that the “two turnover test” posited by Huntington is not enough to test whether or not a country has fully democratized, because it assumes that democratization ends after two successful elections. He complicates the validity of this test by asking whether or not the United States was democratic before it abolished slavery—if we hold it up to liberal constitutional values of democracy such as Zakaria champions, and even those of Dahl’s ideal democracy, it most certainly was not. Thus, when it comes to democratization, the timeline that democracy planners anticipate is extremely important. It is necessary to have a nuanced understanding of democracy because if we use an incorrect definition, the act of democratization incorrectly becomes a set of clear, quick, and formulated choices that have a rational construction ending in closure in every situation. The people around the table making decisions matter, and a charismatic leader can pull a country together, but seeking short-term stability as if it was democracy is only going to end in crisis and fragmentation. Finally, as Whitehead states, if a contemporary process of democratization is correctly identified as long-term and open-ended, then the analyst or democracy planner cannot know with certainty what the eventual outcome will be.

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STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS:
APPLYING UNDERSTANDINGS OF DEMOCRACY TO HAITI AND IRAQ

While it is necessary to gain a nuanced understanding of the theoretical literature on democracy and democratization in order to accurately evaluate what went wrong in Haiti and Iraq, it would be insufficient to discuss these theories without further distilling how they can be used to understand real world situations. This section provides an analytical framework to do so. Lijphart, while important to understand in the canon of literature on democracy, was largely rejected by populations who felt that consociational democracy would exacerbate religious and cultural divides. Thus, as the United States was not interested in Lijphart’s consociational democracy, its characteristics, intrinsic contexts, and obstacles will not be considered within this framework. It is important to remember, however, that there is more than one kind of democracy, despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s lack of interest in a power-sharing scheme. When synthesizing the theorists that were just discussed, we can illuminate some common themes: all except Lijphart have a commitment to liberal, individual democracy. These democracies are characterized by free, fair, and frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the creation of a constitution, an autonomous civil society, and legitimate political parties. Along with these characteristics, the theorists—Huntington, Lipset, Dahl, and Zakaria, in particular—are careful to remind their readers of the obstacles to democracy as well: lack of commitment to democratic ideals, insufficient economic development, lack of stability, and an absence of experience in democracy, to name a few. Beyond the requirements and obstacles, however, we can see a third category come to light: the intrinsic and already existing historical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic conditions of a country and how these contexts affect its hopes to democratize.
As there appears to be more to the study of democratization than simply checking off a laundry list of commonly understood characteristics of democracy, this paper extracts from the previous theory discussion three categories by which to evaluate and examine the United States’ failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq. The three categories are as follows: first, the *Characteristics Associated with Democracy* that are dependent on a state’s historical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic contexts (I will label these as internal characteristics), second, the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy* independent from a state’s internal traits, and third, the *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* that arise, in combination, from a country’s existing conditions and from objective qualities that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. These analytic categories and their criteria are represented in tables 1.1-1.3, and may also be found in Appendix 1 on page 99 for future reference.

The first category (*Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy*) relies on a country’s unique historical context. The consideration of each country’s historical, cultural, political, and socioeconomic contexts and how each relates to the success or failure of its democratization process is by nature less clear-cut than that of democracy’s objectively necessary qualities. However, due to the unique nature of every single state in the world, these characteristics are perhaps the most important to consider. When it comes to studying the United States’ failed democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, it is critical to examine if and when the democracy planners ignored internal conditions in each state, thus negatively impacting the democratization process. The distinction between this analytical category and the second category (*Universal Characteristics of Democracy*) is that while this category recognizes that each country’s existing historical, cultural, or economic realities can affect differently the possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization that result from these unique traits,
the second category relies on the United States’ understanding of democracy as independent from how it relates to a specific country. In other words, a country that is declared “democratic” would reflect what is universally considered as democratic. That aside, the internal democratic characteristics associated with each country’s various contexts are represented in Table 1.1:

**Table 1.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogenous society (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization levels (Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education levels (Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic success (Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of civil society (Putnam)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering Table 1.1, we must remember Whitehead’s warning that we cannot insist on standardized outcomes when engaging in democratization, as that would be the equivalent to ignoring each country’s historical, political, and cultural contexts. These characteristics are not something that any state is able to craft and give to another in its efforts to speed along democratization. Timelines of democratization are never as speedy as democracy planners would hope for, and the length of any planned engagement must take into account the internal conditions of the country in consideration.

The second category (*Universal Characteristics of Democracy*) was chosen because there are agreed upon, common goals and prerequisites satisfying the Western model of liberal democracy that we can use to decipher how to construct democracies as well as how to judge
what went wrong when they fail. Constructing this category consisted mainly of collecting all of the objective characteristics for democracy listed in the previous theory section and refining them into a list that can be used to examine Haiti and Iraq. When the United States declares a country to be “democratic,” it follows that these are the characteristics a democracy should have. These characteristics—and the theorists they are attributed to—are represented in Table 1.2:

**Table 1.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Universal Characteristics of Democracy</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative sources of information (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong political leadership (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate political parties (Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and rule of law (Lipset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although some of these features of democracy seen in Table 1.2 have to do mainly with Western values of liberal democracy, the majority of them rely upon the strength, legitimacy, and stability of lasting democratic institutions. For example, free, fair, and frequent elections can only be conducted if the government has created an institution through which people can make their voices heard—if there were no systems in place, anarchy or tyranny would likely ensue. Alternatively, there can be no lasting and legitimate constitution without the power of rule of law to enforce it. While these authors differ in what they consider to be the most important when
approaching the construction of democracy, they all agree that the creation and maintenance of governmental institutions is the key to a successful transition to democracy, and something that is universally desirable when constructing democracies.

Finally, the third category (Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization) contains characteristics that are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, but also on universal characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. These are not as simple as listing the opposites of what we desire in a democracy—they exist separately as things that democracy planners must account for, work against, and anticipate. While this list incorporates the obstacles taken from the theorists discussed in the previous section, it does not contain many of the unique obstacles that the Clinton and Bush administrations faced in Haiti and Iraq, as those will be explained with great detail in later sections. The obstacles to democracy and democratization as derived from the theorists previously discussed are represented below in Table 1.3:

**Table 1.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of stability (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarized democratization (Zakaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdirected international funding (Carothers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As stated in regards to the intrinsic characteristics contained within each state, while these obstacles represented in Table 1.3 certainly make it more difficult to democratize, they do not make it an impossible endeavor. However, the more obstacles to democracy confronted by those who wish to democratize, the less likely it will be for the country in question to successfully democratize. Together, these three categories help us to frame and evaluate what went wrong in Haiti and Iraq, and what policy makers might learn about the act of exporting democracy around the world. The following chapter presents an analysis of the United States’ democratization efforts in Haiti as they relate to this theoretical structure.
II. HAITI

On December 16, 1990, the world rejoiced as it watched Haiti peacefully elect its first-ever democratic president in the nation’s troubled and violent history. Unfortunately, Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s promises of economic prosperity, peace, and security for the chaotic and bankrupt state were never realized. Nine months into his first term as president, Aristide was overthrown by a military coup led by Haitian Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras. Despite numerous plans, agreements, and embargoes then placed on Haiti to pressure the de-facto government, the United States failed to reinstate Aristide without military intervention. Thus, on September 15, 1994, President Clinton announced the United States’ planned invasion of Haiti in order to promote and uphold democracy in our hemisphere. While the Cédras regime was eventually removed, the Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an insufficient time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in Haiti during and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a successful and stable democracy.

In order to understand where and when the Clinton administration maneuvered poorly in its policy plans, it is important to examine the Haiti case as it relates to the characteristics of democracy and democratization provided in the previous section. Accordingly, this section proceeds in the following manner: first, it presents and analyzes Haiti’s political, social, and economic contexts as they relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. Second, it examines the United States’ actions during the three years leading up to military invasion, analyzing the Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization that the Clinton administrated faced in light of the conditions in Haiti. Finally, it provides an analysis of the invasion itself and its aftermath, evaluating the state of democracy in Haiti against the Universal
Characteristics of Democracy. This case will demonstrate that while the Clinton administration constructed opportunities for elections, created programs for reforming the police force, and funneled money into structurally adjusting Haiti’s economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying political, economic, and social contexts, fundamentally misunderstood the necessary characteristics required for a successful and stable democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti before democracy could truly be realized.

Conditions in Haiti Prior to Invasion

If we recall from the previous section, the characteristics associated with the internal evolution of democracy within a country, as listed on page 99, provide a structure with which to evaluate Haiti’s prospects for democracy. Although none of the Internal Characteristics of Democracy alone are the difference between success and failure in the realm of democratization, if enough are not met, it becomes all that much more difficult for democracy to develop. As we examine the conditions in Haiti prior to Clinton’s invasion, looking at its history as well as its social, political, and economic conditions, it is unfortunately true that Haiti lacked nearly all of these internal conditions. For example, Dahl tells us that a democratic belief and political culture are ideal characteristics for a society to exhibit in order to more successfully develop democracy. Additionally, Huntington is quick to remind policy makers of the importance of economic success when attempting to restructure government. However, Haiti has neither been successful in developing a functioning economy, nor has its dictatorial rule encouraged a supportive democratic culture. In examining Haiti’s history with more detail, it is clear that the island nation lacked most key characteristics that would have assisted with its democratization.
Haiti’s history is one that has been consumed with violence, famine, corruption, and poverty. Despite the spotlight placed on the military junta that controlled Haiti from 1991 to 1994, the junta’s theft of democracy from Aristide was simply the latest in a long string of cruel regimes preventing the country from developing economically and progressing politically. Gaining its independence in 1804 from the French through a slave-led revolution, Haiti’s destiny as the first free black republic should have been prosperous. Haiti, however, had been left in literal and economic ruin by the time of its independence.23 The cost of the war bankrupted the new state, crippling its chances for successful development. Additionally, Haiti’s main source of income relied on subsistence agriculture, and in the face of self-perpetuating poverty and the inability to advance their farming techniques, Haitians turned to deforestation in order to create and sell charcoal for fuel.24 Unfortunately, this led to erosion of the land available for farming, which, to this day, has remained one of the main sources of income for the state, as well as the eventual development of a textile industry. In 1990, before the collapse of Aristide’s administration, Haiti’s GDP per capita was approximately $360 per year: less than 50 percent of its population had access to clean water, its citizens’ life expectancy was 53 years, and 28 percent of Haitian children younger than five were malnourished.25 Haiti’s economic state defies Dahl, Huntington, and Lipset’s ideals for the type of environment necessary for democratization: Haiti did not have a successful market economy, let alone a functioning economy of any kind. Even before the United States further devastated the Western hemisphere’s poorest state with harsh embargoes, Haiti was not positioned well to develop democracy. Again, while economic

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success is not the only defining factor in democratic development, it is certainly an important one when looking at Haiti’s extreme levels of poverty.

Haiti’s political past also informed its democratization prospects. As we can recall, according to Lipset, Linz, and Stepan, a supportive democratic culture is absolutely more beneficial for the development of democracy than a culture and government that is hostile, violent, and dictatorial. In order for a government to make democratic changes, as argued by both Linz and Stepan, it ideally needs to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of each member of society. Haiti has been haunted by political instability and dictatorial autocracy for decades, making it impossible to foster legitimacy or a supportive democratic culture. Its political pattern is one that can be characterized by violent coups leading to unstable and frequent changes in government. Each new government was again followed by a violent coup when it failed to live up to expectations.26 This is illustrated by the fact that between the years 1843 and 1915, Haiti experienced 102 revolts, civil wars, and revolutions.27

Haiti’s history has known very little stability, which contributed to its high levels of violence and thus weakened its civil society, which Putnam tells us is critical to securing democracy. In examining Haiti’s political past, it is clear that its governments failed to engender legitimacy, or create a culture of democratic belief and support. Ideally, the legitimacy of a government can be seen in the eyes of its people: it is received in trust from civil society, not taken by force and maintained by the military. Instead of crafting lasting institutions to support strong governance, Haiti’s governments have relied almost singularly on its armed forces for maintaining order and rule of law, until the first, and ultimately ineffective, American occupation

26 Ibid, 540.
from 1915 to 1934. This occupation robbed the Haitians of their dignity and failed to create a lasting difference in the government. While the U.S. soldiers assisted in building roads, constructing schools, and maintaining a stable environment, they took all agency away from Haiti’s government: the United States had total veto power over all governmental and economic decisions in Haiti, essentially confiscating its independence for the duration of the occupation.

In tracing Haiti’s fraught political history, we can now turn to the Duvalier Regime, which will provide the political backdrop to Aristide’s brief presidency, including the conditions that Aristide inherited when he took office: beginning with François Duvalier (Papa Doc) in 1957, and ending with his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Bébé Doc) in 1986, these twin regimes further damaged Haiti’s democratic prospects with their brutal rule and lack of respect for basic human rights. While Papa Doc was initially popular, his rule eventually marked the height of cruelty in the Haitian government. The Duvalier regime can be characterized by its political terror, economic incompetence and rampant violence with the use of the Tonton Macoutes, Duvalier’s private police force, which ensured the regime’s total control of power by instilling fear in the urban and rural areas of the country. This notorious police force, numbering approximately 100,000 at the time the Duvalier regime ended, routinely executed children, raped women, and killed without discretion, effectively destroying civil society in Haiti. Many scholars blame the effects of the Duvalier regime as the reason why Haiti has been unable to sustain democracy, as it removed all forms of opposition to its government, making the democratic process impossible when, years later, the time came for elections. While it is clear that Haiti’s political past cannot be characterized as supportive to democratization, it is important to

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29 Girard, *Clinton in Haiti*, 15
remember that these characteristics become more consequential when paired with others that are equally as unfavorable to democracy. Thus, Haiti’s limited prior experience with democracy cannot be solely blamed for the United States’ inability to install democracy in the island nation.

Before turning to consider Aristide’s brief “democracy” and the United States’ actions prior to the invasion, it is necessary to bring to light Haiti’s social contexts. Haiti divides itself along the lines of race, education, and urbanization. With its history as a French-colonized slave state, 90 percent of its population is black (noir) whereas only 10 percent is made up from the lighter-skinned mulâtres. Historically, the color of one’s skin highly determined one’s level of economic prosperity and education, as Haiti’s mulatto elite often monopolized power. 31 Although homogeneity is not entirely necessary to secure a functional democracy (the United States, if we recall, is proof of this), in a state where other factors are stacked against its development, it may very well be a detriment.

Furthermore, Lipset reminds us that urbanization and education levels are important when evaluating a state’s proclivity toward democracy. While Haiti is not entirely homogenous, as discussed previously, its low levels of education and urbanization are of greater concern when considering democratization. Haiti is divided in its language. While the official language in Haiti was listed until 1987 as French, the majority of the population speaks Creole, with only 5-10 percent of the population, the economic and political elite, fluent in French. 32 Thus, the language of government (French) is inaccessible to the majority of the Haitian population, creating yet another barrier to democracy. Moreover, in 1990, the year of Aristide’s election, almost 75 percent of Haiti’s population of 7 million was functionally illiterate. This systemic lack of

31 Domínguez and Lowenthal, Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, 152.
available education then hurts the country’s economy and prevents its citizens from being fully educated and able to participate politically.

Another important point of division exists between Haiti’s cities and its rural poor. Only 10 percent of the country is urbanized, with the rest dedicated to subsistence farming. This division localizes what little wealth Haiti has to its cities, while the other 90 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty in the more rural areas of the island. Thus, Haiti’s urbanization and education levels, combined with its racial divisions, make the prospect of democracy even more difficult to pursue. Haiti’s economic, political, and social conditions prior to the United States’ involvement reveal there was very little that could have been done in order to overcome the country’s structural barriers to democracy.

Despite criticisms from the CIA, Clinton made clear in the years leading up to the invasion that he supported Aristide through numerous rhetorical commitments, promising that the United States would “restore democracy and President Aristide [to Haiti] as soon as possible,” unequivocally linking Haiti’s return to democracy with Aristide’s return to his country. It was sharply debated, however, whether Haiti’s president (or his administration) was democratic. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in December of 1990 with 67.5 percent of the vote while representatives from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) sent representatives to ensure a peaceful beginning to Haiti’s transition to democracy. As discussed in one of the numerous Congressional Hearings on the matter, many believed that the international delegation, which included former President Carter, made a grave

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33 Armand, “Democracy in Haiti,” 544
mistake in pulling out of Haiti so soon after the election of Aristide. While the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) ensured a peaceful election, they did not stay to ensure a peaceful administration, or a functioning democracy. Aristide’s popularity, which was garnered from the disadvantaged poor and leveraged by the *Lavalas* movement, was indisputable when compared to the U.S.—favored candidate in 1990 Marc Bazin, a pro-American representative from the IMF with little support from the people. A Populist at heart, Aristide promised the Haitian poor that they would no longer be terrorized by the *Tonton Macoutes* or forgotten by the government. However, when elected to a bankrupt government with no judicial system, and little infrastructure to speak of, his promises were difficult to keep.

As discussed previously, Haiti’s biggest hurdles to overcome in its pursuit of democracy were its lack of security, justice, education, and economic development. Once in office, Aristide attempted to tackle these weaknesses, but in doing so he alienated the people within his government from whom he needed support. For example: in his first month in office, Aristide fired all of the army’s senior officers, engendering bitter and hostile feelings within the only operational arm of the state. This maneuver angered the already violent and coup-prone army, and was ultimately the nail in Aristide’s own coffin: members of the disenfranchised army organized the coup that forced him to flee the country. Aristide also lost support in parliament when he refused to accept the nomination of any member of the *Front National pour le*
Changement et la Démocratie (FNCD), the political party that helped elect him. Finally, Aristide promoted violent and undemocratic behavior from his supporters, encouraging *necklacing* against Duvalier supporters when there was no police force to monitor the streets, even going so far as to enthusiastically tell his people to “give [them] what [they] deserve” as people were burning to death. Aristide encouraged violence with his words, and this violence that impeded Haiti’s security was ultimately detrimental to the development of democracy, which requires legal opposition parties and civil society organizations that can voice their opinions within a secure environment.

Despite Clinton’s willing partnership with Aristide, the fiery nationalist was not universally seen as the best choice for U.S. security interests. Two days after Aristide told his citizens to continue murdering people in the streets, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the military coup that brought Aristide’s administration to a shuddering halt. It seems clear that Aristide would not bring Haiti democracy. Yet the Clinton administration, despite opposition from Congress (with the exception of the Black Caucus), the CIA, and U.S. popular opinion, rallied behind Aristide and promised that returning him to his government would ensure democracy. With the choice between Cédras and Aristide, Clinton chose the latter and in doing so, unquestioningly linked Aristide with Haiti’s democratization prospects. Yes, a democratic election brought Haitians a new president in 1990, but Haiti itself still lacked security, justice, education, and a functioning economy. As we have seen, democracy cannot be solely defined by

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40 Ibid, 17
41 *Necklacing* refers to the practice of placing a rubber tire (or tires) around someone, lighting it on fire, and burning the victim to death.
43 According to a study conducted by RAND, support for an invasion generally remained below majority: only 34 percent of the US population approved of how the Clinton administration was handling Haiti leading up to September 19, 1994.
an election. Haiti faced insurmountable structural obstacles to democracy that a charismatic president could not overcome alone. Despite the fact that Clinton’s mission in Haiti was named “Operation Uphold Democracy,” it is clear that for democratization to take hold in Haiti, the country would need much more than its former leader returned home.44

**U.S. Policy Towards Haiti: 1991—1994**

In the three years between Cédras’ coup and the United States’ invasion (September 1991—September 1994), Presidents Bush and Clinton faced numerous obstacles to the democratization of Haiti. These obstacles resulted in part from domestic issues that arose while the administrations were attempting a diplomatic solution to the crisis, as well as from a misunderstanding of the situation on the ground in Haiti and a failure to consider aspects of democracy unrelated to elections. This section will analyze the *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* with the structure and characteristics identified in the previous chapter as applied to Haiti. As we will see, the economic embargoes placed on Haiti in an effort to draw Cédras out of a stalemate only increased levels of poverty, further divided society along lines of wealth and access, created more violence in the streets, and generally decreased the levels of stability in the state as a whole—all considered detrimental obstacles in the pursuit of democracy by our scholars on the subject. Additionally, the Clinton administration underestimated the leaders of the authoritarian regime in negotiations, which harmed the Haitian people. Finally, when the time came to plan how democracy would unfold in Haiti, the growing refugee problem and its domestic impact compelled Clinton to design a mission that was insufficient in time and

scope, viewing the election as the final step in democratization, in contrast to both Zakaria and Whitehead, who argue that conducting an election is but one step in a larger process.

Before analyzing the domestic obstacles to Clinton’s “Operation Uphold Democracy,” it is necessary to examine more closely Clinton’s motivation for getting involved in the first place. There are several possibilities that have come to light. First, the United States seeks to universally support democracy and prevent human rights violations, which it finds “intolerable everywhere, but are unconscionable on our doorstep.”45 Second, Haiti is in the American sphere of influence, and pertinent to US foreign policy, as established by Clinton’s most famous foreign policy endeavor of “Engagement and Enlargement” in which he demonstrates a “firm commitment to expanding the global realm of democracy.”46 Third, as we will discuss, the Haitian refugee problem was getting out of control: by the spring of 1994, the refugees held at Guantanamo had already cost the U.S. government $200 million and the U.S. Coast Guard had already turned away tens of thousands of displaced Haitians.47 Fourth, the United States had suffered continual humiliation from Cédras’ junta since the inception of the coup, in addition to the international embarrassment the Clinton administration had been feeling due to its failures in Bosnia and Rwanda. Finally, ensuring the success of democracy in Haiti benefits US interests, such as free markets, economic opportunity, and national security, because as President Clinton frequently noted, “democracies don’t attack each other.”48 Due to these overlapping incentives, it is important to examine the President’s policy choices regarding Haiti as well as the domestic pressures weighing on Clinton during the three years that the Cédras coup held Haiti hostage. As

45 *International Herald Tribune*, 26 September 1994
we will see, the competing interests of the Clinton administration were ultimately harmful to Operation Uphold Democracy.

When faced with the collapse of Aristide’s government, the United States crippled Haiti with three years of ineffectual embargoes as it attempted to unseat the Cédras regime that had taken hold in the island nation. Days after the coup had unseated Aristide, President George Bush initiated Executive Order 12775, prohibiting Haitian access to US assets and all transfers of money to Haiti.49 This was followed by Executive Order No. 12779 of October 28, 1991, and to the same end President Clinton followed suit with Executive Orders No. 12853 of June 30, 1993, No. 12872 of October 18, 1993, No. 12914 of May 7, 1994, No. 12917 of May 21, 1994, No. 12920 of June 10, 1994, and No. 12922 of June 21, 1994.50 As each embargo failed to bring the Cédras regime to the negotiating table, the sanctions increased in severity throughout the three years Cédras was in power, limiting oil, arms, and eventually all trade to Haiti. While economic sanctions can prove very effective when sending a message to another country, the United States failed to make an impact on the military junta as the sanctions were felt not by the junta, but by the already starving Haitian poor. Additionally, not all of Haiti’s trading partners followed the U.S. embargoes, until UN and OAS involvement in June of 1993 with UNSC Resolution 841, which placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.

Instead of helping democracy return to Haiti, the United States’ push for economic sanctions only damaged the state’s infrastructure, increased levels of violence, sickness, and famine, and unquestionably worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country. As the United States supplied between 60 to 65 percent of Haiti’s imports, as well as received approximately 85

percent of the country’s exports, both President Bush and President Clinton with the support of Congress, expected the embargoes to have a crippling effect.\textsuperscript{51} Unfortunately, the embargoes did indeed cripple Haiti, but it did not seem to touch the military junta as was planned. While the United States maintained that its mission was to “peacefully, but very forcefully help Haiti’s legitimately elected president and Haiti’s democratic leaders reverse this coup,” the embargoes, which acted as a “sledgehammer” against the Haitian poor, made it impossible to carve out humanitarian exceptions.\textsuperscript{52} Despite President Bush’s guarantee that “our actions are directed at those in Haiti who are opposing a return to democracy, not the Haitian poor,” the poor were exactly the segment of the population to first and foremost feel the effects of the sanctions.\textsuperscript{53}

In order to illustrate the magnitude of the economic sanctions on the majority of Haitians, we must examine the relevant statistics before and after the military coup. During Aristide’s presidency, only 50 percent of the labor force was employed, one third of the population lacked access to modern health services, and 20 percent of Haitian children did not have access to education.\textsuperscript{54} While it is generally agreed upon that embargoes should be conducted in a way that prevents unnecessary suffering, the economic impact was felt most severely by the rural poor, women, and unskilled factory workers, rather than the well-off military junta. Between 1991 and 1994, Haiti lost 30,000 jobs, the number of workers employed in the assembly industry sector declined from 44,000 to 8,000, and the per capita income decreased by 30 percent to $250 per

\textsuperscript{51} Update on the Situation in Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 102\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 25 (1991) (Statement of Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State).

\textsuperscript{52} Update on the Situation in Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 102\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 2 (1991) (Statement of Congressman Torricelli, chairman of the subcommittee).


year.\textsuperscript{55} Regarding education, nutrition, and basic human rights, the embargoes were equally damaging. UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) estimated that during the years of the coup, the number of children in the street doubled to 4,000 and the gross school enrollment fell from 83 percent to 57 percent in 1994. The number of malnourished children also increased from one in five to one in four, as the humanitarian aid designated by the United States was unable to reach the rural poor due to gas shortages and inaccessibility of roads.\textsuperscript{56} The embargoes remain incredibly relevant to the democratization efforts in Haiti because, as the poorest nation in the hemisphere, even testimony in U.S. Congress noted that “without economic growth, there shall be no democracy in Haiti… it is absolutely vital.”\textsuperscript{57} While economic development is not absolutely necessary for every burgeoning democracy—for example, in India at its time of independence, 85 percent of the population was rural\textsuperscript{58}—Haiti’s condition as the poorest state in the Western hemisphere made it particularly susceptible to any type of sanction.

The embargoes worsened conditions in Haiti so much so that they further divided society, increased poverty and violence levels, and decreased stability, conditions that theorists such as Dahl and Huntington argue are obstacles to democracy. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administrations anticipated the destabilizing effects of poverty and resulting violence within the state when constructing the economic sanctions, and was therefore embarrassed over the course of three years by a small, but very resilient military coup. Both Clinton and Bush underestimated the power and adaptability of the authoritarian de facto government, leading the people of Haiti...
to question the United States’ commitment to Haiti.\textsuperscript{59} In short: due to lack of consideration for the social, political, and economic conditions on the ground in Haiti, the U.S.—instituted embargoes seriously inhibited the growth of democracy in the island nation.

One of the key domestic pressure points that called for U.S. action in Haiti, and one that Clinton faced in his first term, was the growing Haitian refugee crisis. During his campaign, Clinton had promised to reverse President Bush’s policy of returning the Haitian “Boat People” unjustly back to their broken country, but once in office, he maintained the limitations and claimed that the refugees were economic in nature, rather than political. The state of Florida had already initiated a $1 billion dollar lawsuit against the federal government for spending on illegal immigrants over the years.\textsuperscript{60} Clinton could not afford to alienate Florida, or its congressional representatives, as it was a key swing state in national elections. However, this restrictive immigration policy was extremely controversial: The Congressional Black Caucus, led by Congressman Charles B. Rangel, accused the Clinton administration of a racist immigration policy towards the Haitians, asking in regard to what makes the Haiti refugee policy different during a Congressional hearing, “is it the color?”\textsuperscript{61} The administration faced additional criticism from Human Rights Watch for its refugee policy because the coup had internally displaced 300,000 Haitians, 42,000 of which had attempted over the course of three years to escape to the United States.\textsuperscript{62} Although the Clinton administration ultimately softened its immigration policy, the United States was still looking at a growing humanitarian crisis in its backyard, ineffectual

\textsuperscript{60} von Hippel, “Democratization as Foreign Policy,” 11
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103\textsuperscript{rd} Cong., 16 (1994) (Statement of Charles B. Rangel, a representative in Congress from the state of New York).}
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 103\textsuperscript{rd} Cong., 10 (1994) (Statement of Carrie Meek, a representative of Congress from the state of Florida).}
embargoes, and a promise to “restore democracy in Haiti and restore President Aristide as the elected leader of that country” that was beginning to ring false.\(^6^3\) Facing pressure from the Black Caucus, Florida, and the international community, Clinton had nowhere to go except Haiti. Thus, while the Clinton doctrine reaffirms the United States’ commitment to democracy around the world, it seems evident that Clinton’s decision to ultimately invade Haiti was also a product of his domestic political calculations.

When considering his options with how to proceed in Haiti, Clinton utilized the UN in conjunction with the OAS to assist in returning Aristide to Haiti. This was Clinton’s way of ensuring a limited US time commitment in Haiti, as well as a demonstration of his previously stated commitment to multilateralism over unilateral action by a superpower. However, as we know from Whitehead, an insufficient time commitment in any democratization effort does not often lead to a stable and successful democracy. In light of the military coup that forced Aristide to flee the country, and given that Cédras’ thugs were “executing orphaned children, raping young girls, killing priests, mutilating people and leaving body parts in the open to terrify others;”\(^6^4\) the UN and OAS appointed Dante Caputo, the former minister for foreign affairs of Argentina, as the special envoy to Haiti in January of 1993. He was charged with the responsibility of diplomatically restoring democracy to Haiti. His mission was known as MICIVIH, or “International Civilian Mission in Haiti,” and its top three objectives were to return Aristide to Haiti, appoint a Prime Minister, and resolve the question of amnesty for Cédras and his thugs.\(^6^5\) Caputo worked closely with U.S. special envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, but their efforts were unsuccessful as Cédras was unwilling to negotiate. Thus, on June 16, 1993, the


UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 841, imposing new oil and arms embargoes against Haiti.\textsuperscript{66} There is no doubt that this action lead to the Governor’s Island Agreement on July 3, 1993 that promised to restore Aristide peacefully, but unfortunately the agreement did not come to fruition when the United States and the UN again underestimated the tenacity of the Cédras regime: when it came time to re-instate Aristide, in October of 1993, Cédras refused to cooperate, and the agreement was nullified.

Despite the initial failure of the agreement, it is important look at it closely as it remained the indispensable plan of action for the US, UN, and OAS when the time came to invade Haiti in September of 1994 during “Operation Uphold Democracy.” The plan contained several concrete steps: first, President Aristide would appoint a new commander in chief to replace Cédras, who would be granted amnesty along with the rest of the de facto government. Following his reinstatement in Haiti, President Aristide would appoint a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the newly reconstituted Parliament. Finally, after these measures were observed, all U.S., UN and OAS sanctions were to be suspended. At this time, the agreement specified that monetary foreign assistance would help with job creation, social development, and most importantly, the installation and training of a new police force that was made separate from the army. All of this was expected to take approximately 3-5 years in total.\textsuperscript{67} Additionally, the mandate would call for elections to be held for municipal and Parliamentary seats, as well as for presidential elections at the end of Aristide’s term. One year later, in September of 1994, these steps remained the agreed upon course of action for the invasion of Haiti, with an important exception: the use of military force to implement them.


\textsuperscript{67} “United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)”
The Governor’s Island Agreement was an important moment of diplomacy for Aristide, Cédras, and the United States, but the initial agreement ultimately failed for several reasons: it had an insufficient time commitment to the growth of democratic institutions, it viewed conducting elections as the final step in the plan, and the sign of a finished success, and its misdirected international funding made Haiti subject to the kind of neo-liberal economic practices characterized by IMF structural adjustment programs that had already made other governments around the world unpopular. Although the agreement promised foreign assistance in job creation and social development programs, the aid package would be based on compliance with undercutting, neo-liberal modifications and defunding of government programs such as public education, healthcare, and support for businesses.\(^\text{68}\) These known obstacles to democracy inhibited a democratic government from successfully developing in Haiti. Despite apprehension expressed in Congressional hearings that the largest humanitarian concern in Haiti was the complete decimation of its civil society, or its lack of economic growth, or even the responsibility to “help rebuild Haiti… not simply engraft the government and walk away,”\(^\text{69}\) the governor’s island negotiations, which molded the eventual invasion and Operation Uphold Democracy, failed to account for Haiti’s lack of democratic experience, poverty, instability, and the staying power of the Cédras regime. While these concerns were brought to light, Clinton chose to ultimately ignore the apprehension of the legislative branch and maneuver through the approval of the UN for an eventual military engagement in Haiti.

\(^{68}\) Girard, \textit{Clinton in Haiti}, 145

\(^{69}\) \textit{Haiti: The Agreement of Governor’s Island and Its Implementation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 42 (1993) (Statement of Lawrence Pezzulo, U.S. Special Envoy on Haiti, Department of State).}
THE INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH: EVALUATING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

This final section of the Haiti case evaluates Operation Uphold Democracy and its aftermath, using the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy* to provide insight into whether or not the “remarkable coalition” truly “restored democracy to Haiti,” as President Clinton had claimed. While the Governor’s Island agreement and the following UN involvement in Operation Uphold Democracy allowed for the restoration of President Aristide, the appointment of a Prime Minister, and free, fair, and frequent elections, other crucial aspects of democracy were missing, thus weakening the democratization efforts. Haiti’s lack of security or control of force inhibited civil society’s sustained freedom of expression, its ability to participate politically—all characteristics deemed necessary for democracy by Dahl, Huntington, Linz and Stepan, and Lipset. The absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law close to impossible, as well as undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. Finally, Haiti’s dire economic situation and budget restrictions mandated by the IMF prevented the development of infrastructure that the island nation desperately needed to function democratically and economically. Therefore, while the trappings of democracy were constructed in Haiti due to the scheduled elections, it is clear that unfortunately, the majority of the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy*, as defined by our scholars of democratization, were not met. As we will see, the Clinton administration, in conjunction with the UN, failed to provide sufficient time to develop the key democratic institutions and characteristics, thus dooming Haiti to instability and chaos.

On September 15 1994, President Clinton announced to the world that the United States would be “leading the international effort to restore democratic government in Haiti” in a military operation that would be “limited and specific,” utilizing an overwhelming 20,000 troops.

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in an effort to minimize casualties on both sides with a time commitment guaranteeing
Americans soldiers a return home no later than March of the following year.\textsuperscript{71} Previously, on
July 31 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 940 had granted President Clinton the right to
invade Haiti due to the Cédras regime’s obscene human rights violations and the Haitian
people’s right to the democracy they had previously chosen. During the speech, Clinton appealed
directly to America’s idealistic values of upholding democracy, protecting human rights, and
securing borders. As both Congress and the majority of the population were opposed to any
military engagement in Haiti, Clinton used explicit language to describe the violent situation on
the ground, quoting a Haitian child who once told a visitor “I do not care if the police kill me
because it only brings an end to my suffering” and positioning the US not as “the world’s
police,” but as a country that has a “responsibility to act” when democracy is denied to a nation
in our “backyard.”\textsuperscript{72} This mission would redeem Clinton from his previous international failures,
and prove to the rest of the world that the United States would not shy away from its
commitments, even if it took three years to fulfill its promises.

Ahead of the military forces, President Clinton sent former President Carter, General
Colin Powell, and Senator Samuel Nunn to attempt diplomatic negotiation with Cédras one final
time in light of the promised military engagement. The negotiations, which proceeded up until
the U.S. military was landing in Port-au-Prince, were miraculously successful, but did not
ultimately remove the occupation presence from the island.\textsuperscript{73} The diplomatic coalition, backed
by the pressure of the U.S. military, reached an agreement that allowed the military leaders of
Haiti to leave with amnesty, so long as the remaining provisions of the Governor’s Island
Agreement, as discussed previously, could be carried out. The US forces, instead of facing an

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Girard, \textit{Clinton in Haiti}, 103—109
active engagement, would act as a peaceful occupation force as part of a UN coalition (15,000 member multinational force as specified by UN Security Council Resolution 940) to guarantee that the dictators carried out the terms of the agreement. This large force would be scaled down incrementally as Haiti built its own democracy that was independent from the MNF (multinational force). With the UN involvement, Clinton could keep his promise of limited U.S. participation in restoring democracy to Haiti without committing to a long military engagement. He also promised the American people that their troops would come home as soon as elections were held in the spring of 1995. However, as we will see in the numerous UN Security Council reports on the status of Haiti’s transition, this would prove to be an insufficient period of time in which democracy could be rebuilt in Haiti.

The invasion itself was brief, and by the Governor’s Island Agreement’s definitions successful: by October 15 1994, the military junta had been disbanded; Aristide had been reinstated, and had named Smarck Michel as his new Prime Minister. The new government, with its newly reinstated Parliament, took office on November 8 1994. The next steps would be to create and train a new police force, restructure the army, hold elections, and utilize international monetary aid to boost Haiti’s economy. Correspondingly, legislative elections were scheduled for June and September of 1995, with Presidential elections to follow in December of that same year. In the words of President Clinton, the invasion was only ever designed to “provide a secure environment for the restoration of President Aristide and democracy, to begin the work of retraining the police and the military in a professional manner, and to facilitate a quick handoff

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to the United Nations mission so that the work of restoring democracy can be continued, the
developmental aid can begin to flow, Haiti can be rebuilt, and in 1995 another free and fair
election for President can be held.” Unfortunately, none of these steps were successful long-
term. Clinton viewed elections as the final step in democratization, but as we know, elections do
not ensure an inclusive and educated citizenship, nor do they guarantee political legitimacy and
stability of government, characteristics all deemed necessary for successful democratization. In
short, the invasion planned for the trappings of democracy and little else. It is in the aftermath of
the invasion—in the time of building, peacekeeping, and restructuring—that the Clinton
administration’s mistakes in transplanting democracy to Haiti become clear.

After the invasion, the rapid dismissal of the Haitian military caused the creation of the
police force to begin in a chaotic, haphazard manner. Despite its violent crimes against the
Haitian people, the army was really the only functioning body in the state, and its quick
dissolution caused problems for the US forces in Haiti. As the invasion agreement required a
functioning police force and restructuring of the army, the MNF were asked to train former
members of the oppressive force into defenders of human rights in a short period of time. According to a Security Council report submitted in January of 1995, it was observed that “the
collapse of the FADH and the dissolution of the corps of section chiefs have created a security
void that has contributed to a marked increase in banditry and criminality throughout the
country,” causing a large portion of the population to be “afraid to meet or demonstrate,” thus
decreasing personal freedoms and political participation. Members of the permanent national
police, known as the Haitian National Police (HNP) did not begin training until February 1995,

77 “The President's News Conference With President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator
Sam Nunn on Haiti.”
78 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 124
January 17, 1995, 3.
with training lasting around four months in order to get the HNP functioning independently as soon as possible. However, this fast turnaround affected the HNP for years to come, exhibiting another example of insufficient time commitment to the Haitian democracy project. Even a year after the creation of the police force, the most serious concern for the HNP was the “absence of competent senior officers and overall leadership,” a direct result of insufficient training. Instead of the control of force creating legitimacy and stability for Haiti and its government, the ineffectiveness of the HNP and its “lack of qualified staff, adequate premises, and equipment” only destabilized the country. The new police force was essentially unable to ensure security and reduce violence in Haiti, resulting in a lack of basic freedoms of person and damaging civil society as a whole, all in all weakening Haiti’s new “democratic” government.

Furthermore, Haiti lacked a functioning justice system and strong rule of law; important characteristics that have been argued to be absolutely necessary for a functioning democracy. Despite Aristide’s insistence in creating programs to restructure the judicial system in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy did not allocate sufficient resources or time to the forces of justice in the country. Without a functioning justice system, there can be no democracy. The agreement to give the Cédars regime amnesty only contributed to “rising frustration at the inability of the justice system to address past human rights violations and current criminality.” This was especially upsetting as it was estimated that during his regime 4,000 people were killed,

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80 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 125
300,000 were internally displaced, and more than 60,000 took to the sea on rafts.\textsuperscript{85} Additionally, the courts suffered from a long-standing lack of supporting infrastructure, such as inadequate prison systems and courthouses that were on stand-by for rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{86} These factors contributed to weakening Aristide’s legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of Haiti’s burgeoning democracy. More than two years after the invasion, in March of 1997, the situation with regard to the judiciary system “remained critical,” revealing an absolute lack of progress in the development of the necessary infrastructure.\textsuperscript{87} Any security or protection of human rights enjoyed by the Haitians as a consequence of the invasion remained incredibly fragile. However successful from a military standpoint, Operation Uphold Democracy failed to deliver its promises. As we have seen, without basic freedoms of person, rule of law, and the protection of a functioning judicial system, successful democracy cannot be realized.

The humanitarian and developmental concerns in Haiti, despite the United States’ declarations that Haiti had achieved democracy, were just as pertinent as its problems with security and judicial reform, and equally as detrimental to the creation of a lasting and legitimate government. As established previously, the lack of economic development in Haiti largely contributed to its previous inability to develop democracy, thus its economic state in wake of the invasion must be examined. Despite the economic sanctions being lifted in light of Aristide’s return, Haiti’s slow economic recovery continued to cripple its people, further limiting the growth of democracy in the state. For example, before the embargoes, the number of people employed in the assembly sector was estimated at 65,000 people, and neared zero in 1994.

However, by 1997, this number had only rebounded to 18,000. Additionally, the financial commitment of international allies to Haiti’s democratic development and its corresponding neoliberal economic agenda did not do much to alleviate the rampant poverty that remained in the state for years to come, as noted in a UN Security Council report in June of 1996, which observed a “growing demand for social services and infrastructure, such as medical and educational facilities, roads, electricity, and improved living conditions.” In the years after the invasion, and still to this day, Haiti’s economic situation can be characterized by low growth, high unemployment, and an impoverished population. By March of 1997, the decreasing international commitment to support only served to further the violence and unrest that were fuelled by “persistent high levels of unemployment, a rising cost of living, impatience at the slow pace of change, and the attempts made by certain sectors to profit politically from growing popular frustrations and discontent.” Without the proper support for police and judicial institutional projects, crimes against humanity grew while the Haitian economy remained stagnant. The economy simply could not support the efforts to sustain a democratic government.

Although the 1995 elections in Haiti acted as the most important piece in the Clinton administration’s plans for democratizing the island nation, they were carried out in a way that limited citizenship association and informed participation, both necessary for a successful and functional government. In the municipal and legislative elections that were held in the summer of 1995, a million electoral cards went missing, the Provisional Electoral Council confirmed the existence of fraud in the voter registration process, and because the elections were hastily put in place before the citizens could be properly educated about their new government, there was a

88 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 139
low voter turnout of less than 20 percent.\(^9^1\) Thus, a scheduled election does not necessarily guarantee democratic conduct or participation. Additionally, in the following Presidential election in December 1995, President Préval received an even lower voter turnout of only 15 percent. This was because the election occurred when Aristide was at peak popularity in Haiti. The low turnout reflected the Haitian people’s aversion to electing a new president (despite Haiti’s constitutionally mandated five-year presidential terms) when they believed Aristide should be able to serve an additional three years in office to account for the amount of time the Cédras regime had taken from him.\(^9^2\) Although a UN report claimed “the electoral process, which culminated with the election of President Préval on December 17 1995, has provided Haiti with newly elected democratic institutions,” it seems clear that labeling Haiti a true democracy was for the benefit of Clinton’s foreign policy legacy.\(^9^3\) Préval was a choice that did not represent any political change, as he was also from Aristide’s Lavalas party, but significantly less popular than his counterpart. Focusing on the surface indications of democracy, the election of Aristide and subsequent transition of power to President Préval in 1996 signified to the Clinton administration, and the larger community, that democracy had arrived in the island nation. According to a popular news source in Haiti, however, democracy was “on course without the people.”\(^9^4\) Democracy requires much more than two elections. Operation Uphold Democracy failed to support the aspects of a democratic government that extended beyond an elected President and Parliament.

When the final agreed-upon round of municipal and Parliamentary elections was held in the spring of 1997, less than 10 percent of the electorate voted. To make matters worse, President

\(^9^1\) Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” 182.
\(^9^2\) Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 135.
\(^9^4\) “La Démocratie en Cours, Sans le Peuple” Le Nouveliste 7 April 1997
Préval’s Prime Minister, Rosny Smarth, faced widespread criticism due to his neo-liberal economic policies, and resigned on June 9 1997, leaving Haiti without a functioning Parliament for the next two years. Upon Smarth’s departure however, due to promises of a limited time commitment in Haiti, the UN mandate and all US involvement in the country had ceased. The United States had abandoned Haiti without ensuring sustained freedoms of expression and person, civil society’s ability to participate politically, control of force, strong political leadership, security, legitimacy, and stability, or rule of law. All this, while fully acknowledging that, “the political crisis continues unresolved.” Finally, in January of 1999, five years after Clinton had declared democracy in Haiti, President Préval dissolved Parliament and appointed his own Prime Minister, effectively running the country by dictatorial decree. Clearly, democracy had ceased to function in Haiti, along with its Constitution. Without a lasting and legitimate constitution, there can be no democracy.

Operation Uphold Democracy did not succeed. Despite efforts to conduct elections, create a police force, and restructure the economy, it is evident that, due to a misunderstanding of the requirements of democracy and its necessary institutions, an insufficient time commitment, and a failure to acknowledge the existing structural obstacles to democracy in the island nation, the United States failed to successfully democratize Haiti. As we shall see in the next chapter, ten years later, George W. Bush and his neoliberal, neoconservative administration neglected these past lessons during the Iraq War and subsequent democratization efforts, ultimately leaving the country in worse condition than when the United States invaded.

97 Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” 190
III. IRAQ

On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush coined the term “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address, an excerpt of which is reproduced below:

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction.

We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack.

And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.  

A little over a year later, in March of 2003, the Bush administration invaded Iraq on the basis of protecting the United States from Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), preemptively guarding against the state’s connection to the terrorist group Al Qaeda, and for the promotion of democracy in the Middle East. When it became clear that there were no WMDs to be found, and no evidence of the Iraq’s connection to Al Qaeda, the only remaining justification for the Iraq War was the claim that the United States could bring democracy to Iraq and liberate its people from years of brutal, autocratic rule. Unfortunately, due to an inadequate

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understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a misguided implementation strategy, and a total failure to sufficiently support the hastily constructed democratic institutions in the state, the United States again failed to successfully democratize a foreign country.

The analysis of the Iraq case will continue in a similar manner to that of the Haiti case, focusing primarily on the United States’ democratization efforts in Iraq as opposed to its war efforts and strategy from 2003-2011. Thus, the sections comprising this chapter will proceed guided by the structure laid out in chapter one according to our democracy scholars. First, I will present and analyze Iraq’s political, social, and economic conditions prior to invasion as they relate to the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy. Second, I will examine the United States’ actions in the years leading up to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the involvement of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), analyzing the Obstacles to Democracy that the Bush administration both created and faced in light of the conditions in Iraq. Finally, I will provide an analysis of the invasion and CPA’s aftermath, evaluating Iraq’s fledgling “democracy” against the Universal Characteristics of Democracy previously identified by our democratization scholars. This case will demonstrate that while the Bush administration removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities for democratic elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context coupled with the United States’ military destruction of the existing institutions only lead to an unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.

**Conditions in Iraq Prior to Invasion**

By examining Iraq’s history from its artificial and external inception in 1920 after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, it can be seen that unfortunately, due to its harsh autocratic rule and
politicized sectarian conflict, the state did not possess many of the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy before the United States’ attempts at democratization. Politically, Iraq has not been successful in developing a democratic culture, nor had its autocratic governments inspired trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Socially, Iraq is divided along ethno-religious lines, making it nearly impossible for civil society organizations that foster democracy to bridge sectarian divides. It is a country with a heterogeneous society, which scholars such as Dahl and Huntington argue impedes the development of democracy.

Economically, while Iraq was eventually able to develop a functioning market economy due to its vast oil resources, the sanctions placed upon it following the Gulf War in 1991 created irreparable damage to the state’s institutions and its ability to provide basic human necessities to its people. If we recall, both Huntington and Lipset contend that a state’s economic levels are consequential in its development of democracy. As we have seen, the more internal characteristics associated with democracy a state lacks (democratic political culture, vibrant civil society, and a stable economy, for example) the more difficult it will be for the state in question to develop democracy. Iraq is no exception to this long-standing pattern.

Iraq is an artificially constructed state, and like Haiti, its political past can be characterized as mostly autocratic, oppressive, and violent. The British, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, drew its borders arbitrarily in 1920. With the creation of the Iraqi state, the British appointed the Hashemite Faisal bin Hussein as the new King, starting the long tradition of the British appointing almost exclusively Sunni Arab elite to government and ministry positions. 99 While there was an early demand for independence during the Great Iraqi Revolution (May—November, 1920), the British did not grant independence to Iraq until 1932.

For the next 20 years, the monarchy struggled, facing stagnant per capita income and human development due to Britain’s continued control of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Despite the deplorable levels of poverty within the country, Iraq received little in exchange for its most precious resource for the first two decades after its inception until the 1950s when oil revenues increased.\textsuperscript{100} According to a World Bank report from 1952, despite being rich in oil and natural resources, most of Iraq was impoverished, with an extremely low standard of living and considerable unemployment plaguing the state. The report assessed that almost 90 percent of the population was illiterate, and subject to diseases such as malaria, hookworm, and bilharzia as Iraq’s housing and sanitation for the most part were primitive. Additionally, much of the available water was wasted owing to a lack of storage and regulation, contributing to the poor agricultural output.\textsuperscript{101} In short: Iraq was failing.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that in 1958, in response to the dire state of things in Iraq, the monarchy was deposed in a violent military coup led by General Abed al-Karim Qasim and Abdul Salam Arif in what is now known as the July 14\textsuperscript{th} revolution. Qasim and his Free Officers established Iraq as a republic, intending to completely overhaul society through social, legislative, and economic reform.\textsuperscript{102} Although important efforts were made at developing infrastructure, such as the construction of roads, dams, and bridges, in addition to creation of an educated middle class, this revolution marked the beginning of a 45-year period of autocratic rule, which was naturally detrimental to Iraq’s strength of civil society, its political culture, and the government’s levels of legitimacy. The few trappings of democracy that accompanied the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Al-Ali, \textit{The Struggle for Iraq’s Future}, p. 25
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revolution gradually slipped away over the next decade as various civilian and military groups vied for control of the state through regional and ethnic revolts, brutal suppressions, and the banning or purging of political parties all together.\textsuperscript{103} With this oppression of civil society and the subsequent flattening of any political opposition, Iraq’s organic chance at democracy was never realized. It then follows that Iraqis failed to develop any sense of democratic political belief or culture. Iraq’s absence of democratic history thus substantially diminished its prospects for democratization.

Another exhibit of instability and violence within Iraq, and the catalyst for Saddam Hussein’s eventual rise to power, was the Baath party’s conquest of the government in July of 1968. The Iraqi Baath party was first established in Syria in the 1940s, only forming an Iraqi branch in 1952. Traditionally, its platform was built on Pan-Arab ideology, favoring unity for the Arab people, socialism, and the freedom for Iraq to determine its own path.\textsuperscript{104} The Baath party was not always a Sunni-dominated organization: it still included 54 percent Shia membership from 1952 to 1963, but from 1963 to 1970, that number was reduced to 6 percent.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, the party became known for its exclusion from power on the basis of ethno-religious background and its strong contempt for democracy, exhibited by the Baathists’ assassinations of leading members of the Iraqi government, their series of executions of rival dissenters in a reign of terror, and their elimination of all forms of opposition.\textsuperscript{106} All told, the new Baathist party arrested, tortured, and executed an estimated 3,000 members of the Iraqi Communist Party in an attempt to terrify the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{103} Moon, “Long Time Coming,” p. 137
\bibitem{104} Al-Ali, \textit{The Struggle for Iraq’s Future}, p. 30
\bibitem{106} Moon, “Long Time Coming” p. 140
\end{thebibliography}
Iraqi people into subservience. Finally, when General Saddam Hussein rose to power in 1979, a member of the Baath party, the government’s system of oppression only became worse.

It is especially important to examine Hussein’s regime, as his was the regime that preceded the United States’ invasion in 2003, and subsequent attempt at democratization. With his presidency, Iraq transitioned from an autocratic state to a personal cult with a despotic regime that was dependent on Saddam Hussein and his close family members and cohorts. Thus, what little pluralism and balance that remained in the highest echelons of Iraqi government completely disappeared. Elevated to General of the Iraqi Armed Forces in 1976, Saddam became the de facto leader of Iraq years before his official presidency in 1979, during which time he consolidated his power over the government and the Baath party. The state became increasingly centered on Saddam as he eliminated rivals brutally: this included the execution of key members of the governing council within days of his inauguration, imprisonment of ministry officials, and mass executions of Communist and Dawa Party activists. This was done in an attempt to crush any kind of opposition to Saddam, completely eliminating any possibility for civil society organization or a democratic political culture.

Overall, Saddam’s rule was typified by extreme levels of spying, intimidation, oppression, and torture carried out by the Jihaz al-Amn al-Khaass (The Special Security Organization). The secret police, known as the Mukhabarat, encouraged civilians to denounce family members, friends, or anyone who was close to them who might be deemed a threat to Saddam’s rule. It was essentially forbidden to question any of Saddam’s inhumane actions. These policies were financed by Iraq’s increasing oil wealth, which, however profitable, was

107 Ibid.
109 Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, p. 33
110 Ibid.
ultimately unsustainable as the power was concentrated largely in the hands of a single individual.\textsuperscript{111} Despite the economy’s growth in the 1970s, oil revenues consolidated the hegemony of the political elite by providing it with the necessary financial resources to strengthen its agenda.\textsuperscript{112} Essentially, the wealth Iraq collected in the 1970s was unavailable to the majority of its population. Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq war itself (1980-1988), Saddam Hussein’s policies caused over 100,000 people to be killed within his own state, and over a million people to be displaced.\textsuperscript{113} Two years later, Iraq faced yet another armed conflict when Saddam invaded Kuwait and the United States responded. The ensuing Gulf War, which lasted until 1991, resulted in further consequences for the Iraqi people. To illustrate this point, it is estimated that in the uprising within Iraq following the Gulf War, between 20,000 and 100,000 civilians died, in addition to the 15,000 to 30,000 Kurds who died in refugee camps.\textsuperscript{114} For almost a quarter century, an entire generation in Iraq knew nothing but harsh autocratic rule that crushed civil society, worsened economic prospects, and decreased legitimacy of government as well as any chance at organically fostering a democratic political culture.

Equally as important as Iraq’s political history is Iraq’s ethno-religious sectarian conflict, as Iraq has always been a religiously and ethnically divided country. In 1932, the year of its independence, its population was made up of 21 percent Sunni Arabs, 14 percent Sunni Kurds, 53 percent Shia Arabs, 5 percent non-Muslim Arabs, and the final 6 percent composed of other religious groups.\textsuperscript{115} These three main sects—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Kurds—create the lines upon which Iraq is divided. King Faisal even proclaimed in 1932: “I have to say that it

\textsuperscript{111} Al-Ali, \textit{The Struggle for Iraq’s Future.} p. 34
\textsuperscript{112} Philippe Le Billon. "Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq." \textit{Third World Quarterly} 26, no. 4/5 (2005): 691.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 36.
\textsuperscript{115} Wimmer, "Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq." p. 120.
is my belief that there is no Iraqi people inside Iraq. There are only diverse groups with no national sentiments.”

While it is true that for the majority of the time, Sunnis and Shia live side by side without fighting, their sectarian identities always played a role in politics, as Parliamentary lines followed ethno-religious preference. Saddam enforced these sectarian divisions with horrific levels of violence, hardening the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish identities and flattening any kind of resistance within the country. With a Sunni minority in a position of power within an oppressive government for almost 100 years, the Shia and Kurdish communities experienced increasing levels of antagonism (especially from Saddam’s regime) to the already-existing sectarian tension. Iraq’s neighbors have also intensified the conflict, using the ethnic and religious divides to advance their own agendas. Iraq is thus largely held together by its artificial borders as it has never been ethnically, religiously, or culturally homogenous, another characteristic associated with democracy. While the United States itself is an exception to Dahl’s observation that democracies will develop more easily in homogenous countries, Iraq—in addition to its sectarian divides—faces further obstacles to democracy, such as its lack of democratic experience and its illegitimate government, that all together inhibit its ability to successfully democratize.

Today, the majority of the Kurdish population in Iraq resides in the state’s three most northern provinces, a region which is unofficially regarded as Kurdistan. In fact, when Iraq was first created, the Kurds sought autonomy on educational, linguistic, cultural, and other matters, but were largely ignored for decades. The Kurds wished for their own country, and felt slighted by being labeled a minority in the predominantly Arab Iraq. Indeed, after a decade of

118 Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, 17
violent conflict in the 1960s, on March 28 1970 the Kurds were acknowledged as a political party with a Constitutional amendment that would recognize the Kurdish population as one of the main components of the Iraqi nation and would allow for the Kurdish language to be recognized as an official language alongside Arabic.\footnote{Ibid.} Four years later, in 1974, the Kurds were extended regional autonomous privileges by Baghdad, although it remained clear that all legislation emanating from the region had to exist “within the state’s general policy,” thus placing the Kurds in a position of subservience to the Arab population in Iraq.\footnote{Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq’s Future*, 19} This decision, while initially beneficial for the Kurds, established the principle of decentralization in Iraq that would later be reflected in the United States’ construction of government, and eventually contribute to the failure of Bush’s democratization experiment in the Middle East. It is important to note here that this would not be a reflection of Lijphart’s Consociational Democracy, as the Kurds did not have true control over their own domestic issues. Additionally, the ethno-religious groups in Iraq do not all face a single external threat, and thus the political elites are not compelled to come together in a cartel to govern the state together. With the rise of Saddam’s Baathist party in 1974, the Sunni minority again imposed a brutal authoritarian regime upon Kurdish and Shia populations.\footnote{James Kurth, "Ignoring History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World." *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 49, no. 2 (04, 2005): 305-322}

Tensions were only exacerbated throughout Iraq due to the devastation of the Iran-Iraq war, extending from 1980 until 1988, and the Gulf War, lasting from 1990 to 1991. Saddam Hussein initiated the Iran-Iraq war as an attempt to re-assert dominance over border territories between the two states: in particular, the debate over the sovereignty of the Shatt al-‘Arab, a river formed at the meeting of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that was historically the border between
Iran and Iraq. While the United States initially supported Iraq during the war, its international standing was damaged when Saddam used chemical weapons on Iraqi-Kurdish civilians, the majority of whom supported Iran in the war. Kurdistan was thus devastated during the Iran-Iraq war with massive killings at the hands of the Saddam Hussein regime, as exemplified by the attack on Halabjah in March 1988, where approximately 5,000 Kurdish civilians were killed.\(^\text{122}\) Even though Kurdistan was given protection after the Gulf War with a U.S.-mandated no-fly zone under Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the ethnic violence and brutalization of the Kurds at the hands of the Baathists, which lasted for years, prevented Kurdistan from fully transitioning to a semi-autonomous state. The Gulf War also gave rise to obscene violence against the Shia Arabs in Iraq, who were encouraged by the United States to rise up against Saddam’s dictatorship, but when they did they were met with subsequent repression and violence.\(^\text{123}\) Iraq’s lack of ethnic, cultural, or religious homogeneity, while only one aspect under consideration in its struggle for democracy, is certainly an important factor. If we recall, democracy scholars argue that a heterogeneous society is characteristically less likely to develop democracy. This fact, coupled with Saddam’s efforts to destroy any kind of civil society organizations that were seen as a danger to his regime, or representative of intersectional communities within Iraq, makes it that much more difficult for the state to develop or maintain any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.\(^\text{124}\)

As we have discussed, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War aggravated the already-existing sectarian divides within Iraq, creating an extremely polarized society upon which the United States attempted to develop democracy. However, these two wars, with the addition of

\(^\text{123}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{124}\) Saddam only allowed Mosques and tribal associations to continue during his regime as he sought to manipulate these to his advantage.
the resulting economic sanctions, also devastated Iraq’s economy, another important indicator associated with democratization. Under Saddam’s rule, economic data were considered state secrets, thus much of the reliable data for the era was eliminated. It is estimated, however, that before the Gulf War, oil accounted for more than 60 percent of the country’s GDP (but only employs 2-3 percent of the labor force) and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings. The CIA’s economic intelligence unit estimates that Iraq’s GDP stood at roughly $38 billion in 1989 due to the state’s rapidly growing oil wealth since its nationalization of oil in 1972.\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, unlike most Gulf States, Iraq has considerable agricultural potential: about 12 percent of its land is arable, of which 4 percent is irrigated. Another 9 percent is suitable for grazing, and 3 percent is forested.\textsuperscript{126} This agricultural potential was not realized during Saddam’s regime, however, as most economic efforts were focused on the production of oil, as evidenced by the following excerpt from the 2004 Economic Intelligence Unit:

Under the Ba’ath party, activity in the food and agriculture sectors of the economy continued to decline. Government expenditures on agriculture dropped from 18 percent of total government expenditures in 1976 to less than 10 percent in 1980 and continued to decline during the Iran-Iraq war. Under Saddam, as a result of drought, lack of inputs, poor methods and weak administration, Iraq was unable to achieve agricultural production levels near its potential. Following the first Gulf war, the irrigation systems fell into disrepair and much of the irrigated cropland in central and southern Iraq was badly damaged by salinization. Rapid population growth during the past three decades, coupled with limited arable land and an overall stagnation in agricultural production has steadily increased Iraq’s dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs.\textsuperscript{127}

Unlike Haiti, due to its natural resources, Iraq could have had the economic development levels that Lipset and Huntington say are required for a democracy. Instead, however, its economic potential was undermined by Saddam’s rule. It can thus be seen that Iraq was struggling

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
economically even before the United Nations imposed the harsh sanctions on the state in an effort to punish Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait.

In August of 1990, the UN Security Council imposed the most comprehensive and restricting sanctions regime ever devised (to date) in order to coerce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. After the war ended, however, these sanctions remained in place until 2003, and were only modified in 1996 with the United Nation’s Oil for Food program (UNOFF). The initial sanctions, instituted by UN Security Council Resolution 687, mandated that Iraq could not import or export anything for any reason, reducing the country to beggar status while leaving its senior leadership virtually unscathed, as it was discovered that Saddam pocketed at least $1.8 billion at the expense of Iraqis suffering under the UN sanctions.\(^{128}\) Iraqis were hungry and sick as public sector salaries were cut to around $2 per month, poverty rates grew, and basic medicines ceased to be available. Without oil export revenues, the Iraqi government could not allocate any funds to education, transportation, housing, or infrastructure for over a decade.\(^ {129}\) Although Iraq’s economic prowess early on would suggest high levels of urbanization and education (\textit{Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy}), these factors were marred and stunted by these devastating economic sanctions, further inhibiting democracy.

Dennis Halliday, a former UN humanitarian coordinator placed in Iraq to monitor the Oil for Food program, contended that the economic sanctions constituted “genocide” due to their responsibility for the deaths of thousands each month in Iraq, and their exposure of millions of people to starvation or malnutrition, and sickness.\(^ {130}\) As the UN Security Council would not allow oil revenues to be spent on the repair of infrastructure, there was no way for Iraq to

\(^{128}\) Al-Alì, \textit{The Struggle for Iraq’s Future}, p. 38.

\(^{129}\) Ibid.

adequately repair water, power, or sewage systems critical in the battle to save lives of infants and children. Funding was also not available for the reequipping of hospitals. With these factors in mind, Halliday argues: “with or without original intent, the impact of economic sanctions constitutes genocide.”

Thus, the Iraqi state inherited by the US-led occupation force in 2003 had already been dramatically weakened by the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the corresponding economic sanctions, the ensuing delegitimization of government, and finally the invasion itself. As argued by our democracy scholars, this economic failure (contributing to low levels of education and urbanization) again inhibits and sometimes even prevents democratization. It is clear that in the years leading up to the 2003 invasion, Iraq encompassed characteristics that are extremely unfavorable to democracy: insurgency, illegitimacy of government, violence, ethnic rivalry, economic failure and harsh autocratic rule. Even before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the state possessed structural obstacles to democratization that prevented it from developing any Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy.


The Bush administration both created and faced many of the Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization in its planning and implementation of liberal democracy in Iraq. These obstacles resulted from Bush’s failure to view Iraq as distinct and unique, separate from his desires for a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Middle East. His administration did not take into account Iraq’s political, ethno-religious, and economic conditions prior to the invasion.

131 Halliday, “The Deadly and Illegal Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the People of Iraq,” 232. It must be noted that Halliday’s use of the term “genocide” in his argument was highly controversial as his description of the situation in Iraq did not match the United Nation’s universally accepted definition of genocide.

Additionally, the planners viewed the removal of Saddam as the equivalent to the creation of democracy in Iraq, forgetting that Iraq has had a total lack of democratic experience, or any previous political commitment to democratic values. This section will analyze the *Obstacles to Democracy* with the structure and characteristics identified in chapter one, and previously applied to Haiti. As we will see, the CPA’s actions in Iraq after the initial invasion only exacerbated the divides within society, failed to alleviate poverty in the provinces outside of Baghdad, and dramatically increased levels of violence in the state due to the insurgency as a reaction to the United States’ actions; all obstacles to democratization according to scholars such as Dahl, Huntington, Zakaria, and Whitehead. Most importantly, the United States again viewed elections as the final step in a militarized democratization effort, failing to design a mission with the necessary time and scope for successful democratization, and thus leading to a collapse of a hastily and poorly constructed “democratic” government in Iraq.

*Obstacles to Democracy: Planning for Iraq*

It would be impossible to analyze the United States’ attempted democratization of Iraq without examining President Bush’s stated reasons for the intervention. While it is widely acknowledged that the Bush administration’s economic concerns over oil, and its security concerns regarding terrorism were key motivators for invading Iraq in 2003, what is more relevant to this thesis is the Bush administration’s belief that exporting democracy to Iraq would not only be easy, but that it would also lead to a larger wave of freedom throughout the Middle East. In the years and months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration pivoted from a strategy of containment (of Iraq) to a strategy of preemption in the Middle East. Up until 2003, the United States had been content to contain Saddam Hussein with multilateral economic
sanctions put in place by the UN. However, this strategy was replaced with the Bush Doctrine in light of the events of 9/11, which favored preemptive strikes against known enemies, unilateral action, military preeminence, and the promotion of democratic regime change.\textsuperscript{133}

9/11 provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to enact its agenda, bolstered by the neoconservative security argument for going to war in Iraq that had been brewing since the 1990s. The neoconservative movement’s central interest was America’s role in global security, with a unified goal for the U.S. to eliminate threats to the security of America and its allies. They were also influenced by the Wilsonian tradition of making the world safe for democracy.\textsuperscript{134} After the collapse of the Soviet Union, at the start of what many thought to be a “new world order,” Francis Fukuyama’s claim that the triumph of Western liberal democracy signified the “end of history” was a harbinger of later, rather ethnocentric arguments that the exporting of Western ideals (democracy and capitalism) would serve the larger interests of humanity.\textsuperscript{135}

A full decade before the plans were drawn to invade Iraq, this theme of exporting Western liberal democracy can be seen in Paul Wolfowitz, “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay Khalid’s “Defense Planning Guidance” document, as requested by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in 1992. Wolfowitz would go on to become Donald Rumsfeld’s Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2001, with Libby serving as Cheney’s chief of staff. The document advocates for the United States to show the leadership necessary to establish and protect this new world order, to address sources of regional conflict and instability, to promote democracy and free markets globally, and to retain “preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle

\textsuperscript{133} George W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” September 17, 2002
\textsuperscript{135} Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History” \textit{The National Interest} Summer 1989
international relations.” Emphasized primarily in the list of U.S. interests is the protection of Persian Gulf Oil, connecting Iraq to these ideas of exporting democracy to protect U.S. interests. This document was later incorporated into the Project for the New American Century, and then brought back into the administration when they returned as policy makers under George W. Bush, helping to construct his National Security Strategy of 2002. Wolfowitz himself called for the overthrow of Saddam as early as November of 1997, stating that the U.S. should not “be afraid to go after targets that constitute the support of Saddam’s regime” with a “willingness to act unilaterally...because the international consensus is weak.” Finally, in early 2000, Condoleezza Rice—Bush’s National Security Advisor at the time of the invasion—outlined a post-Cold War foreign policy that argued above all, “the next president must be comfortable with America’s special role as the world’s leader,” words that anticipated Bush’s freedom agenda in the coming years. This confidence in the United States' ideals would only increase during Bush’s presidency, where he leveraged the emotional devastation from 9/11 to further his administration’s interests to democratize Iraq in what he and his advisors believed would be the first step in democratizing the Middle East.

The Bush administration’s insistence that Iraq was a threat to world peace made Saddam Hussein the focal point around which the neoconservatives could reorganize world politics through the construction of a war that had little support globally to militarily democratize Iraq. Scholars such as David Beetham and Fareed Zakaria, who are referenced in the literature review, argue that even the concept of militarized democratization itself is an obstacle to democracy, as it

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138 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 2000
undermines the very nature of democracy and its concepts of freedom and self-determination.\textsuperscript{139} The Bush administration propagated the view that pro-western democracy can be created, manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries—even when there seems to be little evidence for its success in any historical or structural sense. This confidence is shown again and again in the planning and implementation of the Iraq War, thus reinforcing the concept of militarized democracy, which as we know, is actually a known obstacle to democracy.

The infamous Downing Street Memo, written a little under a year before the invasion of Iraq, and months before the United States would ask the UN Security Council to authorize renewed weapons inspections, noted “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”\textsuperscript{140} The United States, from the planning to the execution of the invasion, lacked the legitimacy needed to successfully democratize Iraq. According to the UN (Chapter VII of the UN Charter), the desire for regime change is not a legal basis for military action. Furthermore, the United States could not claim self-defense: Iraq was not threatening its neighbors, nor was its military capability any greater than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran.\textsuperscript{141} Most importantly, Bush failed to receive authorization for the use of force from the UN Security Council. One month later, however, Cheney confidently announced, “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us… With our help a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited

\textsuperscript{140} “The Downing Street Memo,” July 23, 2002.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
potential for a peaceful, prosperous future.”

In October of the same year, the Bush administration received the proper authorization from Congress for the use of force in Iraq.

Regardless of the lack of multilateral approval, the only thing that mattered in this new world order was U.S. military power and the ability to use it preemptively. By the time President Bush announced the beginning of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in March of 2003, Saddam Hussein and his WMD’s had become the public justification for unilateral, militarized democratization. In his announcement to the world concerning the start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” President Bush assured his viewers that “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” Whether or not this is actually true, it is important to note the administration’s connections to oil companies such as Chevron and Halliburton, which accompanied the administration’s belief that bringing democracy and free markets to Iraq would be beneficial to America’s economy and security. Despite the Bush administration’s confidence that democracy could easily be exported to Iraq, the plans for its democratization never considered Iraq’s unique social, political, or economic contexts, or the fact that Iraq had a distinct absence of democratic experience, a characteristic that scholars argue is a key obstacle to democracy. President Bush and his administration simply assumed that with the removal of Saddam, the U.S. military would be seen as liberators, evidenced by Vice President Cheney, who when asked to discuss the invasion, bluntly responded: “My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”

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144 Rice served 10 years on the Chevron board and resigned in early 2001, President Bush and his family have been running oil companies since 1950, and Vice President Cheney spent the latter half of the 1990s as the CEO of Halliburton.
Iraq’s only obstacle to democracy, thus ignoring other important *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* in Iraq itself, such as its absence of democratic experience, its divided society, its poverty, and its lack of stability.

Bush’s desire to democratize Iraq was misguided from the start: a woeful lack of historical understanding combined with ideas of Western superiority led his administration to believe that it could waltz into Iraq, democratize the state for the benefit of the United States, and wrap things up before it got too messy. There is clearly a gap between the Bush administration’s declared policies—wrapped in moral discourse—and the realities of its proposed actions.\textsuperscript{146} The Bush administration propagated the view that pro-Western democracy can be created, manufactured, and shipped off to foreign countries, even when there seems to be little evidence for its success in any historical or structural sense when considering Iraq itself.

*Obstacles to Democracy: The Actions of the CPA (March 2003—June 2004)*

In order to go about democratizing Iraq, the Pentagon established the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) on January 20, 2003, two months before Bush sent troops into Iraq. OHRA reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and was headed by Ret. Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, who had helped coordinate relief operations in northern Iraq after the first Gulf War. However, Garner’s initial desire to rely on local Iraqis and his refusal to abolish the Baath party led to the Defense Department dissolving OHRA on April 21 2003.\textsuperscript{147} OHRA was then replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), lead by L. Paul Bremer, who served from May 11 2003 to June 28 2004, the date when the U.S. occupying


forces restored limited sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government. Douglas Feith, the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Head of the Office of Special Plans, expected that the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi government would be easy—lasting no more ninety days—since 
grateful Iraqis would greet the Americans as liberators. Feith’s optimism was also shared by 
President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security 
Advisor Rice.\textsuperscript{148} This clearly signifies an insufficient time commitment to the growth of 
democratic institutions, a characteristics that Whitehead argues is one of our \textit{Obstacles to} 
\textit{Democracy and Democratization}. In actuality the CPA’s occupation lasted over a year, and the 
United States left Iraq well before it had accomplished the goals that it had put forth. As revealed 
in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feith did not want to waste time 
“theorizing” what to do, as he intended the CPA to be an “expeditionary” office relying on 
practical work.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, rather than a carefully thought out developmental project to achieve 
lasting democratic institutions, the CPA’s construction presented a lack of nuanced 
understanding of democracy and its requirements from the very start.

As we now know, due to a series of mistaken assumptions, almost everything in Iraq 
post-invasion had to be reconstructed: army and police, governmental ministries, banking and 
education systems, and basic infrastructure for delivering and generating electricity and water, 
handling sewage, and producing and delivering oil.\textsuperscript{150} The United States did not have sufficient 
plans in place for rebuilding Iraq post-invasion: thus, hopes for organizing a pro-U.S. liberal 
democracy and privatizing Iraq’s economy collapsed.

\textsuperscript{149} Douglas J. Feith, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003 
\textsuperscript{150} Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Sayej, \textit{The Iraq Papers}, 165.
Paul Bremer’s actions leading the CPA in his first few months in Baghdad only served to further damage the state, dividing Iraq’s society, creating violence that lead to the insurgency against the U.S. military, and undermining the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government by unilaterally controlling the key executive, judicial, and legislative decisions made early on. In short: with its poor planning, the United States helped to create significant *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* in Iraq rather than cultivating an environment conducive to democratization. In Orders 1 and 2, issued on May 16 and May 23 of 2003, respectively, Bremer gutted the governmental and military institutions that existed in Iraq, leaving behind no institutional memory and little stability or legitimacy (obstacles to democracy). These orders were made against the judgment of Jay Garner, the senior CIA officer in Iraq, and against the advice of military planners. Additionally, Bremer acted without consultation with Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers, Vice Chair Peter Pace, General McKiernan, CIA Director George Tenet, or Intelligence Community lead for the Middle East Paul Pillar.\(^\text{151}\) Guided by the notion that the removal of all things related to Saddam Hussein’s regime would end Iraq’s problems, Bremer’s initial policies politically cleansed the state.\(^\text{152}\) His intentions are made clear in the infamous CPA Orders 1 and 2, which dissolved and dismantled the Iraqi state, removing everything and everyone associated with the Baath Party.\(^\text{153}\) This decision effectively eliminated the leadership and top technical capacity for universities, hospitals, transportation, electricity, and communications, weakening the existing infrastructure and institutions within the state, demonstrating again how the United States helped to create *Obstacles to Democracy* within Iraq.

\(^{151}\) Pfiffner, "US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army." 85
\(^{153}\) Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, May 16 2003.
While Bremer claimed that the order would only affect 20,000 people, the total amounted to more than 100,000, including approximately 40,000 schoolteachers who had joined the Baath party only to keep their jobs.\textsuperscript{154} The second order was even more devastating, as the members of the security forces in Iraq amounted to over 385,000, all of whom were now also jobless and angry. The following is a list of the “Dissolved Entities” from CPA Order 2:\textsuperscript{155}

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<th>Entity</th>
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<td>The Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>The Iraqi Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>The National Security Bureau</td>
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<td>The Directorate of National Security</td>
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<td>The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defense Force, and other regular military services</td>
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Not only did these orders alienate hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who were now jobless, but they also created a security vacuum, which allowed for the development of a violent insurgency—characteristics that our scholars have identified as \textit{Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization}. Clearly, the massive extent to which Bremer cleansed the Iraqi state reveals a failure to preserve any existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, severely reducing Iraq’s

\textsuperscript{154} Pfiffner, "US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army." 80

\textsuperscript{155} Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, May 23 2003.
chances at democratization.\textsuperscript{156} What is so tragic about these first two orders is that under Garner’s guidance, they were never supposed to occur. According to Colin Powell, a very different plan had been approved previously at the highest level:

When we went in, we had a plan, which the President approved. We would not break up and disband the Iraqi army. We would use the reconstituted army with purged leadership to help us secure and maintain order throughout the country. We would dissolve the Baath party, the ruling political party, but we would not throw every party member out on the street.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition to this, Bremer’s actions worsened Iraq’s economic situation and made clear that the United States was not interested in including the views of the Sunni minority because it was tainted with the memory of the Baath Party. In his memoirs, Bremer reaffirmed his belief that Iraq’s democratization process was analogous to the democratization and reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan post-WWII, stating “we had to build a success story here that, like Germany and Japan, still looked good after fifty years,” again failing to realize that Iraq is unique in its historical context.\textsuperscript{158} Most people in Iraq thus saw the war as an occupation rather than a liberation, and rightfully so: by October 2003, a poll was conducted in Baghdad that revealed only 4.6 percent of the population saw the United States as liberators or peace keepers.\textsuperscript{159} Again, we see that the Bush administration had little understanding of the political and historical realities that dominated the region.

The CPA’s next step was to draft a constitution, and Paul Bremer’s first impulse was to appoint a drafting committee that would write the document and organize a government friendly


\textsuperscript{157} Colin Powell, \textit{It Worked For Me: in life and leadership}, (Harper, New York, 2012), 162.


\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
to the United States. The Iraqis, however, would not allow the United States to completely co-opt the democratization process. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior cleric in Shia Islam, issued a Fatwa in June of 2003 stating that only elected experts should be involved in composing the new constitution. The Fatwa strongly asserted that, “there must be a general election so that every Iraqi citizen—who is eligible to vote—can choose someone to represent him in a foundational Constitutional preparation assembly.”

This moment signified a rare instance in the history of the CPA where Bremer chose to change course: on July 13th of the same year, the CPA announced a 25 member Iraq Governing Council (IGC), whose purpose would be to serve as the provisional government. The Council was charged with drafting a temporary constitution that would organize elections for a national assembly, write a permanent constitution, and establish a sovereign government. However, the 25 members promoted to the IGC were apportioned according to a strict ethnic and religious groupings, effectively forcing the council to function based on identity politics, which only served to increase sectarian tensions throughout the drafting process of the constitution.

The way the CPA organized its democratization efforts thus led to a radicalization of ethno-nationalist parties and an upward spiraling of their demands. In addition to the existing sectarian tensions in Iraq, the United States was complicit in further dividing Iraq’s society, thus helping to create identifiable obstacles to democracy within the state.

Bremer approached the rest of the CPA’s timeline with a set of seven steps that would, he claimed, ultimately lead to sovereignty. The first step, as discussed previously, was the creation of the IGC. Reproduced below is Bremer’s list of steps:

161 Al-Ali, *The Struggle for Iraq’s Future*, 77
2. Appointing a preparatory committee to devise a way to write a constitution.
3. Appointing ministers who serve at the pleasure of the Governing Council with the purpose of setting policy.
4. Writing Iraq’s new constitution.
5. Popular ratification of the constitution.
6. Election of a government. When that government is elected, Iraq will have a government designed and selected by Iraqis. It will be unique in Iraq’s history and will send a powerful message about democracy to other countries in the region.
7. Dissolving the Coalition authority, which will follow naturally on the heels of the election. The coalition authority will then yield the remainder of its authority to a now sovereign Iraq.  

There can be no greater certainty that Bremer, the CPA, and the Bush administration viewed elections as the final step in democratization. Such thinking, as we know, can be a major obstacle to achieving democracy. Additionally, there is no mention in this list of fostering a politically informed civil society, or strong rule of law, characteristics necessary for a functional and successful democracy. Furthermore, Bremer failed to clear this list with the State Department, Defense Department, or the White House, all of which were very concerned with the possibility of a long occupation and promptly instructed Bremer to drop his plans and focus on a rapid transfer to sovereignty: the new deadline for transfer of sovereignty was to be no later than June 30, 2004. This deadline conveniently preceded the upcoming mid-term elections that coming November in the United States, where the administration itself would be tested. Bush wanted a victory, and he viewed the transition of governance from the CPA to Iraq as signifying freedom and democracy for Iraq. We know that this was not in fact the case. It is evident that the United States exhibited an insufficient time commitment to the construction of a functional democracy from the start in favor of a quick and easy “victory.”

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164 Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Sayej, The Iraq Papers, 193
In November of 2003, the CPA began its work on Iraq’s interim constitution, as designated in step four of Bremer’s plan, which would later be known as the Transitional Administrative Law, or TAL when it was officially issued on March 8, 2004. This was the step in the CPA’s timeline, however, that would prove to be Bremer’s undoing. Although the CPA claimed that it would consult with the IGC on all matters, the drafting process of the interim constitution was secretive, and ill-managed: the CPA appointed a small group of US officials and academics and two Iraqi-American jurists to write TAL, which was first drafted in English and only later translated to Arabic when it became necessary to share some of the provisions with the IGC. TAL specified a series of rights, organized state institutions, and established federal relations between the capital and the regions, most importantly recognizing a measure of autonomy for the Kurds while “reserving control of fiscal, defense, and foreign policy for Baghdad.” While the constitution attempted to centralize the provisional government in a construction of liberal democracy, the initial organization of the IGC (based on ethno-religious identity) would undermine the government as votes and decisions broke down along sectarian lines. The vast majority of Iraq’s political class, including Dawa, the Sadrist movement, the Iraqiya alliance, and the Iraqi Islamic Party, were not given a voice in the IGC. The constitution advocated for federalism based on fundamentalism, not on legitimate geographical areas. This process ultimately robbed legitimacy and authenticity of government from the Iraqi people, sowing seeds of contention and protest early on.

Bremer must have been aware of the discontent of the Iraqis, however, as the day before the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people, he issued CPA order 17, which gave

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165 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” March 8, 2004
166 Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, 79
167 Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sánchez, and Sayej, The Iraq Papers, 203
168 Al-Ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future, 101
immunity to all external actors involved in the attempted democratization of Iraq. Section two goes as far as to explicitly state: “Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi legal process,” thus excluding the offending parties from Iraq’s rule of law. The United States created a safeguard to avoid responsibility for the mess it had caused. On June 28, 2004, having accomplished only four of Bremer’s seven goals, the CPA was succeeded by the collaborating interim Iraqi government, headed by Ayad Allawi, a secularized Shiite. The transfer of power was conducted in secret, as the Bush administration feared a violent reaction from the Iraqi people if the ceremony had been in public. While the United States had caused a civil war in Iraq due to its occupation, resulting in increasing levels of violence, instability, and division, the Iraqis were left alone to ratify a permanent constitution and elect a new government in the hopes of achieving democracy. Bush’s invasion of Iraq aggravated the country’s already-existing Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization, such as its absence of democratic experience and divided society, as well as creating even more obstacles by sabotaging any efforts to construct a democratic government as evidenced by the United States’ insufficient time commitment in Iraq, its exacerbation of violence through militarized democratization, and its failure to view democracy as more than an election.

The Aftermath of the CPA: Evaluating Democracy in Iraq

This final section of the Iraq case evaluates “Operation Iraqi Freedom” after the transfer of power from the CPA to the Iraqi people. It applies the Universal Characteristics of Democracy, as identified previously in the theoretical section and discussed in the Haiti case, to the failed state of democratization in Iraq. As we will see, Iraq’s lack of alignment with the

169 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17, June 27, 2004.
*Universal Characteristics of Democracy* signifies the United States’ failure to successfully democratize Iraq. The Bush administration (much like the Clinton administration did in its Haiti intervention) viewed elections as the final step in the creation of a democracy, when in fact Iraq was far from achieving a democratic government. From the very beginning, the creation of Iraq’s constitution sabotaged its prospects for democracy—because the Iraqi people were not given full control over their constitution, it cannot be seen as legitimate. Additionally, the Iraqi people did not fully control the construction of their new government, minimizing the potential for strong political leadership, legitimately representational parties, or stable democratic institutions. Furthermore, with the dissolution and rapid re-creation of the Iraqi Army, the state did not have a reliable control of force, contributing to the insurgency. Accordingly, the insurgency and civil war then inhibited sustained freedom of expression and civil society organization and participation in the new “democracy” due to the brutal violence it created. Iraq is a sobering reminder that elections, while an important part of democracy, are not enough to constitute a successful democratization effort. It is unfortunately clear that the majority of the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy* were not met long-term in Iraq, in no small way due to the Bush administration and CPA’s total failure to construct lasting democratic institutions that reflected a nuanced understanding of Iraq’s unique political, social, and economic history.

While the majority of the analysis of the CPA’s actions occurred in the previous section, the magnitude of its impact must also be considered. Therefore, this section will look at the years following its exit from Iraq (2004—2006) to assess why, based on the identified *Universal Characteristics of Democracy*, the Bush administration failed to achieve its goal of democratizing Iraq. While the CPA passed the torch to the Iraqis in June of 2004, there are
lingering legacies of destruction that arise not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole. As we will see, the Bush administration’s early optimism regarding democracy Iraq was not viable. Iraq held its first election after the CPA had left the country on January 30 2005 for drafting the constitution, accompanied by provincial elections and the election of the regional parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan. 11 months later, Iraq held a legislative election on December 15 2005. These elections reflected a clear pattern of ethno-sectarian preference—the Sunnis boycotted the first election entirely, and the Shia and Kurds voted along ethno-religious lines, indicating the CPA’s divisive construction of the government.170 Due to the construction of the IGC and the constitution itself, this pattern of sectarian preference remained consistent in the years following the CPA’s exit from Iraq, and as none of the three major ethno-religious groups had a majority in the government, Iraq’s elected members would constantly have to work across sectarian lines in order to get anything done.171 These patterns reaffirm the lack of legitimacy and stability at the very core of Iraq’s new government: its constitution.

In the elections that occurred in December of 2005, Iraq elected al-Jaffari as Prime Minister—this appointment, however, would not last long. The U.S. was unhappy with this turn of events due to his close cooperation with Iran, his growing unpopularity with the Iraqi people, and his failure to crack down on sectarian militias. Thus the Bush administration turned its attention to Nouri al-Maliki.172 In May of 2006, the Bush administration backed Maliki and he was elected the Prime Minister of Iraq. The United States would eventually regret supporting Maliki so fiercely as after 2006, he slowly built a shadow state that circumvented both the

existing governing elite and democratic oversight of the exercise of power.\textsuperscript{173} He placed his office at the center of state power, reducing the ability of the cabinet and parliament to influence policy—thus becoming more and more like an autocrat, and thus Iraq diminished as a democracy. He even placed his family members within the ranks of his party—the Dawa party. He appointed his son, Ahmed Maliki, as deputy chief of staff, giving him oversight across all of Iraq’s security services. Continuing his path towards autocracy, Maliki used a renewed de-Baathification as a means of disqualifying political opponents.\textsuperscript{174} Iraq’s new government was repeating the actions of Hussein’s regime that had decimated the ability for civil society to participate in a democratic process, or for legitimate political parties to exist in the political sphere. Furthermore, while Iraq’s government was descending into corruption, the rest of the state was caught up in a seemingly endless civil war, contributing to a loss of basic freedoms of person, inclusive citizenship, and the rule of law. While elections are a universally agreed-upon method for implementing democracy (not to mention one of the identified \textit{Universal Characteristics of Democracy} for a democratic government to truly function, there is a need for a wider set of democratic values, principles, and characteristics than the U.S. planned for in Iraq’s fledgling “democracy.”

Iraq’s civil society organizations also suffered at the hands of the CPA, which had focused almost exclusively on Baghdad (the center of Iraq’s oil production) while it ignored the rest of Iraq’s provinces. Because of this focus on Baghdad and oil, the majority of Iraq was not equally represented in its central government as it should have been in order for liberal democracy to function successfully. Accordingly, a more authentic grassroots experience of democracy through the provincial governorates was diluted and channeled through existing

\textsuperscript{173} Dodge, “State and Society in Iraq,” 245.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
power structures created by the CPA in Baghdad, limiting a large number of citizens’ ability to participate politically.\textsuperscript{175} While USAID sponsored some programs of engagement in civil organizations in the Provincial Governorates in the outer regions, they were not integrated into, nor had been allowed to influence, the top-level policy in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{176} Furthermore, the majority of the USAID programs were being tasked with a strict neo-liberal economic agenda of privatization at any cost in order to capitalize on oil, a sign of misdirected international funding that actually worked to inhibit Iraq’s development of democracy.\textsuperscript{177} Given this poor integration and communication between Baghdad, the International Zone of Baghdad otherwise known as “The Green Zone,” and the rest of the country, there was a clear lack of inclusive citizenship with the full ability to participate present during the United States’ occupation of Iraq. Worse still, the violence (not only in Iraq, but also in the region as a whole) and civil war that followed the invasion made it all the more difficult for Iraqi citizens to attain basic freedoms of person, let alone the ability to participate in their new government.\textsuperscript{178}

Iraq’s control of force and stability were also greatly strained due to the violence of the insurgency and subsequent civil war. The invasion had incapacitated Iraq’s infrastructure, while Bremer’s CPA had eliminated a large portion of Iraq’s existing political infrastructure. This deadly combination, instead of clearing the way for democracy as the Bush administration had hoped, only inhibited Iraq’s democratization prospects. After the CPA exited Iraq, the people’s resentment over the continuing weakness of state institutions and the state’s inability to deliver

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\textsuperscript{175} Jeff Bridoux and Malcolm Russell. "Liberal Democracy Promotion in Iraq: A Model for the Middle East and North Africa?" \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis} 9 No. 3(2013): 330.  \\
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{177} Treasury Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Moving the Iraqi Economy From Recovery to Sustainable Growth,” May 2003.  \\
\textsuperscript{178} As we now know, this violence contributed directly to Iraq’s contemporary instability, and the rise of militant extremist groups such as ISIS. For further discussion on this topic, see Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” \textit{The Washington Post}, April 4, 2015.
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even the most basic services only served to exacerbate the perception of widespread corruption, ineffectuality, and illegitimacy of government in Iraq. According to research conducted at Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, up to 700,000 people had been killed between the invasion and 2006 alone.\(^{179}\) The total cost of damage done to Iraq is generally considered to be around $12 billion, but from 2003—2011, the US government spent approximately $61.11 billion attempting to rebuild civil and military institutions in the state.\(^{180}\) Conditions were so bad, that in 2011 the UN estimated that only 26 percent of the population was covered by the public sewage network, and only 25 percent had access to safe drinking water.\(^{181}\) Iraq’s government, plagued by its weak institutions and damaged infrastructure further inhibited its control of force, its democratic leadership, and due to the violence from the insurgency, its basic freedoms of person.

In attempting to construct a liberal democracy with the semblance of ethno-religious based federalism, the United States failed to account for the fact that Iraq lacked a majority of the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy*, including basic freedoms of person, the creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution, inclusive citizenship with the ability to participate politically, control of force and strong political leadership by an elected official, stability of democratic institutions, a functional and legitimate party system, justice, and rule of law. Even Robert Gates, who replaced Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006 and was assigned to the Iraq Study Group, recognized the errors of implementation that essentially ensured the failure of militarized democratization. In his memoir he states that “we had simply no idea how broken Iraq was before the war—economically, socially, culturally, politically, in its infrastructure, the education system, you name it,” which returns to the idea that not only was the Bush administration’s implementation of democracy misguided, but that Iraq itself also faced structural obstacles to

\(^{179}\) Dodge, “State and Society in Iraq,” 254.
\(^{180}\) Ibid, 255.
\(^{181}\) Ibid, 258.
democracy it could not overcome.\textsuperscript{182} Given the CPA’s destruction of established political institutions, its failure to include key societal groups, and its lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people due to a top-down implementation strategy, it seems clear that Bush’s ideals of militarized democracy were incompatible in Iraq in their design, as well as in their implementation.

In light of the Bush administration’s misunderstandings of Iraq’s historical context, the destruction of Iraq’s existing political institutions, and the CPA’s complete failure to successfully implement democratic policies on the ground in Iraq, it is clear that this democratization project failed. In an exchange between Condoleezza Rice and President Bush on the day of the CPA’s transfer of power to Iraq (June 28 2004), Rice wrote: “Mr. President, Iraq is sovereign. Letter was passed from Bremer at 10:26 a.m. Iraq time.” In response, Bush declared: “Let Freedom Reign!”\textsuperscript{183} We now know that the foolish optimism of this exchange would not ring true. In the years following the CPA’s transfer of power back to the Iraqi people, the necessary characteristics for a successful and legitimate democracy were not met. Bush’s version of militarized democratization was never compatible with the creation of legitimate democracy in Iraq to begin with. Thus, it cannot be contested that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” brought neither freedom nor democracy to Iraq.

IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY MAKERS

CONCLUSION

Through a careful examination and analysis of the United States’ democratization efforts in Haiti and Iraq in 1994 and 2003, this thesis demonstrates that due to an inadequate understanding of democracy, poor assessments of each country’s historical, political, and social contexts as they relate to democratization, and various obstacles to democracy, the Clinton and Bush administrations failed to successfully democratize Haiti and Iraq. The United States assumed it could impose a liberal democracy upon the existing conditions in Haiti and Iraq, failing to account for implicit, internal characteristics that were unfavorable to democracy itself. Furthermore, despite the obstacles to democracy encountered in each country, the Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that exporting democracy would not only be easy, but that it would be welcomed in each country. Finally, US policy makers viewed constructing elections in each country as equivalent to democracy, revealing a lack of understanding of the fundamental characteristics of democracy. Together, these cases suggest that the very practice of exporting democracy through military intervention alone cannot lead to sustainable democracy.

While many studies of democratization have been attempted by scholars in the field to understand how and why democracies flourish or fail, the research conducted for this project is distinct in that it relied on prominent democracy scholars to provide identifiable characteristics of democracy and then utilized these characteristics to analyze the military invasions and subsequent democratization attempts through military interventions in Haiti and Iraq. This was done in order to ask the question of where and why U.S. democracy planners went wrong in their efforts to export democracy to Haiti and Iraq. With the exception of Arend Lijphart, all of the
democratization scholars consulted (chosen due to their significance in the field and frequency of
citation) showed a commitment to liberal, individual democracies characterized by free, fair and
frequent elections, basic freedoms and expressions of person, the creation of a lasting and
legitimate constitution, an autonomous civil society, legitimate political parties, and the rule of
law, to name a few.

Utilizing multiple sources to gain a complete understanding of democracy, I developed
three categories against which I analyzed the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti
and Iraq: *Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy, Universal Characteristics of
Democracy, and Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization. Internal Characteristics
Associated with Democracy* contains characteristics implicit to a country’s unique social,
political, and economic contexts. It recognizes each country’s existing conditions and how these
conditions can affect differently the possibilities for, as well as the obstacles to, democratization
that result from these traits. This category’s associated characteristics are:

**INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY:**
Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)
Homogenous society (Dahl)
Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)
Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)
Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)
Urbanization levels (Lipset)
Education levels (Lipset)
Economic success (Lipset)
Strength of civil society (Putnam)

*Universal Characteristics of Democracy* is derived from the qualifications for democracy that
rely on democratic scholars’ understanding of democracy as independent from how it relates to a
certain country. The characteristics associated with this category are based on an external,
Western model of what a liberal democracy should look like, as well as on the consensus that
lasting democratic institutions are necessary for a lasting and functional democracy. This category’s characteristics are:

**Universal Characteristics of Democracy**
Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)
Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)
Alternative sources of information (Dahl)
Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)
Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)
Strong political leadership (Huntington)
Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)
Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)
Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)
Legitimate political parties (Lipset)
Justice and rule of law (Lipset)
Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria)

Finally, the category *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* contains characteristics that are based in combination on a country’s existing conditions, as well as on universal characteristics that would be harmful to any democracy around the world. The characteristics are not simply the opposites of what we desire in a democracy, they are obstacles that democracy planners must account for, work to mitigate, and anticipate. This category’s characteristics are:

**Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization**
Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)
Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)
Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)
Poverty (Huntington)
Lack of stability (Huntington)
Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)
Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)
Militarized democratization (Zakaria)
Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)
Misdirected international funding (Carothers)
Together, these three categories and the characteristics distinguished in each one, help us to understand more clearly why the United States’ democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq ended in failure.

The Clinton administration ultimately failed to democratize Haiti due to an insufficient time commitment to rebuilding key institutions, a lack of economic development in Haiti during and after the intervention, and a misunderstanding of the requirements of a successful and stable democracy. Before the intervention, Haiti contained almost none of the *Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy*. Due to Haiti’s political past of violent coups and corrupt dictators, Haiti neither developed a democratic political culture, nor did its government achieve legitimacy in the eyes of Haiti’s citizens. Additionally, Haiti, as the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere, did not have the economic characteristics associated with successful democracies. Haiti’s poverty contributed to its low levels of education and urbanization, neither of which were optimal for democratization in 1994 when the United States intervened. The *Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization* that the United States faced were numerous as well: by placing economic embargoes on Haiti, the Clinton administration exacerbated Haiti’s levels of poverty, violence, and disease, thus contributing to the refugee crisis. When the decision was finally made to pursue democratization in Haiti, the Clinton administration, due to domestic pressures, designed a mission that was insufficient in time and scope for the creation of lasting democratic institutions. It viewed conducting elections as the final step in democratization, ignoring other important aspects of democracy. Finally, when evaluating Haiti’s democracy by the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy*, in the aftermath of the intervention, we find that Haiti’s lack of security and control of force inhibited civil society’s freedom of expression and ability to participate politically. Furthermore, its absence of a functioning justice system made rule of law
extremely difficult, undermining the strength of Haiti’s Constitution. The Haiti case demonstrates that while the Clinton administration constructed opportunities for elections, created programs for reforming the security forces, and funneled money into reviving Haiti’s economy, it poorly assessed Haiti’s underlying political, economic, and social contexts, fundamentally misunderstood the necessary characteristics required for a stable and legitimate democracy, and effectively abandoned Haiti before democracy could be sustained.

Due to an inadequate understanding of political, economic, and social contexts in Iraq, a misguided implementation strategy, and a disregard for the hastily constructed democratic institutions in the state itself, the Bush administration again failed to successfully export democracy to Iraq. Like Haiti, Iraq did not contain many of the Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy prior to the United States’ invasion. Its autocratic governments traditionally flattened any civil society organizations or political participation deemed a threat to the existing regime, signifying a lack of democratic culture and legitimacy of government in the eyes of Iraq’s people. While Iraq’s economy had fared better than Haiti’s due to its oil resources, the economic sanctions placed on the country in light of the Gulf War eventually decimated its economy and contributed to Iraq’s levels of poverty, starvation, and violence. Iraq also has a divided society, which is significant for the study of democratization as sectarian tension further inhibits democracy. Furthermore, Bush created and faced various Obstacles to Democracy and Democratization in Iraq, most of which were due to his administration’s misconceptions of Iraq as well as to the damaging actions of the CPA. Bush’s view of Iraq as the catalyst for his plans to democratize the Middle East failed to acknowledge Iraq’s unique social, political, and economic contexts, thus contributing to the poor planning of democratization after the invasion. The CPA’s actions de-legitimized the Iraqi government, increased divides within
society, dramatically increased the levels of violence within the state, and viewed elections as the end-all be-all in its democratization efforts. The CPA failed to achieve a nuanced understanding of democracy and its requirements. Finally, in the aftermath of the CPA, Iraq cannot be categorized as having achieved a functional, stable, and legitimate democracy when analyzed according to the *Universal Characteristics of Democracy*. The Iraqi people did not truly control their democratization process or the construction of their constitution, and therefore the government was not seen as legitimate. This lack of legitimacy coupled with sectarian conflict contributed to the instability and violence within the state. Additionally, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army left a security vacuum and aggravated the insurgency. Due to the violence and instability it exacerbated, the ensuing civil war then inhibited freedom of expression and political participation. The Iraq case demonstrates that while the Bush administration removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, created a new Constitution, and constructed opportunities for democratic elections, the administration’s ineffectual knowledge of Iraq’s historical context coupled with the United States’ militaristic destruction of the country’s existing institutions only led to an unstable, illegitimate, and ultimately unsuccessful new government.

**Comparative Understandings of Haiti and Iraq**

Now that we have achieved an understanding of the Haiti and Iraq cases as they relate to the identified characteristics of democracy, engaging in a comparison between the two allows us to consider militarized democratization as a tool of U.S. foreign policy in a larger sense. We can ask the question: after comparing failed U.S. democratization attempts in Haiti and Iraq, what insights on democracy and militarized democratization can we now take away? On the surface, the Haiti and Iraq appear to have very little in common: they are different geographically,
economically, politically, socially, and religiously. Together, however, they represent two U.S. democratization efforts that functioned as the foreign policy centerpieces for Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in a post-Cold War world. Their comparison is useful if we are to further contextualize and understand why each state’s U.S.-instigated, fledgling democracies eventually collapsed. After delving into the intricacies of these interventions, and their ensuing failures in chapters two and three, we can now look at the distinct and important ways in which the two cases are similar, and the ways in which they are not, and why both administrations failed in their attempts to export democratic change militarily.

Both cases were marked by harsh economic sanctions, military engagement, the dismantling of key institutions, and the assumption that through the conduction of elections, democracy would flourish in both Haiti and Iraq. Before each democratization effort, the United States, in concert with the United Nations, placed economic sanctions and embargoes on Haiti and Iraq that ended up crippling each state’s economy, as well as aggravating the humanitarian crises (levels of poverty, violence, famine, and disease) that were already considered severe. The Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that through these policies, the Cédras and Hussein regimes would simply comply with the United States’ demands. We now know that these calculations proved devastating not to the elite members of the regimes as they were intended, but to the ranks of the middle and lower classes within each state, as well as to the state’s economic, transit, and communications infrastructures. Thus, before even attempting to create institutions of democratic governance, the United States damaged Haiti and Iraq so severely that it negatively impacted the democratization efforts post-invasion. Furthermore, during both Clinton and Bush’s pre-invasion planning, both administrations assumed that invading Haiti and Iraq on the basis of democratization would not only be welcomed, but that it would be a
relatively easy endeavor. Democracies, however, require more than fifteen months to build. Thus, despite the Clinton and Bush administration’s rhetorical commitments to democracy in Haiti and Iraq, each administration’s policy makers designed a mission that was insufficient in time and scope, setting up the trappings of democracy in each country, but failing to create and strengthen the key institutions and practices necessary for a successful, legitimate, and stable government.

The Clinton and Bush administrations approached the construction of democracy in Haiti and Iraq with the assumption that by the simple removal or addition of institutions, leaders, and organizations, democratization would smoothly run its course. On one hand, this is evidenced by Clinton’s treatment of Aristide as the primary solution to democracy in Haiti, and on the other hand, through Bush’s treatment of Saddam and his regime as the fundamental obstacle to democracy in Haiti. While the addition and subtraction of core political leaders did indeed influence the development of each country’s governance, viewing Aristide and Hussein in this absolute way prevented the other important characteristics of democracy, such as civil society’s right to associational autonomy, basic freedoms of person, legitimate political parties, rule of law, or control of force by an elected official, to be fully realized. For example, both administrations enacted policy measures that destroyed aspects of Haiti and Iraq’s existing security forces, which ultimately led to the populations of each state facing daily violence, a general instability of state and government, and the inability by citizens to fully participate in the democratic process. Iraq, as we know, had its institutions stripped by the CPA in a way that more severely damaged its democratization prospects than the actions taken by the UN coalition in Haiti.
Finally, the most distinct and important way in which the U.S. democratization efforts in Haiti and Iraq reflect similar failures of military intervention is the notion that for each attempt, the Clinton and Bush administrations assumed that with the advent of elections, democracy had been achieved. We now know, however, that the characteristics of a successful democracy extend far beyond constructing free, fair, and frequent elections. That is not to say that elections are not vital in a democratic society, but that other characteristics of democratic governance (a vibrant civil society, personal freedom and liberty, a legitimate and lasting constitution, strong political leadership and control of force, and legitimate political parties) are of equal importance as well. It is easy to define democracy through an election, because elections are relatively easy to measure. However, when policy makers prioritize elections over every other aspect of democracy, attempts at democratization will not be successful in the long-term. As we also noted in these cases, there were U.S. domestic election concerns that truncated democratization efforts in Haiti and Iraq, and thus sped up the timetable for democratic elections in each country. When timelines for democratization efforts are shortened, it is seen by our democratization scholars as an obstacle to democracy. Presidents Bush and Clinton declared democracy and freedom in Haiti and Iraq upon the conduction of elections in part because they needed to show the world (and their constituencies) that the United States had won itself a victory.

While the similarities between these two failed democratization efforts reveal important patterns for future policy makers, should the United States again attempt to democratize a foreign country, it is necessary to illuminate the ways in which these two cases are different as well. First and foremost, Clinton’s invasion of Haiti exhibited multilateral engagement with the approval of the United Nations, whereas Bush’s invasion of Iraq was only supported largely by the United States itself, and secondarily by Britain—it is an example of unilateral action seen in
Bush’s preemptive national security strategy. While neither of these cases were completely supported by the world or by the United States, this international context is important to consider because it can lend or detract legitimacy from the military engagement, and if we can recall, legitimacy is universally considered an important characteristic of democracy.

Additionally, the conditions in each country prior to invasion were different. Iraq, for example, is divided along sectarian lines in a way that Haiti is not. Haiti, however, had a poor economic situation even before the United States placed embargoes on the state whereas Iraq’s economic status pre-sanctions was relatively strong. It is critical to remember and acknowledge these differences, because although these cases allow for a powerful comparison of the mistakes made by US policy makers in their democratization efforts, the results of each attempt are not exactly the same. Treating them as such would diminish the unique conditions and structural limitations in Haiti and Iraq that impacted each country’s failure to democratize. It is evident, however, that neither “Operation Uphold Democracy” nor “Operation Iraqi Freedom” established democracy in Haiti and Iraq.

As we have seen, between the U.S. policy makers’ mistakes throughout “Operation Uphold Democracy” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in Haiti and Iraq, we can draw important conclusions about the nature of democratization attempts through the use of military intervention after the end of the Cold War. It remains apparent that if policy makers do not pay attention to the internal and external characteristics necessary for a sustainable democracy, and the obstacles to democratization that occur along the way, we cannot expect future military endeavors to be successful. While this thesis focuses on examining explicit failures in the United States’ post-Cold War history of promoting and exporting democracy around the world, it does not suggest that we rule out supporting democratizing initiatives entirely. It does contend, however, that we
must examine carefully the ways in which we must modify our democratization practices if the U.S. hopes to promote democratization abroad. Yes, the Haiti and Iraq cases demonstrate that militarized democratization alone is not viable. Nevertheless, these cases do not signify that other forms of support for democracy should be ruled out. To identify which forms of support would lead to successful democratization, however, requires further research. One thing remains clear: if democratization is to occur successfully, it will not be on the back of a tank.
### Appendix 1: Analytic Categories and Their Criteria

| Internal Characteristics Associated with Democracy | - Democratic belief and political culture (Dahl)  
- Homogenous society (Dahl)  
- Market economy (Dahl, Huntington)  
- Legitimacy in the eyes of each member of society (Linz and Stepan)  
- Supportive democratic culture (Linz and Stepan, Lipset)  
- Urbanization levels (Lipset)  
- Education levels (Lipset)  
- Economic success (Lipset)  
- Strength of civil society (Putnam) |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Universal Characteristics of Democracy | - Free, fair, and frequent elections (Dahl)  
- Sustained freedom of expression (Dahl)  
- Alternative sources of information (Dahl)  
- Inclusive citizenship with ability to participate politically (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
- Creation of a legitimate and lasting constitution (Dahl)  
- Control of force by an elected official (Dahl, Huntington)  
- Strong political leadership (Huntington)  
- Legitimacy and stability of government (Lipset, Linz and Stepan)  
- Civil Society’s right to associational autonomy (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
- Basic freedoms of person (Dahl, Linz and Stepan)  
- Representational party system (Huntington, Schumpeter)  
- Legitimate political parties (Lipset)  
- Justice and rule of law (Lipset)  
- Liberal Constitutionalism (Zakaria) |
| Obstacles to Democracy and Democratisation | - Absence of democratic experience (Huntington)  
- Leaders of authoritarian regimes (Huntington)  
- Divided society (Dahl, Huntington)  
- Poverty (Huntington)  
- Lack of stability (Huntington)  
- Levels of violence within the state (Huntington)  
- Viewing the election as the final step in democratization (Zakaria)  
- Militarized democratization (Zakaria)  
- Insufficient time commitment to growth of democratic institutions (Whitehead)  
- Misdirected international funding (Carothers) |
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